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POST-SOVIET JEWRY AT MID-DECADE — PART TWO

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Jewish Welfare Activity / Indigenous Jewish Voluntary Organizations / Outside Organizations: The Jewish Agency / The Joint Distribution Committee / The Liaison Office and Other Organizations / Common Problems of Outside Organizations / Toward the Year 2000

[Editor's Note: Dr. Betsy Gidwitz, an Overseer of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, shares with us here the second part of a two-part report on the present and future prospects for post-Soviet Jewry. Part One appeared as JL 309 on 15 February 1995.]

Jewish Welfare Activity

With 35 percent of the Jewish population considered elderly and perhaps 70 percent of these seniors dependent on pensions that are not adjusted to reflect rampant inflation, care of Jewish elderly has become a major concern of local Jews and international Jewish organizations. The need for geriatric services will only increase as younger age cohorts continue to emigrate, leaving behind older members of the Jewish population who lack the psychological or physical strength to begin new lives in another society. Many demographers predict that two-thirds of the entire post-Soviet Jewish population will be elderly by the end of the century, a proportion already reached in smaller Jewish population centers as younger Jews have migrated elsewhere in search of greater opportunities.

Jewish elderly in the post-Soviet successor states tend to be in weaker condition than their counterparts in the Western diaspora and Israel. Lingering effects of World War II (deprivation, general hardship, trauma), continuing poor nutrition, ineffective medical and dental care, inadequate housing, and various tensions have extracted a significant toll on their well-being.

Many aged reside in ill-maintained dwellings, some in communal apartments in which individuals and families live in single rooms and share common kitchen and bathroom facilities. Numerous seniors are effectively imprisoned in flats on upper floors in buildings without elevators. Although some have strong support systems of family members and friendly neighbors, many elderly live in isolation, often hungry and fearful.

The collapse of the pharmaceutical industry in the successor states — which was never a priority under the Soviet regime — has only exacerbated already dire conditions. The elderly may be able to afford food or medications, but rarely both.

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Medicines commonly available in the West, such as aspirin and insulin, may be accessible only on the black market at exorbitant prices or through sympathizers abroad who know what is needed and have been able to develop conduits for its delivery to appropriate agents in the successor states. So grievous is the situation that admission to hospitals in many areas is now contingent upon the ability of a prospective patient to provide his or her own medications.

Currently spending over $4 million on welfare operations (over 40 percent of its post-Soviet area budget), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has developed a sophisticated program in partnership with local Jewish welfare societies that assists elderly Jews in 120 cities. It has trained paraprofessional social workers and volunteers to deliver home-care services such as home management (cooking, shopping, etc.), hygienic care, and repair of home appliances, and has arranged for home visits by physicians and nurses. It assists local Jewish welfare societies in operating senior adult day care centers, hotlines, meals programs, socializing opportunities, and services supplying medical equipment, such as wheelchairs and walkers.

The needs of Jewish elderly are so acute and so visible that few other vulnerable Jewish population groups, such as the developmentally disabled or dysfunctional families, have received Jewish-sponsored assistance. A modest program in computer training for unemployed Jews has been initiated in Kiev, but few communities have the capacity to deliver the type of aid provided by Jewish vocational services, Jewish family and children's services, and other agencies in American Jewish communities.

Indigenous Jewish Voluntary Organizations

With no tradition of voluntary communal service, local Jewish activists attempting to organize indigenous Jewish community structures are encountering numerous difficulties. Despite their pretensions, few contemporary activists are capable of leadership, that is, of attracting and retaining constituencies. Individual initiative, civil debate, tolerance of differing political and spiritual views, consensus-building, planning and priority-setting, and accountability are attitudes and skills notably lacking in the experience of most post-Soviet Jews. Having never participated in or even observed a functional voluntary community organization, they are unable to develop a vision of what they purport to construct.

Many indigenous organizations are small, narrowly focused, and fragile. They may not survive the emigration of their presidents, few of whom are capable of even contemplating how to ensure an organized and peaceful transfer of power. Furthermore, even the best groups have encountered difficulty in developing a stable funding base. Many post-Soviet Jews are so assimilated that a sense of obligation to the Jewish community is entirely alien; *tzedakah* is an unfamiliar concept even to those who do identify as Jews. Many organizations lack financial reporting mechanisms, the governments of several post-Soviet successor states are so starved for revenues that they have imposed heavy taxes on charitable contributions, and some groups find it easier to approach Western Jewish organizations for support instead of trying to build a local funding base, a process that requires knowledge and skills yet undeveloped.

