An analysis of Iranian realities as reflected in the press between 27 and 29 December 2025 presents a country under an almost unprecedented economic and political siege. Iran is attempting to maneuver between external military threats, a tightening sanctions regime, and the erosion of domestic social capital. The presentation of the 1405 (2026) budget has become a central point of friction between the government of Masoud Pezeshkian and an antagonistic parliament, while the currency and gold markets are recording historic lows that call the very stability of the state into question.
Nuclear Issue and Negotiations with the West / IAEA
On the nuclear file, the tone is one of deadlock and rejection of imposed dictates. The activation of the European “snapback” mechanism is entrenched in public consciousness as the event that prevented a return to the classical diplomatic track. Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi repeatedly emphasizes that “Iran’s nuclear issue has no military solution”—neither for Iran nor for its adversaries.
The official line is clear: despite damage to various facilities during the “12-day war,” Iran will not relinquish its right to continue enrichment. Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeid Iravani, openly rejects the U.S. demand for “zero enrichment” as a condition for renewing negotiations, presenting it as an attempt to entrench relations of subordination rather than to address genuine security concerns.
Against this backdrop, there is a growing understanding in the press that the direct diplomatic channel with the West is blocked for the foreseeable future. Instead of speaking about a “return to the agreement,” discourse is shifting toward concepts such as “economic diplomacy” and “strengthening the eastern axis”: deepening ties with Russia, Belarus, China, and other actors as a counterweight to sanctions and as an effort to reshape the international pressure environment surrounding Tehran.
Foreign and Regional Policy
On the regional and international stage, attention is once again focused on Washington—this time via Mar-a-Lago. Benjamin Netanyahu’s fifth visit this year to Donald Trump is described in the Iranian press as a “trap” laid by Israel for the American president, aimed at drawing the United States into another confrontation—this time over Iran’s missile program. Headlines stress that Netanyahu needs external escalation to overcome political and legal crises at home, while portraying Trump as someone who may exploit the “Iran card” for domestic campaign purposes.
In parallel, another unusual Israeli move—the recognition of the independence of “Somaliland”—is presented in Tehran as the spearhead of a broader Israeli–Emirati strategy intended to establish a foothold in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Iranian newspapers warn that this move undermines not only Iran’s security but also that of Egypt and the wider Muslim world, describing it as an attempt to encircle Iran with a new “geo-strategic fan.”
In the Syrian and Lebanese arenas, the tone becomes more cautious. On the one hand, there is continued talk of the “axis of resistance” and the legitimacy of Hezbollah as a defensive force against Israel. On the other hand, reports emerge of secret Russian mediation between Jerusalem and the Jolani administration in northern Syria—a development that raises concern in Tehran about being pushed out of a space into which it has invested blood, money, and political capital for years.
This sense of a blow to sovereignty is compounded by prominent news of the assassination of former Afghan general Akram al-Din Sari in the heart of Tehran, an incident attributed to Taliban-linked elements. The very possibility that such groups could operate lethally in the capital raises troubling questions about the regime’s ability to maintain security control in what should be the most protected area of all.
Domestic Politics
Within the political system itself, the final days of December mark a further escalation. The radical conservative faction in the Majles has begun collecting signatures for an interpellation against President Pezeshkian, a move described in newspapers as an “act of revenge” not only against the president but also against his close adviser Mohammad Javad Zarif and the entire policy line of the government. The interpellation serves as a tool to block the budget, attack foreign policy, and send a message that the radical parliament does not intend to allow the president to become the “new face” of the republic.
Pezeshkian himself continues to speak in the language of “vafaq” (national consensus), employing religious and moral rhetoric to emphasize the need for internal unity in the face of external threats. His critics in the Majles, however, portray him as a “preacher at the gate”—someone who knows how to speak about reconciliation but struggles to manage a complex executive system under fire.
Hovering above the political confrontation is the budget. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf publicly notes that a 20 percent wage increase “does not match inflation,” a statement that places the battlefield where it hurts most: in the public’s pocket. The implication is clear—the parliament signals that it has no intention of granting the president political credit for a budget perceived as inadequate and seeks to redefine who speaks in the name of the “injured people.”
Economy
In the economic arena, the numbers speak for themselves—and they speak the language of crisis. The dollar crosses the level of 140,000 tomans, and the gold coin trades at around 166 million tomans. Newspapers describe this as a “catastrophe for the middle class”: anyone whose savings are denominated in rials sees them erode daily, and any long-term economic planning becomes nearly impossible.
Against this backdrop, President Pezeshkian delivers a speech notable for its candor. “They say wages are low—yes, they are low. They say we collect too much in taxes—yes, we collect a lot,” he says. These lines, widely quoted, are perceived as a kind of confession—an attempt to speak plainly to a public that long ago stopped believing slogans about “prosperity just around the corner.”
The new budget is officially defined as a “Baqa” (survival) budget. It is based on eliminating the preferential exchange rate for basic goods and moving to a system of electronic vouchers (kalabarg). From the government’s perspective, this is intended to reduce rents and corruption linked to subsidized foreign currency; from the perspective of the public and medical professionals, it poses a clear danger of sharp price increases in medicines, food, and basic services.
The gap between declarations about “market control” and reality is succinctly captured in a remark by cleric Ahmad Alam al-Hoda: “Price increases are no longer daily—they have become hourly.” This quote, which becomes a headline, reflects the sense of disintegration of oversight mechanisms and the understanding that even parts of the religious establishment are now serving as a voice of public despair rather than merely a mouthpiece for the regime.
Society, Protest, Women, and Human Rights
On the social level, feelings of insecurity and despair are intensifying. The murder of the young woman Elaha by a ride-hailing taxi driver shocks public opinion and returns to the headlines the issue of violence against women, as well as the fact that the “Women’s Security Protection” law has been awaiting full legislative passage for 13 years. This delay is perceived as proof of the power of conservative lobbies and institutional indifference in the face of a reality of gender-based violence.
At the same time, reports emerge of the death of actress Shirin Yazdan-Bakhsh and widespread eulogies for intellectual Kamran Fani. In cultural discourse, they are presented as more than just two additional names on a list of the deceased: their deaths symbolize, in the eyes of many writers, the “quiet emptying” of the cultural elite—a generation of intellectuals and artists who upheld values of knowledge, critique, and language, confronted by a wave of commercialization, superficiality, and escapism.
Against this heavy backdrop, the establishment seeks to project technological strength. The simultaneous launch of three satellites—“Paya,” “Zafar-2,” and “Kowsar”—is presented as proof that “Iranian willpower has reached space as well.” Yet irony seeps in here too: the Minister of Communications himself admits dissatisfaction with the quality of the country’s internet. In the reformist press, this gap—between satellites in space and faltering internet at home—becomes a symbol of a policy that prioritizes image achievements over solving citizens’ everyday problems.
Conclusion
In summing up the discourse of late December, a clear warning emerges: the social capital of the Islamic Republic is undergoing accelerated erosion. The public sees the budget, the currency market, the confrontations in the Majles, the stalled laws, and the incidents of violence, and feels that its voice is scarcely heard. The budget, the nuclear issue, the satellites, and the grand speeches are all experienced through a single prism: are daily lives becoming safer, cheaper, and more predictable—or the opposite? According to the newspaper pages of these days, the answer is clear, and it does not favor the regime.
