Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs

Recently, the Iranian Supreme National Security Council convened an emergency meeting. The issues on the agenda were the most urgent: operational readiness and internal suppression. They discussed several topics, first and foremost:

In recent days, there have been reports of a massive deployment of “Sarallah” units, the elite Revolutionary Guard forces responsible for securing Tehran, at central squares and strategic intersections.

There is no internet. The public has shifted to using SMS. However, the regime is operating advanced monitoring systems to detect keywords in text messages in order to arrest protest organizers before they take to the streets.

One of the clearest signs of the regime’s concern about losing loyalty among local policing forces is its growing reliance on external actors. Reports from recent days indicate the arrival of “advisors” and special units from “Hashd al-Shaabi” (the Shiite militias from Iraq) to the provinces of Khuzestan and Sistan-Baluchestan, as well as to Tehran and Mashhad.

Fatemiyoun Division: The regime continues to recruit stateless Afghan refugees. There are approximately half a million refugees within Iran’s borders, lured by promises of dollar salaries and Iranian identification documents, to serve as “cannon fodder” on the front lines of confrontations with protesters.

The regime is operating under a geographically based “risk management” approach. In core cities such as Tehran, Mashhad, and Isfahan, the emphasis is on visible presence (show of force) to deter the middle class. In Kurdish areas such as Mahabad, Ilam, and Sanandaj, and in Baluchi regions, repression is far more lethal. There, the regime employs light artillery and surveillance drones, out of concern that armed resistance groups may exploit the civil unrest for military activity.

The elimination of Khamenei would undoubtedly mark the beginning of the regime’s collapse. Historically, centralized regimes rely on a “cult of personality” and a hierarchy in which all decisions converge on a single individual. When that figure disappears suddenly, an internal succession struggle begins, weakening the regime’s ability to suppress. A historical example is the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death in 1953. Although the regime did not collapse immediately, the death of the centralized dictator led to internal power struggles, including the elimination of Beria, head of the secret police, and initiated the process of “de-Stalinization” that undermined the foundations of the Communist Party over time. In the Iranian case, such a vacuum would prevent the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards from receiving clear orders at a critical moment.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz turns against Iran. Within a few weeks of an American blockade, there would be a technical collapse of resources. The issue of water infiltration into oil wells is critical. In the oil industry, once drilling stops and reservoir pressure changes, the damage can be irreversible or extremely costly to repair. A historical example is Venezuela from 2019 to the present. The combination of heavy American sanctions and mismanagement of the national oil company led to a situation in which Venezuela, despite having the largest oil reserves in the world, could not produce oil for sale. The result was a total collapse of the electricity grid, hyperinflation, and shortages of basic food that drove millions to flee. In Iran, oil is not just money. It is the channel through which the regime pays its security apparatus.

When a state loses $500 million a day, it loses the ability to subsidize essential goods such as bread, fuel, and electricity. History shows that as long as the public is hungry but the regime remains well-resourced and unified, it can survive. But when the economy collapses to the point where the ordinary soldier cannot feed his family, loyalty breaks. A historical example is the French Revolution of 1789. France’s deep economic crisis, combined with droughts that led to bread shortages, drove the masses into the streets. The royal army, composed of people whose families were also suffering from hunger, eventually refused to fire on the protesters. This is the moment when a regime begins to fail, when its coercive power no longer obeys it.

If the elements are brought together, they form a potentially destabilizing equation: leadership vacuum, infrastructure collapse, and extreme economic pressure leading to loss of control over the streets.

So why is the regime still confident? The Iranian leadership is relying on a “resistance economy” and smuggling networks through Iraq, Afghanistan, and China. They believe that as long as the “core of control” retains weapons and food, they will be able to suppress any uprising, even at a high human cost. The key lies in Washington. If the Americans allow flexibility in sanctions, the regime may sustain itself. If the pressure is airtight, oil assets could become liabilities, and time would work against the regime at an accelerating pace.

We are at a moment of mounting pressure, with signs of instability already visible. Yet timing is shaped by external considerations. The World Cup, beginning on June 11, creates a global preference for stability over disruption. At the same time, the U.S. political calendar is moving toward midterm elections, with campaign dynamics intensifying from the summer.

History suggests that when American leadership is caught between strategic objectives and electoral pressures, compromise often follows. For policymakers in Washington, developments in Tehran may be weighed less as decisive geopolitical turning points and more as variables within a broader political calculus. The tension between long-term strategy and short-term stability remains unresolved.