Iran and the U.S. Edge Toward a Deal as Economic Pressure Mounts

Tehran Is Finalizing a Response, Not an Agreement

Iran is finalizing its response to the American comments on the plan it presented in New York. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the response would be conveyed through intermediaries and that “Iran welcomes diplomacy”, provided that the proposals presented to it are realistic.

That condition allows Tehran to remain engaged in the process without committing to accepting the American proposal. If its response is rejected, Iran will be able to argue that it did not walk away from the talks, but rather received a proposal that failed to meet its basic requirements.

U.S. President Donald Trump also appears interested in keeping the door open. According to an Iranian report based on remarks he made at a campaign speech in Ohio, Trump said that Iran “wants a deal, but does not know how to get there”. He also claimed that the United States may have gone too far in targeting the Iranian leadership.

The remarks were not published in a complete official American transcript, so their precise wording should be treated with caution. Politically, however, they give both sides a way to reach an agreement without admitting that they changed course. Trump could argue that military pressure forced Iran to seek a deal; Tehran could argue that the United States realized the escalation had gone too far and was forced to return to the diplomatic track.

The problem remains the sequence of implementation. An analysis published in Donya-e Eqtesad argued that Washington had accepted some of Iran’s seven conditions, but not the timetable Tehran is demanding. This is not an official version of the American response, but an analysis based in part on comments by a former diplomat. It nevertheless provides a plausible picture of the dispute.

According to the analysis, Iran is demanding an easing of the naval blockade, the removal of restrictions on oil exports, the release of frozen assets, and an end to the fighting before it reopens the Strait of Hormuz. The United States is prepared to discuss some of these measures, but wants to tie them to progress on the nuclear file and to Iranian actions that can be verified and measured.

Tehran does not want to give up its leverage over Hormuz and then wait for something in return. Washington does not want to ease economic and military pressure before seeing a change in Iranian behavior. Even if there is agreement on the overall objective, each side still wants the other to take the first risk.

The Nuclear Issue Is Once Again the Test for Any Relief

No new operational change in the nuclear program was announced this morning. There has been no announcement of a reduction in enrichment levels, a reduction in uranium stockpiles, the suspension of centrifuge operations, or expanded access for inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The development is diplomatic: according to analyses published in Tehran, the United States wants any significant easing of the blockade and sanctions to be linked to an Iranian step on the nuclear issue. From Washington’s perspective, a general assurance that Iran’s nuclear activities are intended for civilian purposes is not enough. It wants a mechanism that can be monitored.

Iran, for its part, is unwilling to return to square one. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said the country “is not running away from the negotiating table”, but made clear that its demands include lifting the naval blockade, ending the fighting on all fronts, releasing assets, and removing the new sanctions.

According to Baghaei, concerns over the nuclear program remain the Americans’ main demand. This means the sides are no longer arguing over whether the nuclear issue will be part of an agreement, but over where it will appear in the sequence of steps and how much Iran will be required to do before receiving anything in return.

The reformist camp is proposing a simpler deal. Veteran politician Behzad Nabavi called for separating Hormuz from the nuclear file, focusing on an arrangement of inspections in exchange for sanctions relief, and giving China a role as guarantor. This is not the government’s position, but it reflects concern that attempting to resolve every issue at once will turn every maritime incident into a reason to halt the talks.

A Fourth Vessel Is Hit, but Once Again Details Are “Missing”

A report emerged this morning of another vessel being hit in the Strait of Hormuz. According to Etemad Online, citing IRNA and a statement attributed to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, an unidentified projectile struck a tanker and damaged it.

The vessel’s name, the condition of its crew, the extent of the damage, and the identity of the attacker were not reported. The report described it as the fourth vessel to be hit since the previous day, but the original alert could not be found on the British center’s public website. It is therefore more accurate to treat this as an indirect institutional report that still lacks full confirmation.

The uncertainty surrounding the attacks is beginning to generate debate inside Iran. Nabavi claimed that President Masoud Pezeshkian had previously expressed anger to military commanders following attacks on vessels and that the commanders responded that they had received no orders and were not involved.

There is no official confirmation that such a conversation took place, so it is impossible to know whether it occurred as described. The fact that the claim was raised in the reformist press points to a broader concern: the government itself may not know with certainty who is responsible for every action in the strait, or it may be unable to convince the public and intermediaries that there is no connection between the talks and the maritime escalation.

