Summary
Iran is increasingly treating control of the Strait of Hormuz as a more immediate and adaptable source of strategic power than the nuclear issue. Tehran appears interested in converting that leverage into sanctions relief, access to frozen funds, reconstruction revenue, and greater regional influence. However, linking maritime access to numerous geopolitical demands reduces the prospects for a rapid agreement and increases the risk of renewed confrontation. Meanwhile, continued economic hardship creates pressure for any strategic gains to produce tangible benefits for the Iranian public.
Key Takeaways
- The Strait of Hormuz is emerging as Iran’s primary strategic lever. Control over maritime traffic offers a flexible way to pressure the United States, Gulf states, and global energy markets while potentially generating revenue and securing political concessions.
- Iran’s expanding demands could make a settlement increasingly difficult. A full reopening is being linked not only to shipping arrangements, but also to frozen Iranian funds, U.S. policy, the broader war, and conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, turning a technical negotiation into a much larger geopolitical bargain.
- Strategic leverage has yet to translate into economic relief for ordinary Iranians. High food and currency prices, strained welfare programs, labor disputes, and unreliable services highlight a widening gap between claims of geopolitical strength and everyday living conditions.
A review of the Iranian press for August 12, 2026, points to a shift in the priorities of the establishment’s discourse. The nuclear program has not disappeared, but the Strait of Hormuz is taking its place as the immediate lever through which Iran seeks to influence the United States, the Gulf states, and the global economy.
Ali Reza Salimi, a member of the parliament’s presiding board, argued that Hormuz is more valuable to Iran than a nuclear bomb. Former parliamentarian Fatemeh Alia added that revenue from managing the strait and selling oil could finance part of the reconstruction of war damage. These are political positions, not official doctrine or an approved revenue-collection mechanism.
Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, made clear that a technical agreement with Oman on a shipping route does not amount to a full reopening. He linked a broader arrangement to an end to the war, a change in U.S. policy, the release of Iranian funds, and an end to the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza.
While the establishment speaks of strategic leverage, the public is contending with an eroding economy. A basic basket of summer fruit costs more than a day’s minimum wage, the dollar remains expensive, the welfare system is under pressure, and errors in government classification systems threaten to deprive families of assistance.
Hormuz Becomes Iran’s New Nuclear Option
The day’s most notable statement came from Ali Reza Salimi, a senior member of the Majles presiding board. According to Salimi, the Strait of Hormuz is more valuable to Iran than a nuclear bomb because it allows Tehran to apply reciprocity and address national problems.
This is not a decision to abandon the nuclear program, nor is it an official admission that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons. Salimi is expressing the view that the power of the strait is more tangible and readily available than potential nuclear power. Iran can restrict or expand maritime traffic, designate routes, delay vessels, and alter the level of risk on a daily basis.
The Strait of Hormuz separates Iran from Oman and connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. Before the war, about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passed through it, along with large volumes of liquefied natural gas, fertilizers, and petrochemical products. Any disruption to traffic quickly affects energy, insurance, and shipping prices worldwide.
A nuclear bomb is primarily a deterrent weapon whose use would carry an extreme cost. Hormuz, by contrast, allows pressure to be applied incrementally. Iran can threaten closure, permit certain vessels to pass, establish a temporary route, or demand payment for services. From Tehran’s perspective, it is a tool that is easier to deploy and calibrate.
Rezaei has previously used similar language, arguing that the strait is more important than dozens of atomic bombs. The fact that a member of the parliament’s presiding board has now adopted the same line indicates that the idea is spreading from the security discourse into civilian politics.
A Shift in Discourse Is Not a Shift in Nuclear Doctrine
The claim that Hormuz is more important than a bomb does not prove that Iran has abandoned its nuclear ambitions. This morning’s Iranian publications contained no new decisions regarding enrichment levels, uranium stockpiles, centrifuges, or the return of International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.
Nor has there been any joint announcement that nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States are resuming. The confirmed contacts are focused on regulating maritime traffic, lifting the U.S. blockade, and Iran’s conditions for fully reopening the strait.
The nuclear issue has therefore receded from the immediate agenda, but it has not been resolved. Shifting the focus to Hormuz allows the regime to present a strategic achievement without acknowledging the constraints imposed on the nuclear program by the war.
This is particularly important politically. Instead of having to explain to the public whether nuclear facilities were damaged, whether uranium stockpiles were preserved, or whether Iran will accept restrictions, the regime can redirect the discussion toward a geographic asset that no one can take away from it: Iran’s coastline and its ability to threaten traffic through the strait.
