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Is The PLO-PA Using International Donor Funds to Finance “Pay-For-Slay”?

By shouldering the onus of paying the PLO-PA’s ostensibly legitimate employees, the EU removes that burden from the PLO-PA and allows it to use its remaining funds to pay the terror rewards.
Illustration: Economics of Pay-for-Slay
(AI-generated)

Table of Contents

Summary

The discussion examines the continuation of the Palestinian Authority and PLO policy commonly referred to as “Pay-for-Slay,” which provides payments to imprisoned terrorists, released prisoners, injured attackers, and families of deceased attackers. It argues that despite financial pressure and Israeli deductions of transferred tax revenues, these payments persisted in 2025. Historical agreements following the Oslo Accords are cited to show longstanding disputes over compliance, financial transparency, and misuse of international aid. The piece further claims that international donors, particularly the European Union, indirectly sustain the system by funding other Palestinian Authority expenditures.

Key Takeaways

  • The Palestinian Authority and PLO continued financial payments connected to terrorism in 2025 despite public claims that the policy had ended.
  • A major argument presented is that international aid indirectly enables these payments because outside donors cover other government expenses, freeing internal funds for terror-related payments.
  • Historical examples dating back to the 1990s are used to argue that donor funds and international financial mechanisms have repeatedly been connected, directly or indirectly, to these payment systems.

“Pay-for-Slay” is the policy implemented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to pay financial rewards to terrorists as a reward for their participation in terror. In general terms, “Pay-for-Slay” consists of two elements: Payments to terrorist prisoners and released prisoners, on the one hand, and payments to injured terrorists and the families of dead terrorists (aka martyr payments), on the other.

Recently, both Israel1 and the United States2 confirmed that in 2025, the PLO-PA continued terror reward payments to terrorist prisoners and for martyrs.

These confirmations are significant for several reasons.

First, because they expose the deceitful attempts of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to mislead the world.3 He pretended that, back in February 2025, in PA legislation, he had ordered an end to the payments.

No less importantly, the confirmation raises a serious question: Where did the PLO-PA get the money to pay the terror rewards?

According to PA financial reports, 65%-70% of the PA’s entire functional budget was funded by tax funds Israel agreed to collect and transfer as part of the Oslo Accords.4 However, since the October 7, 2023, massacre, these funds have been substantially depleted.

Israel has made deductions since 2019 under the “Freeze Law.”5 After the October 7 massacre, the Israeli Security Cabinet deducted an additional sum equal to what the PA transferred to Gaza. Since June 2025, Israel has also stopped transferring the remaining funds.6

Having had most of its financial source cut off, the question begs: Where did the PLO-PA get the money to continue rewarding terrorists?

History Repeats Itself

The answer is simple, albeit difficult for the PA’s donors – most importantly, the European Union – to accept.

The PA was established as a result of a series of agreements collectively known as the Oslo Accords. The collective term encompassed several major agreements, each adding another layer to the arrangements between Israel and the PLO.

The agreements started with the Declaration of Principles, signed in September 1993. That agreement was then followed by the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in April 1994, and the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, signed in May 1994. Soon after, pursuant to the agreements, Israel transferred control of designated parts of the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho to the control of the PLO. The next major agreement, the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was signed in September 1995.

While written agreements accumulated and Israel retreated from ever-expanding areas, another clear pattern emerged.

Despite having made concrete commitments, the PLO never saw itself as bound by them.

Thus, for example, a November 1995 report7 of the United States General Accounting Office to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations and the House of Representatives, already exposed what would soon be a consistent reality.

The report examined the PLO’s ability to support the PA, the new Palestinian governance body created by the accords.

Detailing estimated funding requirements, the report addressed, inter alia, three ostensible anomalies – one a governance issue, and the other two clear breaches of the agreements.

From a governance perspective, the report questioned why the PLO-PA mechanisms required the employment of 9,000 civil servants to replace the 1,600 employees of the Israeli civil administration.

More worryingly, the report questioned why the PLO-PA police force, which at the time was capped at 9,000 people, had already grown to over 18,000.  

Using International Donations to Fund “Pay-For-Slay”

The report referenced one international mechanism established to help the PLO-PA cover expenses. Of the trust funds set up for this purpose, the World Bank’s Holst Fund was the largest and served as a central repository for donors wishing to disburse pledges through the Bank.

The report notes that, despite being dedicated to other purposes, the PA violated its grant agreement with the World Bank by spending $2 million of Holst funds on martyr payments. As noted above, martyr payments are a foundational element of the PLO-PA “Pay-for-Slay” policy.

The use of international donations to fund “Pay-for-Slay,” again through World Bank mechanisms, occurred repeatedly.8

The EU Only Funds the PA Teachers

In theory, the EU restricts most of its direct aid to the PA for the purpose of delivering key public services, including the payment of teachers’, civil servants’, and healthcare workers’ salaries. By limiting the use of the EU funds for the payment of salaries to ostensibly legitimate employees, the EU is making its piecemeal effort to distance itself from funding “Pay-for-Slay.”

What the EU fails to recognize is that funding is fungible. By shouldering the onus of paying the PLO-PA’s ostensibly legitimate employees, the EU removes that burden from the PLO-PA and allows it to use its remaining funds to pay the terror rewards. Within that context, the EU also ignores the fact that it is the PLO-PA teachers who are the ones teaching the PLO-PA curriculum, which is recognized by the EU as antisemitic. Thus, while theoretically avoiding participation in “Pay-for-Slay,” the EU is merely funding the people who have brainwashed and indoctrinated generations of Palestinian to hate Israelis and seek their murder, and to hate Israel and seek its destruction.            

Either way, the reality is clear. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the PLO-PA has used, and continues to use, both directly and indirectly, international donor funds to finance its “Pay-for-Slay” policy.

* * *

Notes

FAQ
What is meant by “Pay-for-Slay”?
It refers to a policy framework in which financial payments are provided to imprisoned terrorists, released prisoners, injured attackers, and families of deceased attackers connected to acts of terrorism.
Why is international funding discussed in relation to these payments?
The argument presented is that foreign aid allocated to salaries and public services reduces financial pressure on the Palestinian Authority, allowing other available funds to be redirected toward terror-related payments.
What historical evidence is referenced to support the argument?
The discussion references reports from the 1990s, including findings related to the Oslo-era Palestinian Authority and the use of donor-linked funds, to argue that concerns about financial misuse and terror payments have existed for decades.

Lt.-Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch

Lt.-Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch served as Director of the Military Prosecution for Judea and Samaria. Since retiring from the IDF, Hirsch worked as the Head of Legal Strategies for Palestinian Media Watch, as a Senior Military Consultant for NGO Monitor, an advisor to the Ministry of Defense, and head of an advisory committee in the Ministry of Interior. Hirsch was the architect of the Israeli law that strips citizenship from Israeli terrorists who have been convicted for terror offenses, sentenced to a custodial sentence, and receive a payment from the Palestinian Authority as a reward for their acts of terror.
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