Summary
A diplomatic dispute revealed deep tensions between U.S. expectations and Lebanon’s political realities regarding Hizbullah’s status. While the United States classifies the group as a terrorist organization, Lebanon manages it as an embedded political and social actor within a fragile confessional system. The Lebanese Army’s refusal to adopt the U.S. designation reflects concerns about internal stability, sectarian balance, and institutional cohesion. The episode underscores the structural double bind between international policy demands and domestic survival imperatives.
Key Takeaways
- The confrontation highlights a fundamental divide between a binary U.S. security framework and Lebanon’s confessional political system, where internal stability often overrides clear legal classifications.
- Hizbullah occupies a legally ambiguous yet politically entrenched position, participating in parliament and cabinet while avoiding formal party registration and full state oversight.
- The Lebanese Armed Forces face institutional constraints that make labeling Hizbullah a terrorist organization potentially destabilizing, risking sectarian fragmentation and weakening the state itself.
In early February 2026, an unusual diplomatic confrontation unfolded between U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham and Lebanon’s military leadership, exposing the structural tension between American policy and Lebanon’s internal political reality. During a scheduled meeting in Washington, Senator Graham asked Lebanese Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal directly whether he regarded Hizbullah as a terrorist organization. Haykal replied: “No, not in the context of Lebanon.”
Dissatisfied, Graham reportedly ended the meeting abruptly and later wrote on X that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) could not be considered a “reliable partner” so long as such a position prevailed. He reiterated that Hizbullah has “American blood on its hands” and has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States since 1997.
This exchange did not merely reflect a personal disagreement. It illuminated two fundamentally different frameworks. Washington operates within a legal-security paradigm in which organizations are classified in binary terms: terrorist or partner. Beirut operates within a confessional political system in which internal stability often takes precedence over doctrinal clarity. What appears in Washington as evasion appears in Beirut as survival.
Hizbullah’s Legal Ambiguity
General Haykal’s response reflects a decades-long balancing act embedded in Lebanon’s political order. Political parties in Lebanon are formally governed by the 1909 Ottoman Law of Associations, which requires organizations to submit an ‘ilm wa khabar (notice of establishment) to the Ministry of Interior. Hizbullah has never filed this paperwork.
Yet despite the absence of formal registration, Hizbullah is not treated domestically as a mere militia. It holds seats in parliament and cabinet portfolios. Because it is not officially registered as a political party, its candidates run under the electoral list “Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc” (Kutlat al-Wafaa lil-Muqawama). Legally, these are individual candidates who form a parliamentary bloc after election. This technical arrangement allows Hizbullah to avoid state oversight of internal bylaws, funding mechanisms, and membership structures—requirements imposed on formally registered parties.
Hizbullah, for its part, argues that its legitimacy derives not from administrative registration but from successive Lebanese government policy statements. Since the early 1990s, most cabinet declarations have included the formula “Army, People, Resistance.” Hizbullah interprets this as state-level recognition of its role as a component of national defense rather than as a voluntary association subject to regulatory supervision. Registration, in its view, would reduce it to the status of a nongovernmental organization and undermine its claim to sovereign “resistance” status.
In practice, the Lebanese state interacts with Hizbullah as a political actor: it allocates cabinet positions, coordinates on policy matters, and incorporates its bloc into parliamentary coalitions. Hizbullah has thus achieved a paradoxical status—participating in the state without being fully subordinated to its administrative framework.
The Army’s Institutional Constraint
For the commander of the Lebanese Army to label Hizbullah a terrorist organization would not be a symbolic gesture; it would constitute a destabilizing institutional act. Hizbullah represents a substantial segment of Lebanon’s Shiite population and maintains an extensive social-service infrastructure—schools, hospitals, and welfare networks. It is deeply embedded in the social fabric.
The Lebanese Armed Forces are structured as a cross-confessional institution designed to prevent sectarian fragmentation. A significant portion of its rank-and-file is Shiite, many with familial or communal ties to Hizbullah. A formal designation of Hizbullah as a terrorist organization by the Army Chief would amount to branding sitting ministers and elected parliamentarians as criminals. Such a move would risk constitutional crisis, military defections, and potentially the unraveling of the armed forces themselves—echoing the fragmentation that preceded the 1975–1990 civil war.
Historically, the Lebanese state also recognized Hizbullah’s right to “resist” Israeli occupation, particularly in southern Lebanon. Although this position has become increasingly contested—especially after the 2024 ceasefire—the institutional posture of the LAF remains one of managed coexistence. The army seeks to preserve internal equilibrium while gradually asserting its claim to be Lebanon’s sole legitimate armed force.
Thus, when General Haykal stated that Hizbullah is not a terrorist organization “in the context of Lebanon,” he was not necessarily endorsing its methods or ideology. He was articulating the state’s internal logic: classifications that may be operative internationally are not mechanically transferable into Lebanon’s domestic equilibrium.
Is There a Strategic Double Bind?
Senator Graham’s frustration is understandable. The LAF depends heavily on U.S. funding, training, and military assistance. American support has long been justified on the premise that the Lebanese state should ultimately monopolize the use of force and disarm non-state militias, including Hizbullah.
From Washington’s perspective, the army’s reluctance to adopt the U.S. terrorist designation appears as double-speak. From Beirut’s perspective, it is a calibrated ambiguity. By stating “not in the context of Lebanon,” Haykal avoided contradicting the U.S. designation outright while refraining from triggering domestic destabilization.
In essence, Hizbullah occupies a structural position within Lebanon’s political order. It is embedded in parliament, cabinet, and communal representation. Its sudden eradication is not an operational scenario but a systemic shock that would threaten the integrity of the Lebanese state itself.
General Haykal’s answer, therefore, was less a rhetorical maneuver than a reflection of Lebanon’s governing reality. In Washington, the analytic framework is categorical. In Beirut, it is transactional and precariously balanced. What appears as ambiguity abroad is, internally, a mechanism of survival.