A U.S. Intelligence Assessment Becomes an Iranian Propaganda Tool
ISNA reported on an NBC story based on anonymous sources in U.S. military intelligence. According to the report, Washington assesses that Iran has shifted its strategic priority from the nuclear program to control of Hormuz.
According to the same assessment, a U.S. attempt to open the strait by force would be prolonged, deadly, and costly, with no certainty that it could ensure stable commercial passage. The intelligence document itself has not been published, the analysts have not been identified, and the data on which their assessment was based cannot be examined.
The report should therefore not be presented as an official and substantiated conclusion of the U.S. national security establishment. Its significance lies in the way Iranian media are using it. A report attributed to U.S. intelligence allows Tehran to argue that even its adversary recognizes that Hormuz has become a more powerful deterrent asset than the nuclear program.
This is a familiar propaganda mechanism: an Iranian claim gains credibility when it is presented as an assessment made by the enemy. Even if the source is anonymous and the document is inaccessible, the mere attribution to Washington makes the claim useful domestically.
Trump Claims Control, Iran Demands Recognition of Its Sovereignty
President Donald Trump again claimed that U.S. forces control the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran has lost control of it. IRNA reported his remarks and presented them as false.
The two sides use the term “control” to mean different things. Trump is referring to the U.S. Navy’s ability to clear mines, escort vessels, and enforce a blockade of Iranian ports. Tehran is referring to its geographic position, its forces along the coast, and its ability to restore uncertainty at any moment.
Even the passage of individual vessels does not settle the dispute. A military fleet can open a limited corridor, but the restoration of commercial shipping requires insurance, the consent of cargo owners, port services, and a coordination mechanism accepted by the states on both sides of the strait.
So far, no agreed map, joint monitoring mechanism, or timetable for a full reopening has been published. There is therefore no basis for concluding that the dispute over Hormuz has been resolved in either side’s favor.
The United States wants to portray passage through the strait as a product of its military superiority. Iran wants to show that every vessel passing through Hormuz does so because Tehran has allowed it. The struggle is therefore not only over maritime traffic, but also over its political meaning.
Rezaei Expands the List of Conditions
Mohsen Rezaei, the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, told the Chinese ambassador that the understanding with Oman on a transit corridor does not amount to a full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Rezaei linked a broader arrangement to an end to the war, a change in U.S. behavior, the release of frozen Iranian funds, and an end to regional conflicts, including those in Lebanon and Gaza. These are official Iranian conditions, but there is no indication that the United States or Oman has accepted them.
The Supreme National Security Council is at the center of decision-making on war, foreign policy, security, and the nuclear issue. Following the appointment of Rezaei, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, negotiations over Hormuz can no longer be viewed merely as a technical matter handled by the Foreign Ministry.
The move could strengthen Iran’s bargaining position. Rather than negotiating separately over each issue, Tehran is trying to create a package deal: passage for vessels in exchange for sanctions relief, the release of assets, an end to attacks, and arrangements in other regional arenas.
The same approach also makes an agreement harder to achieve. Oman can help establish coordinates and manage a maritime corridor, but it cannot by itself end the fighting in Lebanon, resolve the war in Gaza, or compel Washington to release all Iranian funds.
The longer the list of conditions becomes, the greater the likelihood that a feasible technical agreement will be stalled by a dispute unrelated directly to shipping.
From a Threat of Closure to a Revenue Model
Former parliamentarian Fatemeh Alia added an economic dimension to the discussion of Hormuz. According to her, revenue from managing the strait and selling oil could help compensate for war damage.
No agreed collection mechanism has been published. It is unclear whether this would involve a transit fee, payment for security escorts, service charges, Iranian insurance, or increased oil revenue following sanctions relief. Nor is there an approved budget stipulating that future revenues would be devoted to reconstruction.
Nevertheless, the statement marks an important shift. In the past, closing Hormuz was presented primarily as a threat to be carried out in the event of an attack. The establishment is now trying to portray management of the strait as a revenue-generating asset that could be used to finance the costs of the war.
The idea raises legal and commercial difficulties. Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation, and many countries do not recognize Iran’s right to charge a fee simply for passage. Attempts to impose payments could drive away shipping companies, raise insurance costs, and provoke military and diplomatic opposition.
