Summary
Rebranding a jihadist actor as a stabilizing authority does not eliminate extremism; it legitimizes it.
Western engagement with an Islamist-led authority in Syria, justified as a means to impose order, has instead resulted in continued violence, sectarian repression, and the empowerment of militias under the guise of state security.
U.S. policy, shaped by expediency and a narrow focus on suppressing ISIS, has tolerated Islamist governance despite predictable harm to civilians and minorities.
Regionally, trust in Western protection is eroding, with minorities increasingly looking to Israel as the only actor willing to confront Islamism directly.
Rebranding a jihadist does not neutralize jihadism; it normalizes it. The central justification for Western engagement with Ahmed al-Sharaa rests on a single claim: that he could deliver order where chaos reigned. This claim collapses under minimal examination, which raises the obvious question: did al-Jolani deliver order, or did he merely rebrand disorder?
Order implies predictability, protection of civilians, restraint of armed actors, and a monopoly over violence. What has unfolded instead is selective coercion, sectarian intimidation, and the empowerment of militias operating under a thin veneer of statehood.
Recent clashes with Kurdish forces, earlier massacres against Alawite and Druze communities, ongoing attacks on minorities, and the absence of any credible accountability mechanisms all demonstrate the same reality: violence has not been curtailed. It has merely been relabeled as “internal security operations.”
American policy did not drift here by accident. This reality followed a deliberate shift, publicly articulated and operationalized by Tom Barrack, the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria.
Barrack’s statements following clashes between Syrian security forces and the SDF made clear that Washington now views Kurdish forces as obsolete and an Islamist-led central authority as inevitable. The United States chose expediency over containment, signaling that as long as ISIS was nominally suppressed, the ideological character of those holding power no longer mattered.
From Washington’s vantage point, thousands of victims who have been mutilated, raped, humiliated, kidnapped, and murdered, are dismissed as collateral damage. Regionally, however, resentment is growing. The pattern is painfully familiar, echoing American failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.
History will judge American policy in Syria as a failure. The unresolved question is: who will be held accountable?
International law does not criminalize failed policy absent provable criminal intent. That is the shield behind which this strategy operates.
While criminal prosecution under international humanitarian law is unlikely, this does not mean there is no legal or moral framework for responsibility. In domestic systems, gross negligence and reckless disregard are recognized standards when foreseeable harm is ignored. International law, by contrast, remains profoundly underdeveloped when it comes to policy-level negligence, especially where powerful states are concerned.
Barrack cannot realistically be indicted—not because the harm is unclear, but because the law protects state actors from the consequences of foreseeably disastrous decisions. The result is a system in which intent matters more than outcome, power determines exposure, and victims are left without remedy. At a minimum, any serious inquiry into the consequences of this policy should lead to Barrack’s urgent dismissal.
The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad was necessary. His removal mattered for Syria and for the region.
But al-Jolani already existed. He was not created by Assad’s fall; he was groomed to take over in the name of preventing chaos. From a pragmatic perspective, this might have worked had al-Jolani been willing or able to contain jihadist forces.
Instead, one tyrant was removed while an Islamist was emboldened. The fact that this Islamist opposes ISIS does not mitigate the dangers of his ideology. While the United States welcomes al-Jolani’s role in limiting ISIS exports to the West, it appears largely indifferent to the cost inflicted within Syria’s borders.
Rather than containing, restraining, and pressuring Islamist forces at the moment of transition, the West legitimized them. Al-Jolani’s men were not disarmed or disciplined; they were unleashed. What could have been a moment of leverage became a moment of surrender.
Across the region, persecuted minorities are drawing conclusions. Kurds in northern Syria, Druze in Sweida, dissidents in Iran—many no longer look to Washington for protection. Increasingly, they look to Israel.
Israel now occupies a unique position. Quietly but unmistakably, it is seen as the only regional actor willing to confront Islamism without apology. This presents an opportunity: Israel could spearhead a genuine campaign against Islamist expansion. But it cannot do so alone. For that, it needs allies, above all in the United States, where credibility has been badly damaged by Syria’s abandonment, and in Europe as well.
Europe bears historic responsibility for Syria’s unraveling, through paralysis, moral relativism, and indulgence of Islamist actors in the name of “dialogue.” It now has a chance to atone.
How Europe responds to the Iranian regime and to Syria’s interim Islamist government will determine whether it remains a spectator or becomes a serious actor. A new coalition is needed: principled, security-minded, and unambiguous about Islamism.
Who in Europe is prepared to partner with Israel and act decisively, even at the cost of upsetting Erdoğan or severing diplomatic ties with the Iranian regime? Not the UK. Not France. And certainly not Spain.
Tom Barrack is not solving Syria. He is kicking the can down the road by deferring confrontation, externalizing risk, and calling delay “stability.” Syria is once again a reminder that problems cannot be undone by shoving them under the rug.
What is postponed today returns tomorrow: bloodier, broader, and harder to contain. Courts may never judge these decisions. History will.
