Probing Republican Sentiment Toward Israel, Jews, and a Media Personality Candidacy

• We looked at attitudes of a sample of 561 Republicans, balanced for age and gender, with a +-4% margin with regards to a variety of issues.

• Our analysis split younger from older Republicans and gauged potential support for a Tucker Carlson candidacy as well as attitudes on a variety of foreign and domestic matters.

• We found generational differences, with greater levels of support for a Carlson national candidacy in the younger cohort.

• We also saw more traditional, conservative views in the older cohort on matters related to Greenland, Ukraine, and Israel.

• When it came to Christian slaughter in Africa, both age groups showed significant agreement as to its importance for them.

• Despite support for a Carlson candidacy, on Israel and Jews, both groups showed considerable support, although less so by the younger age group.

• Counterintuitively, results show a dissonance between willingness to support a candidate with isolated extreme positions (Carlson) and attitudes towards issues that the candidate supports but which the voting population opposes.

Whom Do Voters Support in Elections?

How do people with extreme views on certain subjects get elected?

This is a question that is being asked more often following the election of Zohran Mamdani as mayor of New York City. Does his election on a platform of “affordability” despite holding extreme anti-Israel positions mean that the issue of Israel is no longer politically relevant? Both in 2020 and more recently last year, we asked American Jews if they would vote for an anti-Israel “squad” member such as Rashida Tlaib or Ilhan Omar over a moderate pro-Israel Republican. In surveys conducted in 2020¹ as well in 2024,² the “squad” members received considerable support, despite their anti-Israel positions.

With the election of Mamdani, it appears that for voters on the left, the Israel issue may indeed not be as important as it may have been in the past. But what of the potential for anti-Israel (or even antisemitic) positions of candidates on the right of the political spectrum to also fade into irrelevance?

In a Manhattan Institute (MI) study conducted in December 2025,³ respondents were asked about the popularity of certain right-leaning public figures that included current office holders as well as several right-of-center media figures, including Tucker Carlson. Carlson, once considered mainstream but now seen as holding views that are clearly not supportive of Israel, has made statements that many consider antisemitic. What MI found was that, despite these views, he remains a highly popular figure, with 51% of “core republicans” viewing him favorably (see Figure 1).

We were interested in how this favorability translates into political strength. Furthermore, we were interested in learning more about the cognitive mechanisms that operate in individuals who perceive figures with extreme views in a positive light. In short, what is the common psychological denominator at work that allows a focus on certain less controversial issues of a potential candidate while ignoring a more explosive, controversial one?

Interestingly enough, MI defined a subgroup among Republicans, which they named “New Entrant GOP,” who they defined as “recent first-time GOP presidential voters, including those who supported Democrats in 2016 or 2020 or were too young to vote in cycles before 2020.” This group is not typical of traditional Republicans and may represent a different kind of Republican, one whose views do not match those of the previous generation. Indeed, the conclusions MI reached reflect this, as a meaningful minority of their sample (17%) meets their definition of anti-Jewish Republicans.⁴

This is a finding that others, such as a University of Maryland study⁵ have found as well. Even Israeli researchers, as reported by a Reichman University paper, find that “…young Republicans aligned with the core of the Trumpist movement are increasingly critical regarding Israel’s actions in the war against the Hamas terrorist group, in a shift that could harm the relations between the two countries in the future.”⁶

The implications of these trends are meaningful in that, as support for Israel weakens in traditional Democratic circles, such a loss among traditionally supportive Republican voters would potentially harm strategic Israeli interests.

Current Study

We chose to look at the popularity of Tucker Carlson as an indicator of sentiment among current Republicans. Our survey first asked respondents whether they felt Carlson is a potential candidate for national office. We then asked whether they would personally vote for him were he to run for national office. We also asked several other questions on general foreign policy issues and immigration to gauge the relationship between sentiment on a Carlson candidacy and those issues.

Our sample represented a balanced (age and gender) group of 561 respondents (+-4% margin of error) that were surveyed between January 21 and January 22, 2026.⁷

Results

The findings in our study are consistent with the MI study regarding popularity, with over 45% of our sample indicating a likelihood that Carlson will run for office and over 48% indicating a willingness to vote for him should he run. When breaking down results in terms of age groups, we see the under-44 age category showing a result over 55% with regard to the likelihood of Carlson running, with over 58% indicating they would likely vote for him. As expected and consistent with other studies, we see a striking difference between general results and results reflecting the younger age group. When we look at the 45+ age category, this trend becomes even more pronounced, with 38% (a full 17% lower than under 44) indicating a likelihood that Carlson will run for national office and 41% (versus 58% in the under 44 group, again a 17% difference) indicating a willingness to vote for him.

Interpreting the findings

On the face of it, the relatively solid number of Republicans willing to vote for a future run for national office by Tucker Carlson seems to confirm sentiment that would be consistent with the “Anti-Jewish Republican” group that MI describes. While a distinct portion of these potential voters certainly may fit in this category, our findings in the current study create other possible interpretations. In a nutshell, being in favor of a Tucker Carlson candidacy did not necessarily translate into anti-Israel or antisemitic sentiment (see Figure 6 below.)

