President Biden, the president of Egypt, and the emir of Qatar have called for the renewal of negotiations on August 15 in Cairo or Doha to close a deal for the release of the Israeli hostages and a ceasefire in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office announced that they would respond to the call.
Senior Israeli officials express concern about the physical and mental condition of the hostages, as well as the appointment of Sinwar as the head of Hamas’s political bureau. They say this situation strengthens his demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the release of Marwan Barghouti in the first stage of the negotiations, the deployment of a multinational force after the war, and regarding the exile of freed prisoners, and bolsters his opposition to the Israeli presence in the Philadelphi corridor.
Sinwar understands that Israel is under American pressure to reach an agreement, while Israel needs the United States for weapons and defense ahead of the anticipated attack by the Iranian-Hizbullah axis, possibly with additional proxies. He also understands that the hourglass regarding the condition of the hostages is running out, and that the failure to free hostages alive will spell the political end of the Israeli government and its leader, and even more important, intensify the social division in Israel. Finally, Israel understands the possible connection between the ceasefire and the intensity of the expected Iranian-Hizbullah attack.
On the other hand, Sinwar—who is the architect of October 7 and a step away from being the “liberator of Palestinian prisoners” including those from Fatah, the military and political leader of Hamas, the “Moses” of the Palestinians as defined by Iranian journalism, and who maintains ties with the Iranian patron—must understand that if he is eliminated or if Israel continues until it totally destroys Hamas’s military forces, and the United States and moderate Arab states decide to deploy a multinational force in Gaza, he might be remembered as a shahid (martyr). But he will mainly be remembered as the destroyer of Gaza in light of the humanitarian crisis he created, especially if the multinational force and Israel implement a multiyear plan to salvage Gaza, create hope and future economic prospects, and carry out the necessary plan for a new education system to replace the framework of hate that he built (Amaliyat al-Tawiya).
The Israeli representatives at the negotiation table must always remember the mindset of the bitter enemy, the Hamas movement, and certainly of Sinwar, who views the conflict with Israel as a religious one, a conflict between Muslims and Jews where Palestine is sacred Islamic land not even an inch of which can be compromised.
There is no recognition of Israel’s right to exist; jihad is the path to its destruction and is the duty of every Muslim. The Land of Israel was conquered in the seventh century by Omar Ibn al-Khattab on his mission to spread the message of Islam beyond the Arabian Peninsula, where it originated, and thus Israel became Dar al-Islam. In the radical Islamist doctrine, if Dar al-Islam is conquered by non-Muslims, there is a religious obligation to liberate it through jihad. “Al-Istish-had fi sabeel Allah,” which means sacrificing one’s life in the service of Allah, is the core of such jihad. For the radical Islamists, the world is divided into Dar al-Islam where the Muslim Ummah (nation) lives and Dar al-Harb where the infidels live. Jihadists are constantly on a mission to seize parts of Dar al-Harb and thereby expand Dar al-Islam.
It should be understood that a “ceasefire” in Western terms is equivalent to a hudna (truce) in Hamas’s terms. A hudna is a temporary break from war and does not indicate a desire to end it and achieve peace. A hudna will occur only when Hamas concludes that the IDF is close to defeating it if the war continues. Only at that moment will Hamas call to negotiate a hudna—a tactical move in the jihadist war, aimed at taking a break to regroup and rearm to resume the battle. Jihadists can break the hudna whenever they feel that the enemy is weak enough and the situation is ripe for a surprise attack, similar to what happened on October 7.
The Islamic ideological basis for hudna is based on the Hudaybiyyah agreement of 628, which Muhammad signed with the Quraysh tribe of Mecca when his forces were inferior to theirs. After two years, the agreement was breached and Muhammad conquered the city of Mecca, even though the hudna was supposed to last 10 years.
In Sinwar’s eyes, a ceasefire or hudna is a tactical move enabling his personal and political survival. This is his interest no less than Israel’s, but he understands the art of manipulation, the pressures on Israel, and the advantage afforded by the axis-of-evil states in the inverse relationship between the size of Israel’s concessions and the intensity of the expected revenge.
Sinwar is preparing to maximize gains at the price of the hostages and to achieve an image of victory. On the Arab psychological level, victory is a fascinating phenomenon. What constitutes victory in Arab eyes can be seen in the October War Panorama Museum, the museum commemorating the Yom Kippur War in Egypt, and we will probably also see a victory image of a Palestinian child sitting on Sinwar’s lap amid the ruins in Gaza at the end of the Iron Swords War, proclaiming “V” with his finger. The victory will signify survival.
It is clear that Sinwar wants to remain in Gaza, coordinate moves with the axis of evil, and set a strategic trap for Israel that will prevent a return to warfare after the ceasefire. Although he allegedly opposes it, the possibility that the hostage deal will entail a consolation prize for Sinwar of escaping with his life and going to manage the Hamas political bureau in Qatar cannot be ruled out since it has already been managed abroad for decades—in Jordan, Syria, and Qatar since 2012. In that way, the Israeli hostages are returned, the war ends, the Hamas leadership leaves for Qatar to fulfill its role, and each side can claim victory.
There is no doubt that the return of the hostages is a moral obligation, especially given the jihadist strategy of the enemy, wherein agreements are temporary until an advantage or interest is achieved. Second, it should be clear beyond any doubt in Western and Arab eyes that the only one remaining responsible for the situation of the Israeli hostages is Yahya Sinwar. Islamic law states that the Islamic leader is the one who decides whether to kill the prisoners of war or demand a ransom for them. This law was established by the divine revelation to Muhammad in the Battle of Badr in 624 between his men and the people of Mecca. The main spoil was the prisoners, and a dispute arose regarding their fate.
Therefore, it is clear beyond any doubt that a second moral obligation is the elimination of Sinwar, wherever he may be—in a luxury hotel, a tunnel, or a shelter, so that against the image of the victorious Palestinian child in Sinwar’s lap, we can place his corpse.