Nor is the distribution of any revenue straightforward. If the arrangement is implemented jointly with Oman, the parties would need to determine who collects payments, for which services, and how the proceeds are divided. Without a transparent mechanism, the promise of using Hormuz to finance reconstruction will remain a political slogan.
The Conservative Camp Raises the Price of Any Compromise
The claim that Hormuz is more important than a bomb serves the conservative camp in two ways. First, it portrays Iran as having found a powerful lever without needing to declare possession of nuclear weapons. Second, it turns any reopening of the strait into a concession involving a highly valuable national asset.
If Hormuz is a source of sovereignty, revenue, and compensation for war damage, reopening it without substantial concessions in return can be portrayed as capitulation. This narrows the room for maneuver available to President Masoud Pezeshkian and the Foreign Ministry.
Even if negotiations produce a temporary arrangement allowing vessels to pass, the government will have to explain why it relinquished potential revenue, compensation demands, or the linkage between the strait and the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza.
At the same time, hawkish rhetoric can serve as a negotiating tool. Through parliamentarians and figures associated with the conservative camp, the leadership can tell mediators that it needs substantial concessions to overcome domestic opposition.
The question is whether this is an attempt to raise the price in order to secure a better deal, or whether Iran is creating conditions that no U.S. administration could accept.
A Basket of Fruit Costs More Than a Day’s Work
The gap between the rhetoric of power and social reality is particularly evident in food prices. According to a calculation published by Eghtesad News, a basic basket containing four kilograms of summer fruit cost 775,000 tomans based on a price list from the end of the month of Tir.
The monthly base wage is about 16.6 million tomans, equivalent to a daily base wage of slightly more than half a million tomans. Buying the basket of fruit therefore requires more than a full day’s wages.
A year earlier, the same basket was estimated to cost about 375,000 tomans, while the monthly base wage stood at approximately 10.3 million tomans. Fruit prices have risen faster than wages.
This is not a comprehensive official measure of household consumption. The calculation covers four kilograms of specific products at prices from a particular list. Even so, it illustrates how ordinary food items are gradually becoming luxuries.
Families do not stop buying food all at once. They reduce quantities, choose cheaper products, and forgo fruit, meat, and dairy products. The deterioration is therefore reflected not only in scarcity, but also in declining dietary quality.
The Dollar and Gold Continue to Reflect a Lack of Confidence
The dollar was reportedly trading on the free market at around 187,800 tomans, while a gram of 18-karat gold was priced at approximately 19.15 million tomans. These are secondary-market figures rather than official rates, but they reflect the level of uncertainty.
Gold and foreign currency are used in Iran as hedges against inflation and the erosion of the rial. Rising prices are not merely a response to developments in global markets. They also indicate that households and investors are uncertain about the government’s ability to stabilize the economy.
Control of Hormuz can raise oil prices and improve Iran’s bargaining power. It does not guarantee that Iran will be able to sell its oil, receive payment, and channel the proceeds into the economy.
As long as sanctions, banking restrictions, and maritime risks persist, there is no automatic connection between higher oil prices and an improvement in the economic situation of ordinary Iranians.
Welfare Payments Erode Alongside the Labor Market
Parliamentarian Asadollah Cheraei called for a review of the formula used to calculate retirement benefits. At present, pensions are determined primarily on the basis of wages during the final years of employment, and the lawmaker argues that the war and economic disruptions are harming workers’ incomes and the pension rights they will accumulate.
The proposed change is still under review and is not a binding decision. The fact that it is being discussed nevertheless illustrates the pressure on the social insurance system.
When factories reduce operations, workers are placed on unpaid leave, or wages are delayed, social insurance contributions also decline. In the short term, workers lose income. In the long term, their future pensions are also affected.
The war is therefore damaging the welfare system from both directions: the number of people requiring assistance is increasing while the revenues used to fund that assistance are shrinking.
A Database Error Could Deprive a Family of Food Assistance
The Labor Ministry announced that it would review the classification of food-credit recipients whom the system identified as not residing in Iran. According to the announcement, travel to Iraq for pilgrimage will be reviewed separately so that pilgrims are not mistakenly classified as living abroad.
The food credits, known in Iran as “Kalabarg”, are a digital government benefit that allows households to purchase subsidized essential goods. Eligibility is determined by cross-referencing data on income, residence, travel, and government databases.
The case exposes a risk inherent in the system. A temporary trip to Iraq for a religious ceremony can be recorded as though the family had left Iran, resulting in the suspension of assistance. For a household dependent on the credit to buy food, a technical error immediately becomes an economic hardship.