Some activists have established Jewish umbrella organizations on a municipal or national scale, attempting to develop councils or federations that are broadly representative of all Jews in the community. Only a few such efforts have succeeded; the would-be constituent agencies are too weak to work collaboratively with other groups, and the presumed leadership of the umbrella organization lacks the experience, vision, and skills to lead weak and disparate groups toward a common goal. To some degree, the Joint Distribution Committee and other institutions in the organized Western Jewish community have provoked the failure of these ventures as they have encouraged and/or supported their formation prematurely. Nascent post-Soviet organizations require time to mature, to generate leadership with a broad, encompassing vision and with the skills to transform that vision into a functional corporate entity. Too many would-be leaders of umbrella associations lack experience in the field and the respect of those whom they purport to represent. Western Jewish organizations have found the claims of post-Soviet umbrella groups so seductive — after all, it is easier to interact with one large association promising that it is representative than it is to develop relations with many smaller groups — that they have accorded credibility to empty shells.

Outside Organizations: The Jewish Agency

A number of international Jewish organizations are active in the post-Soviet successor states. Acting in some ways as a veritable army of occupation within post-Soviet Jewish population centers, they provide services normally offered by indigenous Jews themselves in other diaspora countries. Together, they will

spend about $40 million within the successor states in 1995 and millions more in related programs in Israel and, to a much lesser extent, in other countries.

The Jewish Agency for Israel enjoys the broadest reach, yet its goals and objectives are the most clearly defined of any of these agencies. Its overarching priority is to encourage aliyah (immigration to Israel), and a second priority — promoting Jewish and Zionist identification — reinforces the first. JAFI provides the infrastructure for effecting aliyah, including the arrangement of departure flights through 16 different exit stations. It promotes aliyah through various programs such as Hebrew instruction in 200 ulpans throughout the successor states, approximately 100 Zionist-oriented youth groups (some in partnership with Israeli youth movements), 90 summer camps and 14 winter camps for adolescents, seminars for students, teacher-training programs reaching 600 instructors, and leadership training for youth groups.

The JAFI Naaleh 16 program brings about 2,000 adolescents to Israel each year for residential school programs, the first step in facilitating aliyah for young people whose parents are not ready to emigrate. A program entitled Aliyah 2000 recruits post-Soviet Jews still in the successor states for specific jobs and housing in Israel, thus alleviating fears among potential olim about earning a livelihood in the Jewish state.

The JAFI agenda in the successor states is implemented by more than 100 Israelis working in about 30 post-Soviet cities, each with a Jewish population exceeding 10,000. Local Jews who have completed JAFI training courses are employed by the Agency in smaller Jewish population centers.

The Jewish Agency and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee concluded a memorandum of understanding in 1994 that defines the responsibilities of each and provides for ongoing consultation to promote cooperation and minimize the possibility of turf conflicts. The likelihood of strife between the two groups is reduced by their generally complementary agendas and by the reality that the major leadership and funding source of both is the UJA-Federation system, a governance group whose interest in a distinct division of responsibilities among its beneficiaries is clear.

Despite the strongly focused agenda of the Jewish Agency, its post-Soviet operations are costly and in jeopardy from budgetary pressures. Stagnant Federation fundraising campaigns and the tendency of some Federations to retain greater proportions of campaign revenue for local use and thus allocate less to UJA are almost certain to force major cutbacks in the 1995 JAFI program.

The Joint Distribution Committee

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC; Joint) is also dependent upon the UJA-Federation system for funding. Re-entering the Soviet Union in 1988 at the invitation of then President Mikhail Gorbachev after having been expelled from the USSR some 50 years previously, JDC is pursuing two broad goals — rekindling Jewish identification among post-Soviet Jews, and attending to the welfare needs of vulnerable Jewish population groups, especially the disproportionately large number of Jewish elderly. Within those very encompassing objectives, JDC operates a multitude of programs in welfare (39 percent of its post-Soviet area budget), Jewish education (22 percent), community organization (14 percent), Jewish religious activity (13 percent), and Jewish culture (12 percent). Under separate budgetary provisions, the organization also funds two additional programs: assisting local Jewish groups attempting to reclaim Jewish communal property seized by the regime during the Soviet period and, continuing a practice initiated during the Cold War years, subsidizing the operations of the Israel government's Liaison Office, currently at a dollar amount equivalent to the JDC post-Soviet welfare budget.