What we found in our probe of sentiment on various policy issues is a consistent difference between the younger and older age cohorts of Republicans we surveyed on issues that included but were not limited to Israel. For example, on foreign policy issues, the sentiment toward Israel among the under-44 group was not significantly different from the sentiment on other issues.

We asked the following:

Questions 3 to 6 (rated on a 5-point scale of “extremely important” to “not important at all”)

3. How important is it for Republicans to support action, including military action, to control Greenland?

4. How important is it for Republicans to support Ukraine?

5. How important is it for Republicans to support Israel?

6. How important for you is news of Christians being slaughtered and enslaved by jihadists in Africa?

We saw a consistent trend of mid-range feelings of “extremely important” or “very important” on all foreign policy issues. On the issue of taking control of Greenland, the difference was 51% for under-44 versus 45% for over-45. Regarding support for Ukraine, 58% of the under-44 group indicated it was either “extremely” or “very” important versus 45% of the 45+ group. When asked about Christians being slaughtered by jihadists in Africa, 69% of the under-44 group felt it either “extremely” or “very” important versus 78% of the 45+ group. This represents a unique issue where both age groups appear committed to the importance of the issue, although less for the younger group, consistent with other issues probed.

This relative age group agreement is somewhat less pronounced with regards to sentiment towards Israel, with 55% of the under-44 group indicating support is “extremely” or “very” important versus 69% of the 45+ group. Again, while the gap between age groups is substantial, the level among younger Republicans is like their attitudes towards other issues related to support for non-American actors and does not show any specific negative view related distinctly to Israel. Moreover, the levels of support (even higher when adding in the category of “somewhat important”) clearly are not consistent with the policy attitude of Carlson, despite the willingness to vote for him.

We then asked three separate question probing agreement with sentiment that certain groups (immigrants, Muslims and Jews) pose a danger to “the American way of life.”

Questions 7 to 9 (rated on a 5-point scale of “a great deal” to “none at all”):

7. How much do you believe that immigrants are a danger to the American “way of life”?

8. How much do you believe that Muslims are a danger to the American “way of life”?

9. How much do you believe that Jews are a danger to the American “way of life”?

With regards to immigrants in general and Muslims, we did not see a substantial difference between the age groups (67-73% under-44 to 45+ for immigrants and 70-74% for Muslims) agreeing that there is at least a “moderate” danger. When it came to Jews, while both age groups should significantly lower levels of sentiment agreeing with the danger they pose, the under-44 group did show substantially higher levels of concern (45%) than did the 45+ group (23%). While the difference between age groups is pronounced, so is the difference within the under-44 group between Jews and others, with Jews being rated significantly less of a danger than others.

The Bottom Line: Putting This All Together

What we see here is a “good news”- “bad news” scenario with regard to Israel and Jews. The good news is that while younger Republicans have attitudes less sympathetic to Israel or Jews than their older counterparts, this lower sympathy is not a standout statistic, but rather consistent with their attitudes on other issues. In fact, their attitude towards Jews is significantly more positive than their attitude toward other groups, and their support of Israel is within the same range as their support of other foreign actors.

What is outstanding here, however, is the broad support for a Tucker Carlson candidacy that is present among all Republicans, especially the younger ones. As with the Mamdani candidacy in New York, the specific anti-Israel stance of the candidate does not deter potential voters from supporting the candidate. This dissonance is something that demands further inquiry that investigates the cognitive mechanisms that drive support of a candidate in the face of a unitary issue that is not supported by the voters. Is it that the more popular issues the candidate supports outweigh the negative weight of not supporting a less important issue (here, Israel)? Or is it a rationalization that minimizes the opposition to Israel that the candidate has?

Either of these reasons may be present, but what may be at play here is not an issue-specific phenomenon but rather a finding that is not different from other cases where democratic elections carry results different from what was expected. There is a well-documented tendency for voters to ignore negative aspects of candidates who have a broader appeal on a more overriding message they present. Voters often prioritize a candidate’s “overriding message” or overall persona over specific negative traits through several documented psychological mechanisms, such as “motivated reasoning⁸,” the “halo effect,”⁹ or the “likability heuristic.”¹⁰

Historically, we have seen instances of candidates who were elected in a democratic process for one set of ideas but then became proponents of less popular ideas once in power.¹¹ “Be careful what you wish for” is not only a principle for life in general, but apparently a rule that can be applied to political campaigns and the choices voters make.¹²

Reversing And Challenging the Appeal-Harnessing the Power of Truthful Negativity

While the appeal of a flawed candidate has staying power, studies have shown that attaching negativity to that candidate and stressing it can weaken that appeal. Known as the “horn effect”¹³ (the conceptual opposite of the “halo effect”), it holds that there can be a cognitive bias where a single unfavorable quality causes voters to view a candidate as entirely unreliable or unskilled. This initial negative judgment is notoriously difficult to reverse once it takes root in the public’s mind and is the key to understanding why “negative campaigning” often works.¹⁴

Candidates who oppose the more radical ideas of otherwise popular rivals must pay close attention and learn how to effectively challenge, and clearly expose, the risks of supporting a candidate whose appealing rhetoric masks a not-so-hidden negative agenda. Despite the unpleasantness of “focusing on the negative,” aggressive, focused, truthful, and repeated attacks on one’s harmful character seem to work.¹⁵

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Notes