Baghaei rejected the claim that Iran had created the incidents in the strait to build negotiating leverage. According to him, the insecurity stems from the war and the American blockade.

That denial does not separate Hormuz from the negotiations. Even if Iran is not initiating every attack, it continues to demand American concessions as a condition for restoring security and returning to normal traffic. For shipping companies, who started it is not the only consideration. They need to know whether a vessel can make the passage, how much it will cost to insure it, and how likely the crew is to become caught up in another incident.

Pezeshkian and the Conservatives Are Already Arguing Over the Victory Narrative

Kayhan portrayed Trump as begging for an end to the war and argued that attempts to move oil through the United Arab Emirates would not solve the American problem. The newspaper also called for the creation of an “economic war council”.

The headlines are not a reliable source for assessing the military or economic situation. They matter because they set a political test for the government: any agreement must look like an American surrender to Iranian pressure. If the United States accepts some of Iran’s conditions, conservatives will demand that this be presented as proof that the war succeeded. If Iran is required to take the first step, they may portray it as a dangerous concession.

Pezeshkian therefore has to conduct two conversations. With Washington, he needs to demonstrate that Iran can provide commitments that can be measured. Within the system in Tehran, he needs to prove that he did not give up Hormuz, enrichment, or other assets before receiving something in return.

The dispute is not only about the terms of the agreement. It is also about who gets to tell the public why the agreement was signed and who won on the way there.

Factories Have Been Below the Growth Line for 11 Months

The most important economic figure on October 13, 2026, came from the industrial Purchasing Managers’ Index. The index stood at 48.5 points in September and remained below the 50-point threshold for the 11th consecutive month.

The Purchasing Managers’ Index is based on managers’ responses regarding production, orders, inventories, employment, and delivery times. A reading above 50 generally indicates an expansion in activity, while a reading below 50 indicates contraction. One weak month can result from a temporary shock. A run of 11 months already points to a prolonged industrial recession.

According to the published data, raw material costs reached a seven-year high, input inventories are low, and exports are contracting. Factories’ expectations for the following month also remained below 50.

Weak demand prevents manufacturers from raising prices at the same pace as their costs are increasing. A factory that pays more for raw materials but cannot pass the full increase on to customers absorbs the difference in its profit margins. Eventually, it reduces inventory, postpones investment, cuts shifts, or delays payments to suppliers.

Iran’s economy is not collapsing. Factories are still operating, markets are open, and the government continues to pay at least some salaries and subsidies. A recession looks different: fewer raw materials, fewer orders, and less disposable money every month. The erosion takes place long before a factory closes its gates.

Pezeshkian himself acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and said the economy poses a more serious threat than the military challenge. He called on the system to stop pushing people away from public service and to focus on its ability to provide them with solutions. This amounts to an acknowledgment that the state’s survival is not enough if the public does not have access to jobs, food, and basic services.

The Dollar Falls, but the Money Supply Keeps Rising

The currency market saw some relief. The free-market dollar fell 0.7 percent to 262,700 tomans, its lowest level in ten days. It was the third consecutive day of declines.

The drop was attributed to increased supply from the market maker and caution among traders as diplomatic contacts continued. It could slow price increases in the short term and ease some of the demand for gold and foreign currency.

The figure alone does not change the direction of the economy. The dollar exchange rate can respond quickly to an injection of foreign currency or a rumor about an agreement. A factory cannot replenish the inventory, credit, and orders it lost during months of uncertainty at the same speed.

Liquidity figures also provide a warning sign. Liquidity, meaning the amount of money and liquid deposits in the economy, increased by about 1.3 percent in September and by about 51 percent compared with the previous year. When the amount of money grows rapidly while production contracts, inflationary pressure does not disappear because of three days of declines in the dollar exchange rate.

40 Million Visits, Half a Million Registrations

The program to increase credit for food purchases encountered problems even before the funds were distributed. An adviser to the Planning and Budget Organization said that about 40 million visits had been recorded on the website created to collect household information. The load caused outages, and the government is considering extending the registration period.

The same official acknowledged that he did not have precise information about the timing of payments, funding sources, or implementation stages. The state has already asked millions of households to access the system, but it still cannot tell them when they will receive the assistance or how much money has been allocated to the program.