JDC employs 15 field workers within the post-Soviet Union, maintaining a staffed operational base in 11 different cities and reaching more than 100 additional Jewish population centers through regular staff visits and a series of seminars and workshops attracting local Jews engaged in specific JDC program fields. It frequently engages specialists from Israel on short-term assignments to assist communities in implementing or reviewing various programs.

Its emphases on welfare operations and community organization give JDC a distinctly different focus than that of the strongly aliyah-centered Jewish Agency and Liaison Office. Whereas few would challenge the merits of service provision to Jewish elderly, the community organization segment of JDC activity has been more controversial. It could be argued that such programs — in leadership training, infrastructure development, and facilities acquisition — foster unrealistic expectations about renewal of Jewish communal life in countries of political instability and Jewish demographic decline. Furthermore, attempts to rebuild Jewish communities in the former USSR deny the Zionist mission of ingathering Jews (especially those from "countries of distress") in Israel. JDC responds that

its education programs are Zionist-oriented, that some Jews will remain in the successor states for at least a generation, and that JDC service delivery to the remaining vulnerable Jewish population groups requires an infrastructure for implementation.

Given the breadth of its post-Soviet area agenda, JDC might appear to resemble a North American Jewish federation on an international scale. It shares a contemporary planning dilemma with many such federations, that is, how to balance the "competing" demands of traditional welfare programs with the newer emphasis on Jewish continuity and education programs. Unlike the serious deliberations currently occupying many federations, however, JDC seems to eschew an earnest debate on priorities and is permitting budgetary concerns to drive its planning process.

The Liaison Office and Other Organizations

Established in the 1950s to develop and manage Israeli government policy concerning the Jewish population of the then Soviet Union, the Liaison Office (*Lishkat Hakesher*) is responsible to the Office of the Prime Minister of the State of Israel. So secretive that it was long known only as "the office without a name," its current director is often introduced as "an expert on Soviet Jews" without further attribution. If the extraordinary subterfuge appears exaggerated, it should be remembered that: (1) the enduring antisemitism of Russia and neighboring countries has long been a critical component of the collective memory of Israeli leadership, most of which is of Russian Jewish origin; (2) Israel has steadfastly perceived (post-) Soviet Jewry as its greatest potential source of aliyah; (3) until its collapse some 40 years after the State of Israel was born, the Soviet Union opposed the Jewish state in the public arena, armed its enemies, and trained many of the terrorists who plagued it; and (4) the territory of the (former) Soviet Union lies but a few hundred miles north of Israel.

Its secrecy aside, the formal name of the institution, its provenance in the highest levels of the Israeli government, and the identification of its leadership have long been known to activists in the (post-) Soviet Jewry support movement. Throughout the Soviet period, emissaries of the Office persisted in efforts to gather information about Soviet Jews and to smuggle Russian-language Judaica books and other materials to Jews in the USSR. Some of this activity was subsidized quietly by the Joint Distribution Committee. Concurrently, the Liaison Office attempted to control both Israeli and diaspora-based advocacy organizations, often in a crude manner, suggesting strongly that only the "office without a name" knew what was best for Soviet Jews.

Glasnost and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union have enabled the Liaison Office to operate publicly in the former USSR. Its most visible efforts are concentrated in the management of Israel Culture Centers (or Israel Information and Culture Centers) in 18 post-Soviet cities and in formal Jewish education. The Centers feature Russian-language Jewish-interest libraries, computers programmed with information about Israel, Hebrew ulpans, and Zionist-focused social and cultural programs for different age groups.

The Liaison Office educational enterprise includes sponsorship of 12 day schools under its Maavar program and 130 Sunday schools under its Mechina program, all in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Education. Supervision of such a vast undertaking has proven difficult, resulting in schools of varying quality and program emphases, including one Maavar day school in Ukraine with local anti-Zionist Jews among its senior faculty.

