The 2025 Recognition of Palestine: How Europe and Its Partners Dismantled Oslo and Undermined Peace

In public international law (hereafter “PIL”), interference—often called intervention—refers to any action by a State or international organization that influences, coerces, or imposes decisions on other sovereign entities without their explicit consent. This principle, embedded in the UN Charter and international case law, has been severely tested by recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The New York conference of July 28-30, 2025, co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia, culminated in the New York Declaration on the two-State solution.¹ Led by an informal coalition including France, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia, this initiative triggered unilateral recognitions of Palestine: first by the UK on September 21,² followed by France on September 22 during the 80th UN General Assembly.³ While some praised these actions as advancing peace, they raise serious questions about their legality under PIL, particularly regarding the Oslo Accords (1993-1995),⁴ which established an exclusive bilateral framework for negotiating the “final status” of contested territories including Judea-Samaria, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

This analysis examines interference through PIL, exploring its legal foundations, manifestations, and relevant jurisprudence, demonstrating how these unilateral recognitions undermine both the Oslo framework and the stability of the global multilateral order.

I. Definition and Typology of Interference in Public International Law

Interference encompasses a spectrum of actions in PIL, evolving from the colonial-era concept of jus ad intervention to the near-absolute prohibition following the 1945 UN Charter. Article 2(1) of the Charter establishes sovereign equality among States, making interference a fundamental violation of this principle.

PIL experts typically identify three main categories of interference: direct, indirect or coercive, and treaty-related interference.

Direct interference involves armed force or physical coercion, prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter, which bans threats or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

Indirect or coercive interference includes diplomatic, economic, or political pressure, such as unilateral sanctions or premature recognition of territorial entities. Legal scholars describe this as “soft coercion”—particularly relevant to our analysis.

Treaty-related interference occurs when third States meddle with the execution or interpretation of bilateral treaties, violating the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt codified in Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter “VCLT”): “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”⁵

The events of September 22, 2025, including the French recognition of a state of Palestine exemplify the latter two categories, representing external interference in the Oslo Accords’ consensual framework on both contractual and territorial grounds.

Contractually, by unilaterally imposing a predetermined “final status”—borders based on the June 4, 1967, lines with minor territorial exchanges and East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital—the coalition violated the bilateral exclusivity established in Article V of the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles. This text explicitly reserves permanent status negotiations to “the two parties”—specifically “the Government of the State of Israel and the representatives of the Palestinian people” (Article V§2)—excluding any third party. This premature recognition transforms a carefully negotiated interim agreement into an obsolete framework, depriving Israel of its sovereign right to freely consent to territorial modifications.

Territorially, it amounts to de facto confiscation of 22% of Israeli-administered territory, including Judea-Samaria and East Jerusalem, declared “sovereign territory of the State of Palestine” without Israeli agreement, prejudging the outcome of the permanent status negotiations agreed to in the Oslo Accords, and violating the interim territorial divisions established by Oslo.

These actions contradict Oslo’s core principles: Article V stipulates that negotiations on borders and Jerusalem must occur exclusively between the two parties, without third-party intervention from entities like the Quartet, the New York conference, or leaders such as Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, and Mohammed bin Salman. By prejudging outcomes, the coalition substitutes its will for that of the signatories, effectively nullifying Article XXXI §7 of Oslo II, which preserves the parties’ existing rights. It could also be considered to be interference in a lex-specialis arrangement between Israel and the PLO, witnessed internationally by the US, Russia, EU, Norway, Egypt and Jordan and endorsed in several UN resolutions.

II. Normative Foundations: A Multi-layered Prohibition

The prohibition against interference rests on a hierarchical legal framework incorporating customary law, treaties, and UN resolutions—often obscured by political considerations in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

The 1945 UN Charter forms the cornerstone of this prohibition. Article 2(4) forbids threats or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence, a prohibition that jurisprudence has extended to non-armed coercion.

Article 2(7) prohibits UN intervention in matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction—a principle that extends by analogy to third States (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 of 1970 on friendly relations: “No State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another”).

