Senior Israeli officials believe Iran wants the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to end the war because it faces severe military and economic problems since the conflict started.
According to these assessments, the agreement gives Tehran crucial political and economic relief. This breathing space lets it withstand President Donald Trump’s remaining term while maintaining its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. These are assets that it can later restore and enhance whenever it chooses.
The Iranian leadership requires more than mere regime survival. It needs an agreement that provides security and stability, facilitates sanctions relief, and unlocks access to billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets abroad.
Such measures are viewed as essential to address a growing array of domestic challenges, including rising living costs, deteriorating public services, high inflation, unemployment, and the collapse of the national currency.
Senior security officials believe that Iran is unlikely to sign a new nuclear agreement under the terms sought by Washington.
Tehran is expected to use delaying tactics and negotiation strategies to prolong talks. This aims to make it harder for President Trump to resume military action against Iran as time passes.
Iranian officials are well aware that negotiations over the original nuclear agreement with the Obama administration lasted approximately eighteen months.
Consequently, they see little chance that negotiations with the Trump administration can realistically be concluded within the proposed sixty-day timeframe.
In the meantime, Iran is expected to maximize every political and economic advantage from the Memorandum of Understanding.
According to senior security sources, Iranian decision-makers believe that the two principal pressure points at their disposal, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, provide them with significant leverage over both the United States and the global economy.
This leverage, they believe, enables Tehran to engage in prolonged negotiations while reducing the likelihood of a return to hostilities. Iran appears prepared to withstand potential pressure from the Trump administration over the next two years, until the end of the president’s term, to gain valuable time.
Iranian leaders also recognize the political pressures facing the Trump administration. These include rising fuel prices, the approaching midterm elections in November, and growing pressure from Gulf states seeking regional stability and urging Washington to avoid renewed military escalation.
At the same time, Iran is seeking to protect its regional proxies while promoting its broader security vision among Gulf states, a vision that calls for the removal of foreign military bases from the region.
Although Iran and its allied organizations within the so-called “Axis of Resistance” have suffered substantial setbacks during the war, Tehran still maintains influence through proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip, even if these organizations have been significantly weakened.
Senior security officials nevertheless believe that Iran retains the ability to threaten Israel through these proxies. Hizbullah in Lebanon remains Tehran’s most significant regional asset, while the Houthis in Yemen continue to serve as an important deterrent against the United States through their ability to threaten shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and disrupt freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
The American maritime blockade and economic sanctions have had a significant impact on Iran’s economy and financial resources, directly affecting Tehran’s ability to fund these proxy organizations.
This underpins Iran’s insistence on an immediate release of about $24 billion under the MoU. Tehran also aims to gain substantial revenues from resuming full oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz after U.S. naval restrictions end.
Iran suffered a major strategic setback in Syria with the loss of its ally, President Bashar al-Assad. As a result, it also lost its primary logistical corridor for transferring weapons and military equipment from Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon through Syrian territory.
Regarding Lebanon, Iran is increasingly concerned that Israel may seek to dismantle Hizbullah’s second defensive line, particularly the Badr Force positions in the Nabatieh region north of the Litani River, which serve as a protective buffer for Beirut. According to security assessments, this concern was one of the principal reasons behind Iran’s direct intervention in support of Hizbullah and its declaration of a new deterrence formula against Israel, namely that any attack on Beirut’s Dahiyeh district would trigger a direct Iranian response.
Iranian leaders reportedly fear that Hizbullah’s main stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburb is under serious threat and that a large-scale Israeli offensive there could potentially lead to the collapse of Tehran’s most important regional proxy.
Security officials assess that Iran is trying to limit additional losses. Outwardly, Tehran aims to project confidence and strength while maintaining its regional stance. Privately, Iran seeks to avoid direct war with Israel or the United States, hoping to prevent further setbacks.
Iran’s objective is to reach a political accommodation with Washington, but on terms acceptable to Tehran rather than those dictated by the United States. Such an arrangement would safeguard the survival of the Islamic Republic, slow the erosion of Iran’s regional influence, and preserve the foundational principle of Velayat-e Faqih, the rule of the Islamic jurist.
Officials state that Iran is now at its most vulnerable point since 1979. Iran regards the MoU as a vital tool to exit the crisis, buy recovery time, and use negotiations to ease U.S. demands on its nuclear program.
