The Summit That Never Happened Exposed Iran’s Limited Leverage

The foreign ministers’ meeting scheduled to take place in Salalah on September 14, 2026, was supposed to be the moment when the arrangement Iran and Oman had formulated around the Strait of Hormuz gained regional recognition. In Tehran, officials had already begun presenting the meeting as proof that the Arab states had come to understand that the Gulf could not be managed without recognizing Iran’s central role.

But the meeting was postponed.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi announced that “in the interest of consensus, the regional meeting scheduled for tomorrow in Salalah has been postponed.” He added that Oman remains committed to dialogue that supports stability and long-term cooperation. Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that the decision had been made at the request of several countries in the region, but no alternative date was announced.

The diplomatic wording does not conceal the disagreement. Iran and Oman wanted to bring the foreign ministers to the table after the two countries had already formulated principles governing a shipping corridor, mine clearance, and traffic management. Some Gulf states saw this as an attempt to present them with a fait accompli. Saudi Arabia, for example, requested amendments to the agreement out of concern that the new rules would have long-term implications for all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Bahrain expressed the clearest opposition. It announced that it would not participate in a meeting with Iran before diplomatic relations between the two countries were restored, and demanded that any new mechanism be based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, receive approval from the International Maritime Organization, and guarantee passage for all vessels “without discrimination, fees or permits.”

This is not a technical dispute over the width of the corridor. Iran wants shipping to operate on the basis of recognition that it has the authority to determine the route and the conditions of passage. Bahrain is demanding a mechanism in which the right of passage derives from international law, not Iranian authorization. Accepting Manama’s conditions would leave Iran with a role in mine clearance and safety coordination, but would deny it the right to decide who may pass, when, and how much they must pay.

Even as an Arrangement Is Discussed, Ships Continue to Be Hit

News of the summit’s postponement came alongside a reminder that the strait remains far from safe. An Iranian commercial vessel was hit near Qeshm Island. One person was killed and three were injured. Separately, a vessel was reported to have been struck by a projectile while passing through the strait. It is still unclear whether these reports concern the same incident, and the identity of the attacker has not been established.

The incident explains why the Gulf states are unwilling to settle for an Iranian declaration that a corridor has been opened. Shipping companies and insurers need a clear map, an alert mechanism, accountability in the event of an attack, and evidence that the route has actually been inspected. As long as vessels continue to be hit and there is no agreed authority investigating the incidents, passage under Iranian supervision is not necessarily viewed as a solution. For some of Iran’s neighbors, it could turn dependence on Iran into a permanent principle.

Bahrain also linked the discussion of the strait to attacks on infrastructure in the region, including the strike on Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline. It presented no public evidence of direct Iranian responsibility, but refused to treat Hormuz as an isolated maritime issue. Tehran wants to discuss routes, mines, and permits. The Gulf states also want to discuss missiles, drones, and the activities of Iran-backed organizations.

In Tehran, They Celebrate, Then Warn of a Trap

Iran’s official media offered two almost contradictory versions of the same event. On the one hand, commentary appeared describing the planned meeting in Oman as an “Arab turn toward Tehran”. According to this narrative, the war demonstrated to the Arab states that Iran cannot be excluded from the security equation, and they are now being forced to recognize its status.

On the other hand, the more hard-line camp attacked the very attempt to reach an arrangement. Under the headline “Oman Protects America’s Interests, the Muscat Meeting Is a Trap”, it was argued that Iran must not surrender the leverage it has gained in the strait in exchange for vague promises.

This disagreement exposes the real question within the ruling establishment: what should be done with the results of the war? One camp wants to convert military power into a political and economic arrangement that will entrench Iran’s centrality. The other fears that diplomacy will restore normal shipping before the United States and the Gulf states have paid a sufficient price. The postponement of the meeting gives ammunition to both sides. One can argue that the Arab states have not yet adjusted to the new reality, while the other can argue that the mediators never intended to accept Iran’s terms in the first place.

