Iran Prepares for the Next War as Debate Grows Over Who Will Pay the Price

Diplomacy Continues, but Iran Is Also Preparing for the Possibility That It Will Fail

Two competing messages are vying for attention in Iran on October 19, 2026. The first concerns security: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is responding to Netanyahu with a threat of his own, the new defense minister is speaking explicitly about the need to use the time before the next confrontation to accelerate research and production, and the parliament speaker is extending the warnings to companies and investors in the region. The second is much more domestic: How long can this situation continue, and what exactly are citizens receiving in return for savings, rising prices, and the persistent demand to “hold out”. These are not necessarily two separate camps. Even within the establishment that supports the government, there are calls to distinguish between military resilience and the ability to preserve incomes, maintain the supply of medicines, and sustain a daily routine that is not built solely around the war.

The central development is not that diplomacy has disappeared. Quite the opposite. Araghchi made clear that Iran’s proposal concerning Hormuz remains on the table, that the United States has already submitted comments, and that Iran is preparing a response. Under the sequence he described, if Iran’s conditions are met, the strait is supposed to open on the sixth day and negotiations are to begin on the seventh. This is already a more structured framework than a simple declaration of willingness to talk, but it remains far from an agreement. There has been no announcement that the countdown has begun, no public American acceptance of the conditions, and no jointly agreed mechanism has been released to the public. This means that Tehran continues to pursue both tracks simultaneously: it is testing whether an arrangement can be reached while at the same time ensuring that the military establishment and the public do not behave as though such an arrangement is already guaranteed.

The New Defense Minister Is Not Talking About Peace Being Close

That message received significant reinforcement with Mehrdad Akhlaghi Ketabchi’s entry into office as defense minister. Parliament approved him by a large majority, with 237 votes in favor and 15 against, and after the vote the discussion shifted almost immediately from whether he would be appointed to what he would do. The concluding remarks in the confidence proceedings emphasized not only security responsibilities but also the livelihoods of members of the armed forces and retirees, a reminder that Iran’s security establishment does not exist outside the economic pressures affecting the rest of the economy.

Later in the day, Akhlaghi laid out a set of priorities that leaves little room for optimism about a rapid end to the confrontation. He called for greater investment in air defense and accelerated efforts in missiles and drones, describing the period before what he called a fourth war as a window of time that should be used for research and production. His remarks provide no date for another war, nor is there data demonstrating that the pace of production has already increased. What matters is the language: the new defense minister is not treating the next confrontation merely as a deterrent scenario invoked in order to prevent it, but as a possibility for which the system must begin preparing now.

Against this tone, the president’s circle is trying to preserve a different message. Pezeshkian’s adviser on clerical affairs, Ali Emad, defended the president this morning, arguing that he has remained committed to the policy of national consensus and has shown patience even in the face of harsh criticism and slogans directed against him. This is, of course, not a measure of public support but a political defense offered by a presidential adviser. Still, it illustrates how Pezeshkian’s camp is seeking to distinguish itself: not by abandoning deterrence, but by presenting an image of domestic restraint and an effort to keep the political system united as its rhetoric toward external adversaries becomes more severe.

Toward Israel, Araghchi Threatens; With the United States, He Is Still Exchanging Responses

The contrast between these two forms of rhetoric is particularly evident in Araghchi’s remarks. This morning, he responded to Netanyahu by warning that Iran, too, has “unfinished business” with Israel, while accusing the Israeli prime minister of trying to push the United States into another war. This is no longer a message from a conservative newspaper or a member of parliament. It is a threat attributed to the foreign minister himself. At the same time, it still contains no target, planned action, or timetable, so it is more accurate to interpret it as political deterrence rather than an operational announcement.

At the same time, Araghchi continues to manage the diplomatic track. According to him, Washington has submitted comments on Iran’s proposal and discussions are continuing. Here, too, it is possible to see how carefully Tehran is trying to control the narrative: if the talks succeed, it wants to present the arrangement as the result of steadfastness rather than retreat; if they fail, it wants to be able to say that it proposed a practical path and that the United States was the party that rejected its conditions. The fact that the proposal links the reopening of Hormuz to the start of negotiations underscores that the strait remains an active bargaining chip, rather than merely a technical problem to be resolved.

