Oman Continues Talking to Tehran, Trump Signals a Decision
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Omani counterpart, Badr al-Busaidi, about developments in the region, the war in Yemen, and the possibility of promoting stability. No details were released about a new proposal or an agreed framework, but the conversation itself shows that Oman’s mediation channel remains active.
Oman has extensive experience mediating between Iran and the United States. It can relay messages without requiring the parties to meet, test in advance whether a particular proposal is acceptable, and reduce the risk that a public statement will close the door to compromise.
At the same time, the Mehr News Agency, citing Al Jazeera, reported that U.S. President Donald Trump said the war with Iran “may end soon” and that an American decision would be made shortly. The report was not accompanied by a complete official transcript, so it should be regarded as a political signal rather than an announcement that an agreement is imminent.
The talks with Oman and Trump’s remarks do not stand alone. Tehran continues to demand relief from the naval blockade, an end to the fighting, the lifting of sanctions, and the release of frozen assets. Washington is seeking verifiable Iranian steps in the nuclear and security spheres. Mediators can convey proposals, but they cannot resolve the dispute over who must act first.
Concern about Russia’s role is also being voiced within Iran’s moderate camp. Shargh warned that Iran could shift from being an independent actor to becoming a subject discussed between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The newspaper stressed that there is no evidence that Moscow has already traded away Iranian interests, but there is also no clarity about what Tehran is receiving in return.
The concern is not that Russia will stop supporting Iran altogether. It is that Moscow may prefer an arrangement that serves its relations with Washington and its interests in the region, even if it does not grant Tehran everything it demands. From the moderates’ perspective, Russia cannot be made the principal guarantor of Iran’s future without knowing what it is promising the other side.
The Tanker Caught Fire, but the Cause Is Still Unknown
The Iranian Navy announced that a tanker that had switched off its identification system and entered a restricted area caught fire east of the Strait of Hormuz. The statement did not provide the tanker’s full name, its flag, information about its crew, or evidence explaining how the fire started.
The Automatic Identification System, AIS, broadcasts information such as a vessel’s position, course, and speed, allowing authorities and other ships to track maritime traffic. Switching it off can raise suspicion, but it does not prove that the tanker was engaged in prohibited activity, nor does it in itself explain the fire.
It can therefore be established that the Navy issued a statement about the incident. There is not enough information to determine what caused it, who was responsible, or whether it involved military action.
Shortly afterward, Ali Azimai, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ naval forces, claimed that U.S. vessels had moved away from the strait because of their vulnerability and “do not dare approach”. The claim was not accompanied by vessel locations, photographs, or external confirmation.
For the Revolutionary Guards, the statement matters even without complete proof. It is intended to portray Hormuz as an arena in which U.S. military superiority is not absolute and as a place where Iran can impose costs even on an adversary stronger than itself.
That message also feeds into the negotiations. The more dangerous passage through the strait is perceived to be, the greater the pressure on Washington and the Gulf states to reach an arrangement. At the same time, insurance, shipping, and import costs also rise for Iran itself. Hormuz gives Tehran leverage, but using it is not free.
The Nuclear Threat Escalates, but Official Policy Has Not Yet Changed
Nuclear rhetoric in Iran is becoming more aggressive. The head of the Friday Prayer Policy Council called for a reassessment of the country’s nuclear doctrine and asked why Iran continues to remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The treaty, known by the acronym NPT, requires states that are not recognized as nuclear powers not to develop nuclear weapons and places their nuclear activities under international oversight. In return, it recognizes their right to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes.
An Iranian withdrawal from the treaty would not be merely a symbolic change. It could further reduce oversight, heighten fears that Iran is moving toward a nuclear weapon, and trigger additional escalation. As of this morning, no decision has been announced by the government, parliament, or the Supreme National Security Council to withdraw from the treaty or change the nuclear doctrine.
The significance of the call lies in its timing and the platform on which it appeared. When such a position appears in Kayhan and is attributed to an establishment figure, it functions as a threat: if the United States continues to exert pressure, voices demanding a shift toward a more extreme nuclear policy will grow stronger.
Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi also warned that if the United States returns to the military track, this time the consequences of the war “will extend beyond the borders of the region”. On the one hand, the Foreign Ministry is keeping the door open through Oman. On the other, it is signaling in advance that the failure of the talks will lead to broader escalation.
None of this proves that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon or withdraw from the treaty. It is a deliberate attempt to raise the cost of failure, aimed both at the U.S. administration and at the countries trying to mediate.