The July 29, 2025 New York Declaration violates Article 2(7) by internationalizing a bilateral conflict reserved for the parties under Oslo I’s Article V. It imposes obligations on Israel without consent, including Palestinian Authority reforms and acceptance of 1967 lines as final borders It, as a purported lex specialis, imposes obligations on Israel without its consent — including requirements for Palestinian Authority reforms and the acceptance of the 1967 lines as final borders — thereby directly contravening Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which prohibits a State from aiding or assisting another State in committing an internationally wrongful act, such as the imposition of obligations or territorial arrangements without lawful consent.⁶ The UN, meant to uphold the Charter, becomes partisan: Secretary-General António Guterres, by endorsing the September 22 recognitions, engaged the organization’s responsibility for unlawful interference under Article 103 of the Charter, which prioritizes UN commitments without authorizing their violation.

The 1969 Vienna Convention reinforces this framework. Article 26 establishes pacta sunt servanda: treaties must be performed in good faith. Third States cannot induce violations or take prejudicial actions (Article 18). Article 52 nullifies treaties obtained through coercion, and the coordinated 2025 recognition exerts diplomatic pressure that taints any future Israeli consent. Article 34 reaffirms that third parties cannot alter bilateral treaties.

The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereafter “ARSIWA”, 2001) add that States aiding violations incur responsibility (Article 16).⁷ The coalition, aware of Oslo, assisted the Palestinian Authority in circumventing bilateralism through illegal, unconventional, and unilateral recognition.

Finally, UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 (2012) grants Palestinian non-member-state observer status contingent upon a negotiated settlement within the Oslo framework—a requirement the 2025 recognitions disregard.⁸ Moreover, the Oslo Accords were witnessed internationally, and international practice considers the witnessing of international documents as an obligation not to act to undermine the document.

III. Factual Application to the 2025 Situation: From Conference to Recognition

The Oslo Accords, through Article XXXI (7) of Oslo II, stipulate that interim arrangements do not prejudge final status issues, which are reserved for bilateral negotiations. The New York conference imposed an “international framework” characterized as interference by observers like UN Watch in its 2025 report, violating both the Charter and VCLT.

The coalition orchestrated interference in three synchronized phases:

1. Pre-determination of outcomes: The New York Declaration established non-negotiable parameters—Palestinian statehood along 1967 lines with minor exchanges, East Jerusalem as capital—contradicting Oslo I’s Article V, which reserves these issues for open bilateral negotiations.

2. Encouraging violations: On September 22 at 2:17 PM, France initiated negotiations for a Palestinian embassy in Paris, violating Oslo I’s Article IX, which prohibits formal diplomatic relations for the Palestinian Authority before final status agreement. This confers premature state attributes, rendering Oslo obsolete.

3. Historical guarantors’ betrayal: France and the United Kingdom, co-authors of the 1922 British Mandate (protected by Charter Article 80) and the 1917 Balfour Declaration, had heightened obligations of non-interference. Their 2025 reversal constitutes a normative betrayal, especially given the fact that France, as a EU member, is violating the EU status as witness to the Oslo Accords.

In just 73 days, this strategy dismantled a bilateral agreement under the guise of diplomatic progress—completely violating the international law the coalition claims to uphold.

IV. Consequences and Systemic Implications

The repercussions of these interferences are profound and far-reaching.

Legally, the coalition is complicit under ARSIWA Article 16, entitling Israel to proportionate countermeasures (Article 49): suspending fiscal transfers, and/or canceling agreements.⁹

On the ground, conditions worsen. Hamas, claiming to having retaken northern Gaza, celebrates the recognition as a “victory of jihad at the table” (September 25 statement). In the diaspora, antisemitic incidents have increased following the recognitions, with demonstrations in Paris, London, and Brussels linking Palestine to what they imaginatively see to be an Israeli defeat.

Systemically, this undermines multilateralism: the UN, as a potential party to this cautious arrangement, becomes a diplomatic belligerent, compromising its Charter. A dangerous precedent emerges, potentially applicable to other conflicts—Russia in Ukraine (Budapest 1994), China in Taiwan (1898 treaties), or Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh (2020 agreements).

September 22, 2025, marks not only Palestine’s recognition but potentially the end of the post-1945 international order, where bilateral treaties could still prevail over collective pressure.

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