The communications minister reported that more than 500,000 people completed registration within a day using a valid postal code. This figure does not contradict the 40 million visits. The first refers to all visits to the website, including repeated attempts, while the second refers to completed registrations.

The gap between the figures illustrates the bottleneck. A person may access the website repeatedly without completing the process, particularly if the system crashes or fails to recognize the postal code. For the government, this is a technical malfunction. For a family waiting for food credit, every such day is part of the economic problem itself.

Aviation Restrictions Are Affecting Pharmacy Shelves

A spokesman for the Food and Drug Administration said the suspension of direct flights from India since the outbreak of the war has made it more difficult to import certain mental health medications. These include antidepressants from the tricyclic class, an older group of drugs used to treat depression and sometimes also neuropathic pain and other conditions.

According to the spokesman, the Indian side did not agree to transport the shipments on Iranian aircraft. No figures were published on the scale of the shortage, the names of all the affected medications, or the number of patients affected, so it cannot be described as a complete nationwide shortage.

The statement illustrates how aviation isolation affects even people who have no plans to leave Iran. A canceled route or a refusal to load cargo does not remain confined to the airport. Its effects reach the pharmacy and the patient who has to switch medications or search for the drug in another city.

With psychiatric medications, switching treatments is not always straightforward. Changing medication may require dosage adjustments and medical supervision, and abruptly stopping treatment can adversely affect some patients. As a result, even a limited shortage can place significant pressure on pharmacies and the healthcare system.

Even Before Winter, There Is Already Talk of Cutting Working Hours

An energy expert warned that at the height of winter Iran could face a daily gas shortage of 200 to 300 million cubic meters. This is an expert estimate, not an official government forecast, but the solutions he presented show which scenarios are already being discussed publicly.

The options mentioned include switching power plants to alternative fuels, reducing working hours, and managing consumption at the edges of the distribution network. Alternative fuels at power plants can reduce gas consumption, but they are sometimes more polluting. Reducing working hours saves energy, but also reduces output and income.

The energy crisis also affects the internet. According to figures published in the economic press, power outages took between 10 and 15 percent of operators’ telecommunications sites out of service during the previous year. Backup batteries deteriorated because of repeated charging cycles and were not always able to keep antennas operational.

The result is a cycle that makes it harder for the state to function precisely when it is moving services online. A power outage disables an antenna, the disruption affects internet access, and a government website intended for food assistance registration becomes even more difficult to use. Citizens are required to use a digital service to receive support while the infrastructure that allows them to connect remains unstable.

Protests Remain Local, but the Demands Remain Basic

No verified report of a new nationwide wave of protests was found this morning. HRANA reported that at least six gatherings took place the previous day, including demonstrations by retirees from the telecommunications company in Ahvaz, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Isfahan, and Khorramabad, as well as an online protest by workers dismissed from the Khavar textile factory.

Some of the events were also reported in local media, but the overall number comes from a human rights organization operating outside Iran. It should therefore not be regarded as a comprehensive nationwide count.

The demands concerned unpaid wages, health insurance, welfare rights, and dismissals. These are not protests centered on a single political slogan. Each group is asking the state to fulfill a different commitment it has already made.

The local and occupational nature of the protests allows the authorities to deal with each one separately and prevent it from developing into a broader movement. It does not indicate that the pressure has weakened. It shows that the crisis is appearing simultaneously in many places, through unpaid wages, more expensive medical care, lost jobs, and government assistance that has not arrived.

Desk Conclusion

The channel between Tehran and Washington is active, and the two sides are no longer limiting themselves to statements about a general willingness to talk. Iran is preparing a response, the United States is responding to its conditions, and intermediaries continue to carry messages.

The remaining distance to an agreement now lies in the sequence of actions. Tehran wants relief from the blockade, sanctions, and the freezing of assets before it reopens Hormuz. Washington wants to see a verifiable nuclear or security step before giving up its leverage.

While the two sides argue over who should act first, the Iranian economy continues to count the months. Industry has remained below the growth threshold for 11 months, liquidity has increased by about 51 percent in a year, and the food assistance system is struggling to turn tens of millions of visits into completed registrations.

The most important number this morning is not only the number of vessels that have been hit. It is also the industrial index reading of 48.5. Hormuz gives Iran leverage over the United States, but the condition of its factories determines how long it can continue using that leverage without receiving anything in return.