In some post-Soviet cities, emissaries of the Liaison Office and the Jewish Agency have achieved a modus vivendi, operating Hebrew ulpans in different areas and holding joint commemorations of Israel Independence Day and other events. Too often, however, they are at loggerheads, implementing competing programs and engaging in public rivalries that have not gone unnoticed by local (non-Jewish) newspapers. An Israel-based coordinating committee meets to assign various responsibilities and attempts to eliminate program duplication, but it has not always been successful. Even some of its victories are dubious; an agreement for formal Jewish education to be the province of the Liaison Office and informal education to be the domain of JAFI creates a needless gap between the two related elements of Jewish identity-building. Further, the resulting involvement of the Israeli Ministry of Education (a natural government partner of the Liaison Office) in formal Jewish education outside Israel seems less appropriate than would be the commitment of the Jewish Agency Joint Authority for Jewish Zionist Education, which specializes in diaspora Jewish education. An additional complication in interagency relations is that the Joint Distribution Committee continues to subsidize Liaison Office operations, currently providing approximately one-third of the latter's budget. JDC avers that its aid to the Office enables the latter to maintain a significant presence and programs in the successor states, a reality that may be of critical importance should political developments in a yet unstable

atmosphere force other agencies to suspend their activities.

Much more so than the Jewish Agency, its Zionist "competitor," the Liaison Office is seen as confrontational and conflict-prone in its post-Soviet operations. Many of its emissaries are poorly trained, some seem ill-suited by temperament for work in politically sensitive circumstances, and a substantial number appear anti-religious and hostile to efforts to promote Judaism in the successor states. (A Liaison Office-promoted 1994 International Conference on Orthodox Religious Activities in the Commonwealth of Independent States, a Jerusalem event officially sponsored by the Office of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel and the Israel Ministry of Religious Affairs, has done little to improve the Office's image in this area. It is likely that the Office would be more successful in earning the goodwill of religious figures and organizations if it encouraged respect toward Jewish tradition among its emissaries in the former Soviet Union.)

A prisoner of its history as a creation of the Cold War, the Liaison Office has yet to define its post-Soviet mission and to remove from its ranks those who are incapable of post-Soviet thinking. As long as it remains a semi-secret state agency without popular accountability, it is unlikely that the Office will initiate the transforming process that will permit it to be a fully constructive force among the Jewish population in the post-Soviet successor states.

In addition to large agencies with numerous staff positioned in the former USSR, a number of small non-indigenous Jewish organizations are also active in assisting post-Soviet Jews. The Aleph Society, a U.S.-based group affiliated with Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz of Israel, focuses on Jewish education. The Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture also operates a number of Jewish educational programs, including a computer-education project in cooperation with ORT. Various Jewish foundations sponsor specific welfare and community-building activities. Some Western diaspora Jewish communities have developed sister-city relationships with post-Soviet Jewish communities, providing welfare assistance and initiating various exchanges.

Common Problems of Outside Organizations

Whatever their agendas, these outside organizations encounter common problems in the post-Soviet successor states. The absence of qualified local Jewish communal professionals — such as community organizers, social workers, rabbis and other religious functionaries, educators, and youth workers — means that post-Soviet Jewry lacks enablers familiar with local culture and circumstances. Most large organizations import Israelis of Russian origin to manage their programs, but difficult living conditions and salaries that do not keep pace with inflation often hinder the enlistment of qualified personnel. Furthermore, a return of the expatriate to the native land sometimes recalls Soviet behavior patterns, such as exploiting agency resources to advance one's own economic gain, that many organizations understandably find objectionable. Despite screening procedures and training programs in Israel, each of the three largest agencies — JAFI, JDC, and the Liaison Office — has experienced serious personnel failures in the successor states, sometimes leading to recall and subsequent dismissal of representatives.

