Summary
Iran, still reeling from its recent military defeat by Israel in the “12 Day War,” is working to reinforce its influence over regional proxies in its so-called “Ring of Fire.” Senior Iranian officials, including Ali Velayati, are engaging with pro-Iranian groups in Iraq, while Tehran continues to back Hizbullah in Lebanon, instructing the group to resist disarmament efforts by the Lebanese government. Iran seeks to limit the Lebanese Armed Forces’ growing capabilities while avoiding provoking new Israeli or U.S. attacks.
Despite bold rhetoric about missile capabilities and threats against Israel and the U.S., Iran is under pressure to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to avoid European sanctions, though hardliners in the Majles resist. At the same time, Iran accuses Israel of plotting against its leadership and uses propaganda to rally regional support. Beyond the Levant, Iran is also pressuring Armenia to block U.S. influence in the South Caucasus, particularly over the newly established Zangezur corridor, which threatens Iranian and Russian interests in regional trade.
Iran’s leadership continues its efforts to shore up political and military ties to its “Ring of Fire” sub-state proxies following its humiliating shellacking by Israel’s military.
Iran’s most prominent post “12-Day-War” move was to dispatch Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s most senior foreign policy advisor, former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Velayati, to meet with pro-Iranian elements in Iraq.
Iran also has assured the remaining networks of Lebanon-based Hizbullah of its continued support. Tehran will instruct Hizbullah’s new General Secretary Naim Qassem to resist the Beirut government’s effort to regain national sovereignty by attempting to disarm the terrorist group.
Iran is determined to prevent the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) from developing the strength to challenge Hizbullah in any future showdown. Initially, the LAF has made some progress in disarming smaller Palestinian armed groups inside refugee camps in Lebanon.
However, Iran will remain careful not to create a situation that will invite Israel to renew its attacks on Iranian military and/or terrorist support networks. Neither will Iran seek to disrupt the pause in U.S. attacks on Iranian targets. Nevertheless, Iranian military and political spokespersons will continue to emit braggadocio comments such as facetiously describing their readiness to re-engage Israel with more formidable weapons. One such comment from Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Nasirzadeh claimed that Iranian ballistic missiles can now reach U.S. cities. This boast is concurrent with Iran’s continued efforts to postpone a renewal of direct talks with the U.S., intimating that the time is not yet appropriate to do so.
These boasts are also a cover for Iran’s humiliating necessity to re-engage in talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to prevent the European powers of France, Germany, and the UK from threatening “snapback” severe sanctions. Iran must answer for its failure to cease additional enrichment of uranium and can no longer refuse to allow IAEA inspectors access to its nuclear facilities.
Iranian hardliners in the Majles, in opposition to any formal renewal of cooperation with the IAEA, passed a bill that forbade any visitation by UN inspectors to Iranian nuclear sites unless approved by the Supreme Council of National Security, an institution controlled by the Supreme Leader’s office.
Iran will also continue to heap verbal propaganda abuse upon Israel as it perceives that most of the world may consider its charges with at least as much credulity as Israel’s own attempt to justify its policy in Gaza and elsewhere in the Middle East. For instance, Tehran recently accused the IDF of planning to assassinate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at a National Security Council session.
One substantive move by the Iranian regime was to dispatch President Pezeshkian to Armenia to pressure Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to prevent American control or influence over the newly created trade route, the Zangezur corridor. Following President Trump’s negotiated effort to tamp down tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the talks produced an opportunity for the U.S. to diminish Iranian and Russian commercial influence by way of sponsoring the Zangezur corridor. The new 43 km (26.7 mi) byway connects Azerbaijan with its detached province of Nakhchivan as it runs through Armenian territory. The new route will reduce the influence of both Iran and Russia in the South Caucasus Region. Tehran fears, quite correctly, that this will create an opportunity for the U.S. and its ally Israel to make mischief on Iran’s border. This is why Iran pejoratively refers to the new trade route as the “Trump Corridor.”