Meanwhile, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf broadened the scope of deterrence to include the economic and technological arenas. He warned governments, funds, and companies in the region against investing in artificial intelligence and data companies that he claims are assisting attacks against Iran. No evidence has been published substantiating the allegations against specific companies, so it is impossible to conclude that this constitutes a target list or a new enforcement policy. But the message itself is significant: for parts of the Iranian establishment, economic or technological support for infrastructure perceived as assisting an adversary is no longer regarded as neutral commercial activity. It may be portrayed as part of the conflict.

The Nuclear Issue Returns to the Debate, but There Has Still Been No Policy Change

The debate over nuclear weapons has also returned to the headlines, but here it is particularly important not to confuse a political position with an official decision. An item in a morning news roundup attributed to parliament member Ahmad Naderi support for building a nuclear bomb and an assessment that Mojtaba Khamenei might in the future adopt a religious position different from the one previously attributed to Iran’s leadership. The full source of the statement has not been verified, and even according to the report itself, Naderi is not citing a new ruling but rather interpreting the leader’s behavior and expressing an expectation about the future.

The significance here is less that “Iran has decided to build a bomb” and more that the idea itself can now appear more openly in public discourse. After months of war, damage to nuclear infrastructure, and American demands for additional restrictions, the very question of whether the political and religious prohibition on nuclear weapons will remain in force is becoming a tool in the internal debate. There is still no basis for saying that a decision has been made to change the policy, but it is also difficult to ignore the fact that voices that might once have been considered marginal are now being given a platform.

The Government Talks About Savings, Workers Ask About Wages

If the question in the security arena is how quickly production can be increased, the question in the economic arena is how much of the savings the government talks about actually reaches families. At a cabinet meeting, savings of 141 trillion tomans were presented, reportedly generated through reforms in the fuel, flour, and bread sectors. Pezeshkian ordered that the resources saved be directed toward increasing the Kalabarg, the government credit provided for the purchase of essential goods. The idea is clear: if the state succeeds in reducing expenditure or cutting waste, the public should feel the result in its purchasing power. The problem is that the announcement is not a complete financial report and does not demonstrate that the money has already been transferred to households. At this stage, it is an instruction, not money that has entered people’s accounts.

Pezeshkian simultaneously presented another achievement. According to him, the public’s cooperation in reducing fuel consumption allowed Iran to avoid gasoline imports that would have cost approximately $12 billion, and he promised that revenue from higher fuel prices and more efficient consumption would be returned to the public. Here, too, data that would make it possible to assess the full picture of production, consumption, inventories, and imports is lacking. Politically, however, the president is trying to establish a bargain with citizens: if you consume less and bear the burden, the state will return part of the savings to you.

It is precisely here that criticism from workers emerges. Mohsen Bagheri, a workers’ representative on the Supreme Labor Council, warned against conflating an increase in the Kalabarg with wage adjustments. From his perspective, government assistance to families in need is one thing, while wages that are supposed to reflect work and the cost of living are another. The objection is not to the assistance itself, but to the possibility that it will become a substitute for discussions about wages. If a worker is repeatedly required to receive one-off supplements instead of having wages adjusted to the cost of living, the state is effectively moving the labor system toward a model of permanent support.

The same debate is also appearing in the economic press, which warns that subsidies, credit, and wage increases cannot by themselves generate prosperity if the economy is not growing and production is not expanding. This creates three distinct voices: the government talks about savings and redistribution, workers want wages that protect purchasing power, and economists point out that neither will be enough if there are no additional resources to distribute in the first place.

While the War Continues, Medicines and Illness Do Not Wait

The pressure on the healthcare system clearly illustrates why it is difficult to run an entire country in a state of suspended anticipation. An expert from Tehran University of Medical Sciences estimated this morning that influenza cases are expected to rise during the month of Aban and may peak toward its end, alongside an increase already recorded in visits related to COVID-19. This is a professional assessment, not an announcement that a new wave of illness has already occurred, but it comes at a time when pharmaceutical supply chains are also under pressure.

