While a series of planned Israeli and American strikes inside Iran have been halted—at least temporarily—following the implementation of the trilateral ceasefire between Israel, Iran, and the United States, it is becoming clear that the Houthis in Yemen, Iran’s most stable and powerful proxy, are continuing to wage their own campaign against Israel. Even after the ceasefire between Israel and Iran took effect, the Houthis have not ceased launching ballistic missiles and UAVs toward Israeli territory.
Anyone in the West or in Israel who hoped the ceasefire would also extend to Yemen is now facing a sobering reality. The Houthis have made it clear that the conflict is far from over. In fact, the Houthi threat has returned to the global spotlight following their recent statements. They asserted that they are not bound by the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran and will continue targeting the “Zionist entity” as long as the war in Gaza continues.
Iran has remained conspicuously silent. Security officials interpret this silence as tacit approval—or even active encouragement—for continued Houthi aggression. This is seen particularly as a means of avenging Israel’s breach of Iranian sovereignty and its attacks on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile production sites.
On June 28, senior Houthi official Mohammed al-Bukhaiti declared that the very fact that the United States and Israel accepted the ceasefire proves that “power is the only language they understand.”
He added that “the attacks on Israel will continue until the siege on Gaza is lifted.”
Similarly, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, leader of the Houthi Ansar Allah movement, announced that the Red Sea would remain closed to Israeli shipping. He emphasized that the port of Eilat is effectively paralyzed due to his group’s military operations. “Our naval campaign will continue as long as the massacre in Gaza persists,” he said in a speech delivered on June 28.
According to security assessments, the Houthis’ insistence on continuing hostilities at this stage is not only motivated by solidarity with Gaza. It is also driven by the strategic reality now facing Iran. The attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in Tehran, the assassinations of senior IRGC officers and nuclear scientists, and the fear of further exposure of sensitive military infrastructure have forced Iran to avoid direct retaliation.
Under these constraints, Iran is relying on its proxies—and the Houthis are an ideal tool. They are geographically distant, immune to internal political pressures like Hizbullah in Lebanon, and enjoy regional freedom of action.
Iran is effectively using the Houthis as a strategic lever of pressure and deterrence. Even if no official order was given, Iran’s logic is clear.
The Houthis are avenging on behalf of Tehran without directly endangering it.
Israel, in turn, has issued explicit threats against Yemen. Defense Minister Israel Katz declared that Israel would treat Sanaa the same way it treats Tehran. He warned that any attack by the Houthis would be met with a harsh response. Simultaneously, Israel has imposed an air and naval blockade on Yemen’s ports and on Sanaa International Airport. It issued a direct threat that any fuel transfer to the Houthis would be considered a military target.
Despite the risks, the Houthis appear confident in their operational capability to continue their campaign. They believe Israel lacks sufficient intelligence capabilities in Yemen and does not possess a precise target bank, giving them a significant advantage.
It is also plausible that the Houthis are now taking advantage of the deterrence vacuum left by Iran after the significant Israeli strikes on its territory. They may be seeking to position themselves as an independent regional actor, a “third axis,” distinct from Iran’s Shiite bloc and disconnected from the Sunni axis as well. Such a stance would enhance their standing in the Middle East as the only force actively fighting on behalf of the Palestinians in Gaza.
A senior security official assesses that the Houthis are acting out of an understanding that Iran can no longer effectively mobilize its regional proxy network as it once did. This is especially true following the blows it has suffered from Israel and Hizbullah’s reluctance to respond directly to Israeli strikes on Iranian soil.
In this context, the Houthis are acting independently without waiting for instructions—serving both purposes: revenge and the restoration of Iranian pride, as well as strengthening their own regional and domestic position.
While the ceasefire between Israel and Iran remains in place, Yemen is becoming the central arena of attrition against Israel. Iran has agreed to a ceasefire but has not abandoned its desire for vengeance or the restoration of its honor. And in Yemen, it has the army it needs for that purpose. The Houthis are not merely defending Gaza. They are attempting to entrench their role as an equal partner among Iran’s allies, perhaps even as the spearhead of a new axis of resistance.
Israel, in turn, may find itself dragged into an escalating confrontation in its southern theater—not by choice, but by necessity.
