Summary
Naïm Qassem’s November 17 speech attacks new U.S.-backed Lebanese measures tightening oversight of money changers and non-bank financial institutions. These rules threaten Hizbullah’s financial lifelines: Iranian cash moved through exchange houses, Al-Qard Al-Hassan’s shadow-bank role serving its base, and covert commercial networks including front companies, smuggling, and growing crypto use.
Qassem frames compliance as collective punishment of Lebanese citizens, but the real issue is squeezing Hizbullah’s illicit funding system. Given Hizbullah’s history of using force when core infrastructure is threatened—most notably May 7, 2008—the piece warns that escalation to protect its financial apparatus cannot be ruled out.
In a speech on November 17, 2025, Hizbullah Secretary-General Naïm Qassem claimed that “days ago, a delegation from the U.S. Treasury was sent to tighten the noose financially on Hizbullah and on all Lebanese.” He followed this with a warning that sounded less like advice than a veiled threat: “I advise the government, the central bank governor and the relevant officials to halt the measures that are putting pressure on all Lebanese.”
What, exactly, was Qassem complaining about?
The Real Target of Qassem’s Anger
With Lebanon’s formal banking system largely paralyzed, vast sums of cash—especially U.S. dollars arriving from Iran—now circulate through non-bank financial channels, most notably money-exchange houses. These institutions, whether licensed or informal, are far harder to monitor than banks. They have therefore become pivotal to Hizbullah’s ability to move, store, and distribute funds outside state oversight.
Recent U.S. Treasury sanctions have targeted individuals and financial operatives accused of transferring anywhere from millions to over a billion dollars from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force to Hizbullah. According to U.S. findings, much of this flow runs through a network of licensed and unlicensed exchange companies. Washington has pressed the Central Bank of Lebanon to tighten control over these money-exchange houses, including forcing them to collect and report customer information for transactions exceeding a low threshold (around $1,000).
This is the tightening Qassem seeks to block. For Hizbullah, such regulation does not merely inconvenience an economic network—it threatens the arteries of its illicit cash supply.
Al-Qard Al-Hassan: A Shadow Bank at the Center
The U.S. Treasury’s focus has also fallen on Hizbullah’s Al-Qard Al-Hassan Association, which Washington designated as a terrorist entity in 2007 and has repeatedly sanctioned since. Al-Qard Al-Hassan functions as a quasi-bank: it provides interest-free loans and other financial services largely to Hizbullah’s Shi’a constituency, while operating outside the regulatory system of the Central Bank and beyond Lebanon’s formal banking sector.
With some forty branches across Lebanon, Al-Qard Al-Hassan was built to serve Hizbullah’s community while minimizing exposure to external scrutiny. Despite sanctions, Al-Qard officials have reportedly maintained “shadow accounts” in their own names or in the names of proxies at legitimate Lebanese banks. The method is simple and effective: money moves internally through Al-Qard channels, while external transactions pass through formal banks under proxy identities, obscuring the final beneficiary.
Legally, Al-Qard Al-Hassan is registered as a non-governmental organization, giving it a veneer of legitimacy. In practice, it performs core banking functions—loans, savings, transfers—entirely beyond state supervision.
Hizbullah’s Broader Financial Ecosystem
Hizbullah does not depend on a single pipeline. It embeds its financing in multiple layers of legitimate and illicit activity:
- Front companies and global commerce.
Hizbullah has cultivated complex networks of shell companies and changing corporate structures in sectors such as real estate, auto services, and trade. These companies appear lawful, enabling access to international markets and the formal financial system. Paperwork—invoice fraud, falsified bills of lading, and manipulated shipping records—helps conceal the true flow of money. - Criminal revenue streams.
Hizbullah has long been linked to narcotics trafficking (including Captagon), counterfeiting, and smuggling of gold and conflict minerals. These generate large quantities of cash that can later be laundered into Hizbullah-controlled channels. - Digital finance.
More recently, Hizbullah has explored digital avenues, using cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and stablecoins for fundraising, procurement, and laundering. These tools offer speed and partial anonymity, making cross-border transfers easier to layer and harder to trace than bulk cash smuggling.
This diversified structure forces regulators to fight on several fronts at once: chasing cash in an informal economy, unraveling shifting corporate networks across borders, and tracking millions of smaller digital transactions. Even strong states struggle with that burden; Lebanon, in crisis, is far less capable.
Why Pressure Is Rising Now
American agencies have pursued Hizbullah’s financial trail for years. But since the formation of the new Lebanese administration in January 2025, U.S. pressure has intensified. A recent Treasury delegation to Beirut has reportedly pushed for more aggressive implementation of compliance rules on non-bank financial institutions.
The Central Bank has responded with a circular lowering the threshold at which money changers, exchange bureaus, and transfer companies must record and report full customer details. Institutions are now required to keep extensive documentation and to report a far wider share of transactions.
For Hizbullah—whose operatives rely on trusted exchange-house networks to dodge sanctions—this is a serious escalation. The new rules sharply raise the risk of exposure for both personnel and cash routes.
Qassem’s Strategic Message
Against this backdrop, Qassem’s speech is not rhetorical bluster. It is a direct attempt to deter the Central Bank from implementing U.S.-backed regulations that endanger three pillars of Hizbullah’s internal power:
- Access to Iranian cash via exchange houses.
- Maintenance of its loyal social base through Al-Qard Al-Hassan services.
- The capacity of sanctioned operatives to conduct covert commercial transactions.
In short: compliance with U.S. directives is framed as an assault not just on Hizbullah, but on Lebanon itself. Qassem’s line is simple—tightening oversight equals economic warfare.
Hizbullah argues that these measures punish ordinary Lebanese who rely on cash transfers, remittances, and informal finance to survive. The group also presents the regulations as foreign interference designed to dismantle Hizbullah’s social and financial infrastructure. This narrative dovetails neatly with Hizbullah’s broader strategy of blaming the United States and Israel for Lebanon’s collapse, rallying domestic support through the language of sovereignty and resistance.
The May 7 Question
This leads to the central issue: is Qassem hinting at a repeat of May 7, 2008?
On that day, Hizbullah and its allies moved militarily into Beirut and surrounding areas after the Lebanese government took steps that Hizbullah interpreted as existential threats, chiefly its decision to challenge Hizbullah’s independent telecommunications network and to remove a security official at Beirut airport. Hizbullah’s swift takeover demonstrated both willingness and ability to use force internally when a core component of its power infrastructure was endangered.
Today, Hizbullah faces mounting pressure—regionally, internationally, and at home. If the group concludes that its financial lifeline is being strategically severed by state action under U.S. direction, the precedent of May 7, 2008, cannot be ignored.
Given the deep crisis Hizbullah confronts, the possibility of internal escalation, aimed at restoring deterrence and political centrality, cannot be entirely ruled out.