Even those individuals fully professional in outlook and methodology are thrust into situations for which they are ill-prepared, such as negotiating leases in a post-communist society without a legal system. Emissaries operate in conditions of political and economic instability, ethnic turmoil, immature government institutions, widespread corruption, serious crime, environmental degradation, and recurring shortages of essential commodities such as fuel and basic medications. Such circumstances force many representatives to leave their families behind in Israel, a situation hardly conducive to their own psychological well-being or to family life, and eventually expensive and disruptive to agency agendas as emissaries must be permitted to return to Israel with some frequency in order to maintain family ties. Only the ultra-Orthodox religious functionaries seem to possess the sense of mission that encourages a long-term presence with accompanying family members.

Recognizing the urgency of the personnel problem, several agencies have developed programs to train local Jews as paraprofessional communal workers. Both JAFI and JDC have sponsored numerous workshops and seminars in the successor states and in Israel to educate local individuals in specific fields. JDC has recently opened a St. Petersburg-based institute for Jewish communal and welfare personnel that will train local workers from throughout the former Soviet Union. The Progressive and Masorti movements also operate short-term training programs and, in common with Habad, are building for the future by developing native rabbis and educators.

Post-Soviet Jewry will require time to develop a culture of lay leadership. Many Jews are too consumed with the pressures of daily life to consider volunteering. Indeed, the concept of volunteering reminds many of

the forced labor they were required to undertake even during the later Soviet period when enormous workplace and social pressures compelled individuals to relinquish leisure time for "voluntary work days."

Educated in the tradition of *agitprop* (agitation and propaganda), many of those who do come forward as activists employ a style of communication that is tendentious and florid. Their only role models may be party bosses who achieved compromise through coercion and claimed consensus when none existed. Their inexperience has deprived them of insight and vision. The development of leadership skills will occur in tandem with the development of behavior patterns appropriate for participation in a democratic society with a free-market economy that honors individual initiative and accomplishment as well as personal and social responsibility. In the interim, many local Jews barely conceal their resentment at the visibility and respect earned by Israeli and diaspora agencies, the "foreign army" that they perceive to be occupying their land.

Whether lay or professional, experience has shown that many of the most dedicated Jews emigrate, in part because their Jewish experience in the successor states convinces them that Jewish commitment might be better expressed elsewhere. Many Jews completing training courses offered by one or another Jewish organization leave shortly thereafter, thus limiting the benefit that their newly acquired knowledge may bring to local Jewish communities. The Jewish Agency, whose mission is to encourage aliyah, can hardly be disappointed that so many veterans of JAFI training courses for Hebrew teachers make aliyah, but their departures disrupt local ulpans and force JAFI to offer even more training courses.

Inflation, which is particularly rampant in Ukraine, frustrates planning and destroys budgets, endangering numerous operations. Appropriate communal facilities are difficult to find and increasingly expensive to remodel and maintain. Transportation remains a nightmare in many areas, with unsafe roads, frequent fuel shortages, crime-ridden trains, and meaningless airline timetables.

Toward the Year 2000

The five years until the beginning of the new century may be crucial to the future of Jewish life in the post-Soviet successor states. Continuing emigration of younger Jews will further diminish the Jewish birth rate, which even now is far below replacement rate. The exodus of the young combined with the assimilation and aging of those who remain portend a significant demographic decline, perhaps reducing the post-Soviet Jewish population by half before the end of the century. Those staying behind will be the elderly and the assimilated — and assimilated Jews are unlikely to build and lead a Jewish infrastructure that will provide services to elderly Jews or educate any younger Jews who remain.

Few experienced observers of post-Soviet Jewry perceive a long-term future for a Jewish community in the former Soviet Union. The demographic statistics are too foreboding and the chaos of post-Soviet life too inhospitable to Jewish communal life. Only those with a personal stake in the maintenance of a significant Jewish population in the former USSR (such as indigenous Jews aspiring to leadership positions in a local Jewish setting) promote a vision of a self-sustaining and vibrant post-Soviet Jewish future. More thoughtful individuals suggest that JDC should be prepared to transfer more of its resources toward welfare operations, extending assistance to an elderly population without a local support base. JDC operations in the post-Soviet successor states will soon resemble its activity in central and east European countries, overwhelmingly committed to caring for remnant older Jewish populations. Acknowledging the diminishing aliyah pool, leading professionals in the Jewish Agency for Israel are discussing a scaling back of JAFI operations in the post-Soviet successor states by the end of the century.

