Antisemitism and Aliyah: The Battle for the Jewish Future

Antisemitism has emerged as a significant driver of Jewish immigration (aliyah) to Israel from the Western world, particularly Western Europe and North America. Throughout the West, anti-Jewish sentiment has affected university campuses, city life, and government institutions. Israel, however, while a country of refuge, is not exempt from threats to Jewish life. It remains the central front in the broader cancellation campaign against Jews and the Jewish state. Jewish communities worldwide face a choice regarding where to build their future, whether in Israel or in the Diaspora. This renders the fight against international antisemitism abroad and the essential resilience of Israel’s demographic and social realities as parallel policy objectives.¹

Aliyah Trends: Data and Drivers

Drivers of aliyah to Israel have shifted substantially in recent years. Data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, compiled by the Jewish Virtual Library, demonstrates that aliyah since 2022 has been driven substantially by immigration from the former Soviet Union, with a marked spike following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war:²

• 2022: 71,354 olim, including approximately 63,112 from Russia and Ukraine, 1,680 from Ethiopia, 3,019 from the United States and Canada, and 1,651 from France.

• 2023: 46,101 olim, including 39,490 from Russia, 2,622 from the United States, 1,006 from France, and 1,812 from Ethiopia.

• 2024: 29,859 olim, including 22,628 from the former Soviet Union, 2,145 from France (a 76 percent increase), and 3,590 from the United States and Canada.

• 2025: 19,894 olim from roughly 100 countries, including 11,018 from the former USSR, 4,041 from the United States and Canada, 3,306 from France, and 872 from the United Kingdom.

While immigration from the former USSR has declined since 2022, aliyah from Western Europe and North America has grown proportionally—a trend some analysts describe as a prospective “Great Western Aliyah.”³

Aliyah as a National Security Priority

Beyond demographic trends, aliyah is also framed by Israeli security analysts as a matter of national security policy. Brig.-Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, founder of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, has argued in his book “No Retreat” that settlement and security are directly linked. To strengthen Israel’s national security, he has called for an additional three million Jewish immigrants distributed across the Negev, the Galilee, Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley—regions of the country situated on the front lines of Israel’s security challenges. According to Avivi, regions lacking a substantial Jewish population foster weaker governance and sovereignty.

Aliyah and Integration Ministry and Jewish Agency data from the end of 2025 indicate that one-third of new immigrants were between the ages of 18 and 35; Avivi noted that a significant share of these young olim are now serving in elite IDF combat and intelligence units, marking unprecedented integration.⁴

Antisemitism as a Threat to Western Democracies

Simone Rodan-Benzaquen, Senior Envoy for Europe at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has characterized antisemitism not merely as a Jewish problem but as an indicator of national security and resilience of Western democracies more broadly. As such, antisemitism functions as a symptom rather than the underlying disease: when Jewish communities are attacked or made to feel unsafe, it signals deeper deterioration in a society’s democratic institutions. Rodan-Benzaquen identifies overlapping threats confronting Western democracies: Islamism, far-left alignment with Islamist networks, and elements of the far right. She notes that patterns of antisemitic mobilization long observed in Europe are becoming increasingly visible in North American cities.

Rodan-Benzaquen further argues that states that portray Israel as an aggressor while declining to confront the ideological sources of antisemitism deepen this crisis. She frames the resulting challenge as one of “reputational security”: Israel’s capacity to defend its international legitimacy amid coordinated efforts to delegitimize it, alongside a parallel challenge facing Western states seeking to preserve social cohesion. She argues that while many Jews—notably French Jews—may choose to make aliyah, whether due to antisemitism or a Zionist pull, the concern is not only what may happen to Jewish communities of the West if radical actors continue to infiltrate Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States undeterred. Israel, she conceded, serves as a model stand-up security nation for these societies.

Antisemitism by Omission

Fundji Benedict, President of the Liberty Values Institute, describes a contemporary pattern she terms “state antisemitism by omission.” Her framework asserts that states may formally avoid direct harm to Jewish citizens while failing to actively uphold their equal protection, producing a form of antisemitism without a clear decree, perpetrator, or singular act of persecution. Benedict argues that this pattern of omission drives aliyah through attrition rather than acute crisis: Jewish residents of cities such as Paris and Brussels depart not necessarily because of direct state action against them, but because state institutions cease to provide adequate protection or support.

Aliyah, Yerida, and its Political Implications

In recent years, aliyah has not produced sustained Israeli population growth. According to the Times of Israel, more than 69,000 Israelis emigrated (yerida) in 2025, compared with approximately 19,894 arrivals; in 2024, 82,700 Israelis left while only 29,859 arrived, marking the second consecutive year in which emigration exceeded immigration. In 2025, approximately 19,000 of those departing eventually returned after extended periods abroad, and 5,500 arrived for family reunification. Accounting for these figures, Israel’s net migration balance for the year was a loss of roughly 20,000 people.

Israel’s population nonetheless grew by 1.1 percent, reaching 10.18 million. Analysts attribute yerida principally to security concerns and domestic political frustration, including disputes over judicial reform and the aftermath of the October 7 attacks.⁵

Hostile actors, including Iran-aligned groups, have exploited yerida statistics for propaganda purposes.⁶ In November 2025, Middle East Eye published an interview in which economist Dr. Shir Hever—an Israeli-born citizen who relinquished his citizenship and now resides in Germany—argued that Israeli emigration has accelerated since 2022 and disproportionately involves Israeli Jews, contrasting this with Palestinian “sumud,” or steadfastness.⁷ Researchers note that similar claims regarding Jewish emigration and the viability of the Zionist project have recurred since 1948, and that such narratives typically omit corresponding aliyah data.

Policy Implications

These trends point to converging conclusions for Israeli and diaspora policy. First, Israel has an incentive to invest further in countering Iran-, Hamas-, and Qatar-linked networks that fuel antisemitism abroad to secure communities where Israel has allies and as a responsibility to Jews and Israelis abroad. Second, Israel’s public diplomacy strategy should shift from a defensive hasbara posture toward a more assertive approach to fortify reputational security. Addressing both antisemitism in the diaspora and demographic and security pressures within Israel requires treating the two as linked policy priorities: sustaining safe and equal conditions for Jewish communities abroad, emphasizing their eternal and ironclad connection to Israel, while reinforcing the sovereignty, security, and demographic resilience of the Jewish state.

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