The exile of terrorist operatives is often perceived as an effective strategic measure: it removes them from familiar territory, disrupts their organizational grip, and serves as a powerful deterrent. In Palestinian culture, the connection to the land is considered sacred—”Take my daughters, take my home, but do not take my land.” Therefore, exile from the homeland is seen as a particularly severe punishment. However, in reality, this approach often turns out to be a double-edged sword that endangers Israel’s security interests. Instead of neutralizing terrorists, their exile helps them grow stronger.
The statistics are unequivocal: 82% of released security prisoners return to terrorism, whether in Judea and Samaria or outside Israel. Those deported abroad do not disappear from the equation; on the contrary, they find refuge in hostile countries that provide them with sympathy, support, and unrestricted mobility. Once settled, they forge connections with entities such as Iran, which sees them as strategic assets for rebuilding destroyed terrorist networks and expanding regional influence.
Israel cannot afford to ignore this threat. Hamas and Iran are now focusing their operational efforts on Judea and Samaria, turning exiled operatives into prime candidates for renewed terrorist activity. Many of them will find their way to countries like Qatar, Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia, where they will be welcomed with open arms, integrate into existing terror networks, and, free from persecution, gain new insights, strategies, and alliances. Ismail Haniyeh, for example, was deported to Marj al-Zuhur in 1992 but later returned as a senior Hamas leader. The deportations of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden only fueled the rise of al-Qaeda. Likewise, senior Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri, operating from Lebanon and Turkey, managed to orchestrate terror attacks in Judea and Samaria from afar.
In the current geopolitical climate, Israel has a significant window of opportunity in its fight against terrorism. U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House and his strong backing for Israel, alongside Europe’s inward focus due to threats from Putin’s Russia, allows Israel to intensify its anti-terror policies without facing severe international condemnation. As Europe is preoccupied with its security crises, Israel’s ability to act with greater operational freedom increases, enabling it to elevate its counterterrorism measures to new levels.
The Legal Challenge of Exiling Terrorists
From a legal standpoint, however, the exile of terrorists presents significant challenges. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the forced transfer of populations, including the deportation of prisoners. Many countries view this as a violation of international law, and international courts have previously ruled against states that expelled individuals for political or security reasons. For example, the United States transferred detainees from Guantanamo Bay to third countries, but some resumed terrorist activities. Britain attempted to deport radical cleric Abu Qatada to Jordan, but the European Court of Human Rights blocked it due to concerns over torture. Similarly, France expelled Islamist activists to North Africa, only to discover that some continued running terror networks from there. The conclusion is clear: deporting terrorists does not eliminate the problem—it merely relocates it.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the countries receiving these terrorists are often in regions where Israel’s operational reach is limited—whether due to geographical distance, diplomatic constraints, or logistical challenges. In contrast, security prisoners released into Judea and Samaria remain under close Israeli surveillance. This enables Israel to monitor their activities, recruit informants, and carry out immediate arrests when necessary. Their physical proximity also allows for targeted counterterrorism measures in case they return to terrorist activities—something far more challenging when they are in a foreign country.
A Shift from Prevention to Preemptive Elimination
Israel must abandon the revolving door policy of arrest-release-rearrest and transition from a preventative approach to a preemptive elimination strategy. Any released security prisoner who returns to terrorism must be marked for targeted elimination. Beyond that, Israel should remove restrictions on defining high-value targets so that even lower-ranking operatives who return to terrorist activities are deemed legitimate targets.
The message must be unequivocal: release from prison is not a free pass to continue terrorism. A more aggressive approach, based on focused, proactive operations, precise intelligence, and uncompromising military force, will prevent terrorists from resuming their activities in the future and ensure greater security for Israeli citizens.