The government has promised to allow appeals and the submission of proof of residence. But even the correction process requires internet access, documentation, and the ability to navigate bureaucracy, resources that are not equally available to all citizens.
Petrochemical Workers Wait to Return to Their Jobs
Eight workers dismissed from the Mahshahr Petrochemical Terminals and Tanks complex said they had still not been reinstated, even though, according to them, a labor authority ruling and a judicial enforcement order had been issued.
Mahshahr is a port and industrial city in Khuzestan Province in southwestern Iran, home to a concentration of petrochemical plants, export terminals, and storage tanks. It is one of the country’s key centers for generating revenue that does not depend solely on crude oil exports.
The workers link their dismissals to wage demands. The employer’s response was not included in the report, so the full circumstances of the dispute cannot be established.
Nevertheless, the case illustrates the contradiction between the promise to use revenue from Hormuz for reconstruction and conditions at the facilities expected to generate that revenue. Control of the maritime route is not enough if workers, terminals, and plants are not operating reliably.
Local Cancellation of Power Cuts Is Not a Nationwide Solution
The governor of Mazandaran Province announced the cancellation of scheduled evening power cuts for two days. Mazandaran lies along the Caspian Sea coast in northern Iran and is a major agricultural and tourism center.
The decision is a local and temporary relief measure. It does not demonstrate that the national electricity balance has improved or that the shortage of generation capacity has been resolved.
Canceling outages in one province could result from diverting electricity from other regions, a temporary decline in consumption, or a political decision intended to ease conditions for the public during days of mourning. Only sustained supply data will make it possible to determine whether a genuine change has occurred.
For households, the difference between a structural solution and temporary relief is simple: whether the electricity will continue to flow after the religious observance and the official announcement have ended.
The Day of Mourning Highlights the Two Irans
The 28th of Safar, the second month of the Islamic calendar, is a Shiite day of mourning commemorating the death of the Prophet Muhammad and, according to Shiite tradition, the death of Imam Hassan. Processions and ceremonies were held across Iran, including events at the Shah Cheragh shrine in Shiraz, one of the country’s most important pilgrimage sites.
Religious coverage reduced the volume of printed newspapers and dominated much of the news agencies’ agenda. But it is not disconnected from the political discourse.
State media use the language of mourning to emphasize sacrifice, loyalty, and steadfastness in the face of the enemy. Religious language gives meaning to suffering and connects the hardships of war to a historical narrative of resistance.
Alongside this Iran exists another Iran: one that checks the price of fruit, waits for welfare payments, appeals the loss of food credits, and hopes the electricity will stay on in the evening.
The contradiction between the two does not negate the regime’s deterrent power. It limits the time available to it. The longer the achievement in Hormuz fails to translate into stable prices, wages, and services, the wider the gap becomes between proclaimed power and the benefits the public actually receives.
The Bottom Line
August 12 marks a shift from deterrence based on the threat of closing Hormuz toward an attempt to establish a permanent regime for managing the strait. Iran is no longer content merely with the ability to block passage. It seeks recognition that every route, concession, or expansion of traffic depends on its consent.
This is a more flexible lever than the nuclear issue. It can be applied gradually, its conditions can be adjusted, and concessions can be extracted without immediately crossing an irreversible threshold. It is also a dangerous lever: a delay, the misidentification of a vessel, or an attempt to enforce payment could reignite the confrontation.
The main gap remains between a technical arrangement and a strategic deal. Oman can help establish a shipping corridor, but Rezaei is linking the reopening of the strait to frozen funds, an end to the war, and the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza. The longer the list of conditions becomes, the lower the chances of a rapid agreement.
The new discourse gives the conservative camp a narrative victory. Iran does not have to acknowledge a retreat in its nuclear program. Instead, it can claim that it has shifted the center of gravity to an asset in which its advantage is inherent.
But that same narrative also creates an obligation to the public. If Hormuz truly is more important than a nuclear bomb, citizens will expect it to deliver commensurate benefits: compensation, reconstruction, lower prices, and protection for wages and welfare payments.
For now, there is no final agreement, no confirmed nuclear negotiation, and no structural economic improvement. Iran is seeking to turn geography into political currency. The test will be whether it can convert that currency into an agreement without sacrificing deterrence, and whether the benefits reach the public rather than remaining confined to headlines.
