Psychological Asymmetry Post October 7: The Palestinian Perceptual War Strategy Against Israel

• Israel has had undisputed military victories against Hizbullah and Iran but has yet to achieve total success against Hamas.
• Hamas, and the Palestinian movement, have employed psychological strategies to embolden anti-Israel feelings, limit damage to their own image and to create and take advantage of internal dissent within Israel.
• This was largely achieved outside Israel by exploiting social change movements into accepting pro-Palestinian arguments as consistent with general human rights.
• Within Israel, the strategy of kidnapping Israelis and waging “tunnel warfare” enabled Hamas to remain relevant.
• Conventional military strategy that fails to consider perceptual and psychological aspects of war will not succeed in achieving war goals.

The Military Gain and the Psychological Loss

The past two years have seen Israel engaged in three wars within a war. First, the initial war against Hamas in Gaza. Second, the war against Hizbullah in Lebanon, and third, the “12-day war” against Iran. Alongside these major wars, Israel also experienced an ongoing battle against Judea and Samaria-based terror, Houthi ballistic missile attacks, and attacks emanating from Syria and Iraq.¹

In military terms, Israel certainly seems to have damaged the enemy more than the enemy has managed to damage Israel. In two of the wars, against Hizbullah and Iran, Israel emerged as a clear “winner.” But perhaps the most significant war faced by Israel was not a strictly military one, but rather a more cognitive, perceptual, or psychological one. That war continues to be waged not against a physical target but rather against a “narrative,” the story of what is actually happening between Israel and those who wish to destroy it. That is a war where Israel’s enemies have gained the upper hand.

The evidence is quite clear. More countries are declaring their support to recognize “Palestine,”² more Israelis feel unwelcome around the world,³ and more internal dissent has been sown within Israel around what is undoubtedly the key issue in the conflict with Gaza, the continuing captivity of kidnapped Israelis.⁴

How It All Began

While October 7, 2023, is considered the start of the “war,” the psychological war between Israel and the Palestinians started long before that. In fact, the military success of the October 7 war serves to reinforce and expand an already present anti-Israel narrative promoted by none other than the United Nations that focused on Palestinian dispossession known as the “Nakba” which began in 1948.⁵ Even the “genocide” libel, which became a central mantra in the Palestinian psychological armamentarium, started long before October 2023, as highlighted in a paper by the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) on the genocide of the Palestinian people.⁶

The strategy for Hamas comes straight out of the playbook for social change, as noted by the CCR:

Narrative shifting: We use media and thought leadership to challenge dominant narratives and make space for the voices and experiences of those who have been pushed to the margins. These tactics allow us to shape public opinion about the issues we fight, which can initially be seen as controversial, and create opportunities to dismantle institutionalized power while building the power of social movements.⁷

The CCR goes on to succinctly state “why we win,” as follows:

We partner with social movements because true social change does not come out of a courtroom, although legal and advocacy work can be a powerful tool to demand accountability that can lead to social change. We win because our ‘client’ is ultimately social change, not the law itself.⁸

In partnering with or piggybacking on social change movements, Palestinian narratives have gained not only prominence but cultural acceptance. This, in turn, has fueled political acceptance, leading to the psychological success Palestinian nationalism has had despite, and perhaps due to, its military failure.

The Palestinian Strategy

The presence of kidnapped Israeli hostages in Gaza and the use of a massive system of subterranean tunnels has separated the Palestinian conflict from the other military successes Israel has had over the last two years and allowed the narrative-building strategy to take hold.

While Gaza was destroyed physically, the images of destruction and the rising death toll of undifferentiated Gazans allowed the narrative of genocide and ethnic cleansing to spread. It is the presence of hostages in urban areas, areas that Hamas operates out of, that has limited Israeli activity and hindered any military efforts to achieve the war’s goals, namely, to dismantle Hamas and free the hostages.⁹ The tunnel system has allowed Hamas to continue guerilla-type operations despite being decimated as an organized fighting force.¹⁰ Both these elements have resulted in continued Israeli military action, thus allowing the unconventional Palestinian strategy of building on their victim status to be reinforced. The bind for Israel in ending the war and possibly limiting ammunition for the Palestinian psychological war effort is that there has been no guarantee for either a full release of hostages held or a functional end to Hamas rule and possible future rearming.¹¹

Added to this backdrop is the state of domestic Israeli tensions, which preceded October 7, that morphed into an anti-government policy movement with respect to the hostages. The hostage situation created a social movement that strongly opposed Hamas but unintentionally contributed to the Palestinian war strategy. This, by consistent pressure that began soon after the start of the war to effect a hostage-prisoner exchange,¹² with many saying that dismantling Hamas should and could wait until after a hostage deal.¹³

The focus on social movements by pro-Palestinians is linked to the popular appeal of their message. Instead of terrorism, we get victimhood, and instead of blame, we get pity and compassion. Vivid images and articles claiming a starving Gazan population¹⁴ serve to strengthen these messages and paint Israel as responsible for what is being pushed as war crimes.¹⁵ This focus creates separation between Hamas as a terror group and a civilian population whose connection to Hamas is never mentioned. Ironically, the emphasis in Israel on clearly suffering hostages creates additional empathy with their fate but also has led to targeting the same alleged guilty party, namely those leading the Israeli war effort, enabling the pro-Palestinian allegation of Israeli war crimes.¹⁶

Lessons Learned

Consistent with the concept of “psychological asymmetry,”¹⁷ the last two years have demonstrated that military goals need to consider psychological objectives. A militarily defeated enemy that feels they have won is not really defeated. Sun Tzu, in “the Art of War,” says, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”¹⁸ Hamas has learned that lesson well and has managed to turn defeat into success by manipulating a gullible, naïve, and partially antisemitic world and, in the process, damaging Israel’s image, achieving recognition for Palestinian goals and maintaining its aura as a resistance force. As noted by Mordechai Kedar, “Even if only one of Hamas remained, with a severed leg and hand, he would stand on the remains of a destroyed mosque and raise his two fingers in a victory sign.”¹⁹

For Hamas and many Palestinian Arabs, October 7, 2023, remains a day they are proud of.

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Notes