4.2 Million Families Have Registered, but the System Is Still Struggling
The deadline for submitting declarations to receive an increase in food-card credit has been extended until October 16. According to the head of the Information Technology Organization, more than 4.2 million heads of household have already completed the form.
The system was designed to identify families eligible for additional assistance, but dependencies among several databases and heavy demand have slowed the process. Applicants are required to receive a text message, enter identification details, and navigate a digital system that has already struggled to handle tens of millions of visits.
The first phase includes, among others, three-person households earning less than 20 million tomans a month and owning neither a home nor a car. Recipients of support from welfare institutions are also expected to be included.
The criteria are intended to focus a limited budget on the most vulnerable population. In practice, they create a sharp dividing line between a family just below the threshold and one just above it. A person may own an old car needed for work or earn slightly more than the income ceiling and still struggle to afford food.
The size of the additional payment, 500,000 tomans, has drawn criticism in media outlets associated with workers. According to the criticism, the amount does not come close to keeping pace with the rising cost of the consumer basket, while the registration process has become the “Seven Labors of Rostam”.
The expression refers to a story from the Shahnameh, the Persian epic, in which the hero Rostam must overcome seven difficult trials. Its use here captures the absurdity from the citizen’s perspective: to receive a limited food supplement, applicants must navigate a lengthy bureaucratic process through a system that does not always work.
Forecast of a Deep Recession and Inflation of About 79 Percent
Donya-e-Eqtesad reported that the International Monetary Fund’s forecast for Iran’s economic growth in 2026 had deteriorated from minus 5.4 percent to minus 7.6 percent. The inflation forecast is approaching 79 percent. The article cited two slightly different figures, 78.9 and 78.6 percent, so it is appropriate to treat them as an estimate of roughly 79 percent.
A contraction of 7.6 percent means that overall economic activity is expected to be significantly lower than in the previous year. The forecast is not predetermined and could change if a political agreement is reached, sanctions are eased, or trade recovers. Even so, it puts the assistance program in the proper context: the government is not distributing additional food support during an ordinary slowdown, but at a time when production is eroding and purchasing power is collapsing.
The currency market, by contrast, saw some relief. The free-market dollar fell by about 7,000 tomans to roughly 255,700 tomans, a two-week low. The decline came after the central bank increased the supply of foreign currency.
The stock market also rose. The main index gained 1.52 percent, while approximately 5.5 trillion tomans in funds from private investors flowed into trading.
These figures do not necessarily signal a recovery. The central bank can influence the dollar exchange rate by injecting foreign currency into the market, at least for a limited period. Buying stocks may reflect an attempt to protect money against inflation, particularly when companies hold tangible assets or earn revenue from exports.
The automotive sector illustrates the gap. Its Purchasing Managers’ Index rose to 49 points but remained below the 50-point threshold separating expansion from contraction. Production improved compared with August, while new orders fell to 48.2 points. Factories can produce more cars for a limited period, but if there are not enough buyers, the improvement cannot be sustained.
Truck Drivers Get Higher Rates, but Their Expenses Are Rising Faster
The deputy chairman of the truck drivers’ union warned that raising freight rates does not solve drivers’ difficulties. According to him, “raising freight prices is not the solution; truck drivers’ expenses must be brought under control”.
Those expenses include tires, oils, spare parts, and repairs, many of which are affected by the exchange rate and import difficulties. If freight rates rise but the price of a tire or imported part rises faster, the driver does not benefit from the adjustment.
The union also mentioned the ton-kilometer pricing plan, which was introduced as early as 2018 but has never been fully implemented. Under the system, freight prices are supposed to take into account both the weight of the cargo and the distance traveled, rather than being determined through rates that do not always reflect the true cost.
The problem extends beyond the industry itself. Almost every product in Iran travels by truck at some stage. Higher transportation costs ultimately reach the price of food, medicine, and raw materials, even when the government tries to prevent those increases from immediately appearing on store shelves.
30 Million Liters of Fuel a Day: An Official Claim That Still Lacks Evidence
The commander of the Economic Security Police estimated that approximately 30 million liters of fuel are smuggled out of Iran every day, including at least 25 to 26 million liters of diesel.
No dataset, calculation methodology, or breakdown of seizures was published alongside the estimate. The figure should therefore not be treated as independently verified data. It does, however, show how the state explains shortages and lost revenue: not only through high consumption, weak infrastructure, or flawed pricing, but as a security problem involving organized smuggling.
