Iran Backs Hizbullah in its Refusal to Disarm

Almost nine months after Lebanon and Israel agreed to a ceasefire that ended a tumultuous year of armed conflict – during which Hizbullah suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Israel – the toll was devastating. More than 70 percent of Hizbullah’s missile arsenal and military infrastructure (including weapons depots, military industry, fortified positions, and tunnels) were destroyed. Of the 29 Shiite-majority villages along the border with Israel that served Hizbullah as fortified front-line positions, 22 were razed, displacing more than 100,000 residents who were forced to flee and seek refuge far from the battlefield.

However, Israel’s heaviest blow came with the targeting of Hizbullah’s leadership. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, his designated successor, most of Hizbullah’s senior commanders, and thousands of fighters were killed. More than 5,000 combatants died, with thousands more injured. Left with no alternative, Hizbullah agreed to the terms of the ceasefire as expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which stipulated the militia’s disarmament and the transfer of its arsenal to the Lebanese state – just as other militias had done after the Ta’if Agreement of 1989 that ended Lebanon’s civil war.

Yet Hizbullah’s agreement to disarm was merely a stalling tactic. Its leaders believed the Lebanese state would never be able to enforce it, given Hizbullah’s dominance. They were proven wrong when, against all odds, General Joseph Aoun was elected president on January 9, 2025, followed by the appointment of Sunni judge Nawaf Salam as prime minister. Neither was Hizbullah’s choice; both were supported by the United States and France.

Since November 2024, the United States has pressed Lebanon to issue a decision on Hizbullah’s disarmament, conditioning the lifting of sanctions and the provision of economic aid on compliance. Washington also aimed to encourage Gulf states to follow suit with financial assistance. The U.S. viewed Aoun as the right figure to reform Lebanon and dismantle the “mini-state” Iran had built through Hizbullah since 1982 – complete with its own economic, social, medical, educational, and banking networks.

Following the deaths of Nasrallah and his cousin-successor Hashem Safieddine, Iran appointed Naim Qassem as the new leader of Hizbullah. He was granted the title of sole representative of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His mission was clear: operate under the political cover of Nabih Berri, head of the Shiite Amal movement and speaker of parliament, while focusing on reorganizing Hizbullah and preparing it for the next confrontation.

It is noteworthy that Hizbullah – supposedly central to Iran’s strategy against Israel – received no support from Tehran during its confrontation with Israel. Even during the 12-day war in June between Israel and Iran, Hizbullah was not called upon to divert Israeli fire. The group’s priority was to recover from its losses and reinvent itself, especially amid geopolitical shifts in Syria, where Bashar al-Assad was toppled and replaced by a Sunni, anti-Iranian, and anti-Hizbullah regime.

By June 2025, however, Iran realized that under U.S. pressure, Hizbullah’s disarmament was becoming a real possibility. Tehran decided to intervene. On August 10, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, declared that Iran was “definitely opposed” to Hizbullah’s disarmament, describing the Lebanese government’s decision as a “dream that will not come true” and a policy dictated by the U.S. and Israel. He asserted that Iran would continue to support “the Lebanese people and the resistance.” Hizbullah also rejected the government’s plan, calling disarmament a “grave sin.” Velayati further remarked that Iran “already has one al-Jolani and does not need another,” referring to President Joseph Aoun’s anti-Iranian stance.

Velayati’s statement was followed by an unannounced visit from Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, on June 3. Araghchi described disarmament as an “internal Lebanese matter,” reiterated Iran’s unconditional support for Hizbullah, and warned that the government’s plan was a “grave mistake.”

The most telling event, however, came on August 13 with the visit of Ali Larijani, head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. His trip followed the Lebanese government’s decision to order the army to present a plan for Hizbullah’s disarmament by the end of August, with implementation to be completed by year’s end. Larijani received a public welcome from Hizbullah supporters en route from the airport but held stormy meetings with President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam. Photographs captured the tension in body language, underscoring the deep divisions between the two sides. While Larijani publicly praised the Lebanese government and the role of the “resistance,” he carefully avoided direct criticism of Hizbullah’s disarmament. His tone shifted dramatically, however, when he met Hizbullah officials and other Iranian-aligned groups at the Iranian embassy.

Following this meeting, Naim Qassem declared Hizbullah was ready to fight a battle reminiscent of Imam Hussein’s sacrifice at Karbala in 680, even raising the specter of civil war as a possible option. The message was clear: Hizbullah would resist at any cost and would not accept dictates from the government.

Possible Scenarios

1. Government Pushes Ahead – If the government approves the army’s disarmament plan, Shiite ministers could boycott, potentially collapsing the government and paralyzing the state.
2. Army Action Against Hizbullah – Such action risks splitting the army into sectarian units, as happened during Lebanon’s civil war.
3. Civil War – Renewed conflict could trigger Syrian intervention, repeating the scenario of 1976.
4. War with Israel – Hizbullah may redirect pressure outward by attacking Israel, framing itself as the sole force resisting occupation. This could ignite a new and open-ended war, possibly drawing in Iran.

One thing is certain: most Lebanese observers agree that Larijani’s visit shifted the balance of power in Lebanon. The country is now caught in an arm-wrestling match between the U.S. and Iran – one that may ultimately play out in broader negotiations between Tehran and Washington.