Iraq Reopens the Border, but the North Remains an Arena of Conflict

Alongside the maritime crisis, the land border with Iraq is gradually returning to operation. The governor of Khuzestan announced that passenger traffic at the Shalamcheh and Chazabeh crossings had returned to normal. The resumption of freight traffic is expected to be gradual and dependent on preparations on the Iraqi side. For Iran, reopening the crossings is important for trade, travel, and pilgrims. It provides the country with an active land route while maritime traffic remains restricted.

But the same Iraqi space is also an arena of friction. Reports emerged of explosions in areas containing bases belonging to Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations in Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, Shahrazur, and Zargwez. Iranian media described the organizations as separatist and terrorist groups, in keeping with Tehran’s official terminology. Some reports referred to missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, but noted that their origin was unknown. Iran did not claim responsibility, so there is no basis for determining who carried out the attacks.

Iraq continues to serve Iran as both an artery and a point of friction. The same border that carries passengers and goods separates Iranian territory from organizations Tehran regards as a security threat. The resumption of civilian traffic does not resolve the struggle over the military and political presence in northern Iraq.

Turkey Has Not Stopped Trading, but Iranian Money Is Trapped

At the same time, Tehran is dealing with another constraint, quieter but highly significant: the money generated by energy sales to Turkey is not converted into freely available cash. Reports in Iran initially created the impression that Ankara had prohibited Turkish companies from trading with Iran. The Turkish finance minister’s full remarks present a different picture. Turkey does not transfer cash to Iran in return for gas. Instead, it keeps the money in a separate, supervised account under an arrangement with the United States.

This means that Iran can use the money primarily to purchase goods permitted under the sanctions regime, such as food and medicine. The Turkish finance minister explained it this way: “When Iran purchases products permitted under the sanctions regime, the money accumulated in the separate account is used to pay for those transactions”.

The gas supply itself has not stopped. Iran supplied Turkey with a significant share of its gas imports in both 2025 and the first half of 2026. Tehran’s problem is not merely selling energy, but its ability to convert the proceeds into currency that can be transferred, invested, or used for purchases that are not exempted from sanctions.

Pressure intensified after the United States imposed sanctions on a bank in Turkey and two subsidiaries, alleging that they had helped transfer funds for the Quds Force and the Iranian system. These are allegations by the U.S. administration, not findings from a public judicial proceeding, but the message to banks and companies in Turkey is clear. They do not have to block every transaction to reduce their dealings with Iran. It is enough for the risk to their access to the dollar system to increase, making Iranian clients costlier and riskier.

Iran can therefore continue exporting gas while receiving, in return, a restricted purchasing account rather than liquid income.

The Government Starts Saving Fuel in Its Own Offices

Inside Iran, the government is trying to signal that conservation begins at the top. Masoud Pezeshkian instructed government institutions to designate one “car-free day” each week. On that day, employees and managers are expected to commute by bus or metro. Government offices were also instructed to permit remote work in suitable positions, particularly for employees living outside the city, and to replace older government vehicles with electric, hybrid, or gas-powered models.

The measure is intended to show that the state is setting a personal example, but its impact depends on practical questions: whether public transportation can absorb the additional employees, whether the rules will be enforced in government institutions, and whether there is sufficient funding, vehicle availability, and charging or gas infrastructure to replace the government fleet quickly.

For most private car owners, the allowance of 60 liters per month at a price of 1,500 tomans was retained, along with another 50 liters at 3,000 tomans. But the price in the third tier, purchased using a station card, doubled from 5,000 to 10,000 tomans per liter. Government and imported vehicles, cars registered in free-trade zones, and second or additional cars do not receive the same terms.

The public’s practical response was a surge in applications for fuel cards, from about 12,000 per day to between 36,000 and 40,000. This is not necessarily organized political opposition. It is the reaction of households that understand that even without the quota being abolished, a registration error or the absence of a card could double the price of filling up.

Gold prices tell a similar story. A gram of 18-karat gold was trading at around 23.48 million tomans, while an Emami coin was trading at around 237 million tomans. These are fluctuating market figures rather than a single official rate, but they indicate that demand for protection against the erosion of the rial and the possibility of renewed fighting has not disappeared.