A spokesman for the Food and Drug Administration denied the claim that pharmaceutical imports from India had stopped completely, but confirmed difficulties in transferring some shipments, including medications used in mental healthcare. According to him, Iran is using indirect routes and emergency imports to cover part of the shortfall, but he also acknowledged that these solutions are insufficient to provide a complete response. This point is particularly important because the authorities frequently emphasize the high proportion of medicines produced domestically. Such a figure can be accurate while still concealing a different problem: a country may manufacture a large proportion of its pharmaceutical units domestically while remaining dependent on imports for raw materials or for particular medicines that have no local substitute.

Within the Press, Some Are Already Asking Whether It Is Time to Stop

Alongside the rhetoric of preparing for another confrontation, a voice is also emerging that challenges the assumption that continuing the war is necessarily the way to protect the national interest. An article published in Iran argued that the war and the economic blockade are harming Iran itself first and foremost, and that the confrontation should be assessed not only in terms of the willingness to fight but also in light of disparities in capabilities and the cumulative damage. This is an interpretive position, not a government line, and the figures presented in the article are not being treated here as verified data. But the framing itself is important: support for an arrangement is presented not as betrayal or surrender, but as a way to protect the country and the regime from further erosion.

Alongside this, the HRANA human rights organization reported protests by retirees in Tehran and other cities over livelihood and healthcare issues. The available material does not make it possible to verify the nationwide scale of the protests or all of the accompanying videos, so they should be treated as supplementary reporting rather than proof of a nationwide protest wave. Nevertheless, the report fits into a broader picture in which the demand for “steadfastness” repeatedly runs into questions about what is happening to the incomes, pensions, and basic services of those being asked to remain steadfast.

At Universities, Too, the Debate Is Between Loyalty and Capability

The tension between security and functionality is also recurring in academia. The conservative press continues to focus on faculty recruitment, political conduct, and enforcement of the hijab, presenting the identity of universities and their loyalty as components of national security. Allegations against academics do not become facts simply because they have been published, but they do show what parts of the conservative camp want the Ministry of Science to regard as the central problem.

By contrast, a research report published this morning pointed to declining interest in mathematics tracks, problems with the quality of learning, and difficulties in the relationship between the education system, engineering professions, and the labor market. The original research was not examined in full as part of this review, so there is no independent verification here of all its findings. In terms of the public debate, however, it raises a completely different question: not only who is teaching and what their political views are, but whether the system is capable of producing the engineers, scientists, and professionals on whom the same technological independence that the regime presents as a strategic objective is supposed to depend.

The same pattern also appears in the debate over the water crisis. An expert in the field called for an end to the expansion of irrigation without regard for resource constraints, and for local users to be included in managing aquifers and reducing extraction. This is a policy proposal, not an approved program, but it returns to the same point: not every national problem can be solved through greater top-down control. In some areas, the state instead needs long-term cooperation with the public, experts, and local actors.

The Test of Resilience Is Moving From Declarations to Results

The cumulative picture is not one of an Iran abandoning deterrence, nor is it one of a system that has already decided that the war must continue at any cost. Tehran continues to exchange responses with the United States over the Hormuz proposal, while the foreign minister threatens Israel and the new defense minister speaks of accelerating production in preparation for the possibility of another confrontation. The government promises to turn savings into assistance, but workers’ representatives warn that the Kalabarg cannot replace wages. The healthcare system is preparing for an increase in illness while parts of the pharmaceutical supply chain remain disrupted, and voices are already appearing in the media asking whether “steadfastness” that fails to produce improvements in citizens’ lives can remain a policy indefinitely.

This, in effect, is the test facing Pezeshkian and the system as a whole. Not whether it can present a figure for savings, but whether the money reaches the Kalabarg. Not whether it can declare that Iran does not need gasoline imports, but whether the public feels that the savings are being returned to it. Not whether it can produce more missiles, but whether at the same time it can maintain access to medicines, wages, employment, and an education system capable of producing the workforce it will need even after the war.

Externally, Iran continues to speak the language of strength, deterrence, and cards that have not yet been placed on the table. At home, the question is becoming simpler: how long can the public be asked to pay the price of steadfastness before it demands to see what it is getting in return.