Until the year 2000, Zionist organizations and various educational programs will intensify their activities, hoping to instill in as many children and younger people as possible a strong sense of Jewish identity and Zionist commitment. As these individuals leave the successor states, it is hoped that their Jewish and Israel-focused experiences will facilitate a smooth absorption in Israel.

A related issue is the absorption process in Israel itself. Clearly, a perception that Israel is more welcoming and agreeable will do much to alleviate the unease that many post-Soviet Jews feel about leaving a familiar land for one that is unknown. Employment opportunities for middle-aged immigrant professionals, reforms in the Israeli housing industry, new approaches to schooling for adolescent immigrants, and support of efforts by independent organizations to facilitate absorption are avenues that must be pursued if post-Soviet Jews are to feel confident in their decision to renew their lives in Israel.

Post-Soviet Jewry poses three challenges to Israel

and to Western diaspora Jewry at mid-decade. First, efforts now underway to build Jewish identity and Zionist commitment of those Jews still in the former Soviet Union must be continued and expanded in the immediate future. Representatives of organizations working with post-Soviet Jews believe that their current collective efforts reach only 15 to 20 percent of Jews in the successor states. Second, energy now directed at developing a service delivery system to assist Jewish elderly who will remain in the successor states must also be sustained and increased. Finally, absorption efforts in Israel deserve renewed attention.

Because post-Soviet Jewry cannot be expected to support itself, the commitment of world Jewry is essential during the next five years. Yet much of Western diaspora Jewry appears to have withdrawn into a cocoon of domestic Jewish continuity issues and local welfare problems, reducing allocations to the national and international agencies that work with post-Soviet Jewry. If Jews really believe that all Jews are responsible for each other, a more appropriate course is to perceive Jewish continuity and welfare as a seamless web reaching across continents and over oceans, connecting and reinforcing concern for Jews everywhere.

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★ ★ ★ NEW BOOKS FROM THE JERUSALEM CENTER ★ ★ ★

Israel at the Polls, 1992

Edited by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler

Israel at the Polls, 1992 is the fifth book in the "Israel at the Polls" series begun in 1977 with the "upset" in the Israeli elections that brought down the Labor government which had ruled in Israel since the founding of the state. In the 1992 elections Labor returned as the ruling party and this book looks at the question of whether those elections mark the beginning of a new era in Israeli politics. Thirteen essays evaluate the downfall of Likud and the "national" camp, the major and minor parties, and the Israeli Arab and ex-Soviet Jewish vote, as well as the impact of the elections on foreign policy, the Israeli army, the economy, the style of the media campaign, and the role of interest groups. Special chapters focus on Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's personality and style of leadership and review the first year and a half of the Rabin government.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield and JCPA, 1995, 359 pp.

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Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel: Biblical Foundations and Jewish Expressions

Volume 1 of The Covenant Tradition in Politics

Daniel J. Elazar

The covenants of the Bible are the founding covenants of Western civilization. They have their beginnings in the need to establish clear and binding relationships between God and humans and among humans. These relationships are primarily political in character in that they were designed to establish lines of authority, distributions of power, and systems of law. This first volume of a trilogy addresses political uses of the idea of covenant, the tradition that has adhered to that idea, and the political arrangements that flow from it. The volume represents an in-depth exploration of biblical sources of the covenant tradition, its development in Scripture, and subsequently in Jewish history and thought. It traces the interconnections between ideas, culture, and behavior as well as between peoples and generations. Among the topics covered are covenant as a political concept, the Bible as a political commentary, the post-biblical tradition, medieval covenant theory, and Jewish political culture.

New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press, 1994, 536pp.; $49.95

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Federal Systems of the World: A Handbook of Federal, Confederal and Autonomy Arrangements

Second Edition, Revised and Expanded

Written and Edited by Daniel J. Elazar and the JCPA Staff

Of the over 180 politically sovereign states now in existence, 50 are either federations or include within them forms of self-determination and self-government which represent extensions of the federal principle or applications of the idea of political autonomy. The previous edition of this handbook (1991) represented the first major effort to inventory and describe all known examples of federal and autonomous arrangements, compare their basic features, and classify them by form. This fully updated edition documents the extensive changes in the state system in recent years, including the dramatic events in the former USSR, Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the European Community/Union.

Longman Current Affairs (UK), 1994, 380 pages.