The School Year Begins with Empty Pockets

The start of the school year is also becoming an economic test. The Education Ministry reported that more than 91 percent of students had completed their textbook orders, while around eight percent had not yet done so. According to the ministry, much of the shortfall involves students entering new school levels and those whose registration or make-up examinations have not yet been updated. The figure does not prove that eight percent of students have dropped out, but it does leave a large group whose status remains unresolved on the eve of the new school year.

Field reports place the official figure in the context of families’ daily lives. A father of two elementary school pupils said he had spent nearly 12 million tomans on supplies and uniforms, even before school fees. According to one published calculation, a basic set of supplies for a first-grade student can cost about 4.5 million tomans.

A stationery store owner described a day in which customers come in, check prices, and put products back on the shelves: “People come in, ask the price and leave. Since this morning only two customers have bought anything”. According to him, shoppers are less interested in quality and simply ask for the cheapest product available.

The head of an aid organization warned that school dropout is particularly common among poorer groups and that children who do not remain in school enter the labor market. National estimates are not based on a complete publicly available database, so it is too early to cite an agreed nationwide figure. But the picture from the stores is very tangible. Families do not immediately give up on schooling. Instead, they cut back on supplies, postpone purchases, and seek assistance. For some, this sequence of compromises ends with the child going to work.

The Struggle Over the War Enters the Ruling Establishment

Calls for unity have not stopped the confrontation within the establishment. Nighttime rallies by hard-line supporters are increasingly directing slogans against senior Iranian officials. Former president Hassan Rouhani has become a primary target after calling for the war to be brought to an honorable end and defending negotiations as an instrument of statecraft.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and President Pezeshkian have also previously been attacked by the same circles. The argument is no longer merely about whether Iran is entitled to negotiate. It is about the moment at which military power should be converted into a political outcome.

Rouhani and centrists fear that continuing the confrontation will erode the economy without delivering any additional gains for Iran. The hard-line camp regards the very discussion of an honorable end as a sign that the government is preparing to surrender its leverage in Hormuz before the other side has capitulated.

Alongside the public political struggle came a more serious report from the human rights arena. HRANA reported that Hossein Rasouli-Nasab, who was arrested following the January protests in Shandiz, had been sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court in Mashhad on charges of moharebeh, setting fire to religious institutions, and damaging public property. A source close to the family said: “During the protests in Shandiz, a mosque and a Quranic studies center were set on fire, and Hossein’s case was opened in connection with those events.”

The report has not received publicly accessible confirmation from Iran’s judiciary, so it should be cautiously attributed to HRANA rather than presented as an independently verified fact. It nevertheless points to the gap between the debate permitted within the elite and the treatment of those suspected of participating in protests. Senior officials argue in newspapers over negotiations, while protesters’ cases proceed far from public scrutiny.

Iran Forced the Discussion, Not the Outcome

Iran can claim one clear achievement: it has demonstrated that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be managed without taking into account its power, the location of the mines, and its ability to affect maritime traffic. The Gulf states are talking to one another more frequently, Oman is investing considerable diplomatic capital in mediation, and energy prices respond to every change in the talks.

But the postponed summit makes clear what Iran has still not achieved. Its neighbors are unwilling to accept an arrangement in which Tehran issues permits, collects payments, or decides which vessels are allowed to pass. They want to participate in setting the rules, and some are demanding that the arrangement be placed within an international framework that would reduce Iranian discretion.

The next test will be highly practical: whether a new date is set, who agrees to attend, whether Saudi Arabia accepts the revised wording, and whether Bahrain softens its refusal. In the strait itself, it will be necessary to see regular vessel traffic, a decline in incidents, and changes in insurance prices. Without these, the Iran-Oman agreement will remain a document regulating relations between two countries, not shipping in the Gulf.

At home, too, results rather than declarations are required. A car-free day in government offices does not compensate a driver who has to buy fuel at the third-tier price. A figure showing that 91 percent of textbooks have been ordered does not help a family that cannot afford notebooks and uniforms. Selling gas to Turkey does not provide freely available currency when the proceeds remain in a supervised account.

Tehran succeeded in bringing its neighbors to the brink of the negotiating table. The fact that the chairs remained empty shows that fear of Iran’s power is still not the same as agreement to accept its authority.

I can also produce a more publication-ready version in the style of an English-language geopolitical or news analysis outlet while keeping every factual qualification intact.