Since the beginning of 2025, Hizbullah has been on a downward trajectory within Lebanon’s political landscape. After suffering continuous defeats from Israel and acknowledging its military shortcomings, Hizbullah reluctantly agreed to be represented by its counterpart, the Shia Amal movement, in negotiations regarding the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution calls for Hizbullah’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the surrender of its weapons to the state, even though Hizbullah’s secretary general, Naim Qassem, asserted that the resolution only pertained to southern Lebanon.
Hizbullah faced two significant setbacks when an American-backed candidate, General Joseph Aoun, was elected president after Hizbullah’s candidate, Souleiman Frangieh, withdrew from the race. Additionally, Judge Nawaf Slam was appointed as prime minister, replacing Hizbullah’s ally Najib Mikati, who had been caretaker prime minister since October 2022.
Moreover, Slam succeeded in forming a 24-member government without the active participation of a Hizbullah member, the first since 2008. Thus, Hizbullah’s grip over the Lebanese body politic, which had lasted for almost two decades, was neutralized.
The situation for Hizbullah worsened with the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria and its replacement by a Sunni anti-Hizbullah and anti-Iran government. Hizbullah recognized the severity of this loss, as the physical link with Iran through Iraqi territory was severed, disrupting the supply route which was essential for its military buildup. Not only did the flow of weapons stop, but the new Syrian regime also ceased to act as a base for Iran, preventing weapon convoys from entering Lebanon through illicit crossing points.
Hizbullah has claimed to have disbursed almost $400 million in compensation to families affected by Israeli military operations. Its bank, al-Qard el Hassan, was targeted by Israel, leading to a cash shortage and the suspension of its operations, leaving only Beirut International Airport available—though flights from Iran’s Mahan Air, suspected to be carrying cash, were soon prohibited.
Hizbullah’s response was not immediate. Initially, it continued to rebuild its forces and smuggle weapons from caches in Syria. The group focused on the northeastern Shia villages bordering Syria, particularly targeting local tribes (Zuweitar, Jaafar, and Mudeylah), traditional allies of Hizbullah. This strategy led to skirmishes with the new Syrian regime, which attempted—though unsuccessfully—to halt weapon convoys entering Lebanon.
Subsequently, Hizbullah turned its attention to the Lebanese home front, instigating “spontaneous” protests that originated in the Shia Beirut suburb of Dahiya and spread into Christian and Sunni neighborhoods of the capital, creating chaos and fear among residents. While facing accusations of inciting internal unrest, Hizbullah denied orchestrating these protests, claiming they were initiated by local leaders.
However, the tipping point came when Lebanese airspace was restricted for Iranian planes suspected of carrying cash to Hizbullah. According to reports, Israel threatened to target Beirut International Airport if those planes landed on Lebanese soil. Following a warning from the United States to Lebanese authorities, the government complied with Israel’s demands. This incited organized protests by Hizbullah supporters, blocking roads around the airport and attacking a UNIFIL convoy, resulting in injuries to its deputy chief and other officers. The Lebanese army was deployed to disperse the protests, leading to injuries among 23 soldiers and three officers.
In a bid to restore its tarnished image, Hizbullah announced that the official funeral for its slain secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, and his successor, Hashem Safi el-Din, would take place on February 23 at the Camille Chamoun Sports City in Dahiya. Thousands of followers, accompanied by armed militia, are expected to participate. Hizbullah asserted control over the sports complex without seeking permission and sent invitations to the president, prime minister, speaker of parliament, and numerous other political figures—a show of unprecedented strength.
It is clear that Lebanon now stands at a critical juncture. The previously untouchable phrase “civil war” is once again being mentioned, foreshadowing a potential clash that could paralyze the Lebanese political system. This may serve as a means for Hizbullah to regain influence and authority, which has been severely challenged since its conflict with Israel.
Israel’s decision regarding its withdrawal from southern Lebanon on February 18th is critical. The presence of five fortified positions along the Lebanese border will pose a significant challenge to the new Lebanese president and government. For Israel to withdraw, the Lebanese army must fully deploy in southern Lebanon and eliminate Hizbullah’s presence there.
If Israel remains in those strongholds, Hizbullah may seek to engage in conflict if they determine that the Lebanese army is incapable of confronting Israel’s military power. A renewed clash with Israel could bolster Hezbollah’s standing in its domestic conflicts and reinforce its position as a major political force in Lebanon. This situation could lead to either civil strife or renewed military confrontation.