The gap between the price of subsidized fuel inside Iran and its price across the border creates a significant incentive for smuggling. As long as that gap remains large, enforcement can stop some of the activity but cannot eliminate the profit that drives it.
Once again, the state is addressing the result. The police are developing a six-stage plan to combat smuggling, while the subsidy mechanism continues to turn every liter that successfully crosses the border into a potential source of profit.
Crises Are Returning Faster Than People Can Recover
The Health Ministry’s director of mental health said that at least ten percent of hospital beds should be allocated to psychiatry. In practice, the number of beds, particularly in densely populated cities, falls short of what is needed.
The physical shortage is coinciding with growing psychological strain. A spokesperson for the Iranian Psychiatric Association explained that recurring crises “reduce people’s opportunity to recover”, increase fatigue and anxiety, and shorten their planning horizon.
He warned against describing Iranian society as a whole as collapsing. This is an important distinction. There is no data showing that the entire public is experiencing a mental health crisis or that society has ceased to function. The picture is one of cumulative erosion: people continue to work, study, and manage their families, but they do so as the intervals between crises grow shorter.
Economic anxiety and war are not separate issues. Someone who does not know whether their workplace will remain open, whether medicine will be available, or whether they will be able to connect to the internet finds it difficult to plan more than a few weeks ahead. When the mental health system also lacks beds, the burden remains within the family for longer.
The Government Slows the Internet to “Protect National Assets”
A government spokesperson acknowledged that internet speeds had been reduced and presented the measure as a way of protecting national assets during a crisis. At the same time, authorities are considering providing better access to merchants, researchers, and users who require international connectivity.
The result is, in practice, a tiered internet. The general public receives a slow and restricted connection, while groups whose importance is recognized by the state are given the ability to work under conditions closer to normal.
The government can argue that this distinction is necessary to protect infrastructure and allow the economy to continue functioning. But a citizen who runs an online store, works remotely, or needs access to a digital government service is also part of the economy. The difference is that such a person does not have a status that qualifies them for an improved connection.
The restrictions also undermine programs that the government itself is trying to operate. A state that requires millions of families to register for assistance online needs to provide them with a stable connection. When the website is overloaded and the network is slowed, responsibility for the failure is effectively shifted onto the applicant.
It Is Possible to Oppose the War Without Supporting the Regime
Several voices within the reformist camp are seeking to distinguish opposition to foreign intervention from loyalty to the regime. Mohammad-Javad Haghshenas wrote that Iranians can be “harsh critics of the government’s performance” while at the same time opposing war, occupation, the partition of the country, and harm to its citizens.
This position rejects the convenient division into two camps: someone who opposes the war does not necessarily place trust in the government, and someone who criticizes the regime does not necessarily support an external attack.
Sadegh Norouzi, secretary-general of the National Development Party, called for social reconciliation and an end to polarization between supporters of war and supporters of negotiations. According to him, national resilience depends on public satisfaction, not only on military capability.
The debate over the hijab shows how limited this reconciliation remains. Sociologist Taghi Azad-Armaki argued that a kind of informal understanding has emerged: the state reduces its direct intervention in everyday life, while the public refrains from escalation.
By contrast, the head of Tehran’s courts announced that legal action against “violations related to hijab and chastity” would continue resolutely. These are not two versions of the same policy. They represent two competing directions within the system: one side seeks to buy calm through less intervention, while the other fears that any retreat in enforcement will be interpreted as a loss of control.
No verified report of a new nationwide wave of protests was found this morning. That does not prove that local protests did not take place. The relative calm may also reflect exhaustion, a focus on economic survival, and a decision to wait and see whether the diplomatic track produces change.
Desk Conclusion
Iran continues to talk with Oman while simultaneously making clear what could happen if the talks fail. Hormuz, the threat of expanding the war, and renewed discussion of the nuclear doctrine are intended to raise the cost of an American refusal.
Tehran’s problem lies in the gap between its negotiating leverage and conditions on the home front. The government can extend registration for food cards, inject foreign currency into the market, and raise freight rates. It cannot, through isolated measures, erase a forecast of deep recession, inflation approaching 79 percent, and a public system struggling to cope with the strain.
Nor does social calm amount to full support. It is possible to oppose the war while criticizing the government, to defend Iran’s territorial integrity while demanding less state control over private life. These voices matter because they make clear that the public is not simply another card that either side can automatically count as belonging to its camp.
Tehran can continue using Hormuz to buy time in the negotiations. The question is how much time remains before households, factories, and the healthcare system demand the returns themselves.
