How the Trump Peace Plan Challenges Israel’s Strategic Position

I. Introduction

After 843 days in captivity, the body of Ran Gvili, a police officer taken hostage during the October 7, 2023 massacre, became the final Israeli hostage returned under Phase One of President Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan. For his family, and for Israel, this moment marked the end of an agonizing chapter. Yet, as the nation prepared to lay Gvili, 24, to rest, a troubling question emerged: What exactly has Israel achieved and at what cost?

The return of all hostages, living and deceased, represents the singular achievement of the Trump peace initiative. It is an accomplishment that should not be minimized; the moral imperative to bring captured citizens home is foundational to the Israeli ethos. Yet this humanitarian success has obscured a growing strategic catastrophe. While the world celebrated the completion of Phase One, Hamas is using every additional day of ceasefire to rebuild, recruit, and entrench, emerging from the war not as a defeated terrorist organization, but as a political actor whose patrons now sit on an internationally sanctioned Board of Peace, when the ultimate Palestinian objective of statehood is closer to realization than at any point since 1948.

Israel may be in a worse strategic position today than during active combat operations. The Trump plan, structured as a diplomatic business deal between rational actors seeking mutual benefit, fundamentally misjudges the nature of the adversary. Hamas is not a negotiating partner amenable to compromise; it is a jihadist organization whose founding charter declares that “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it.”¹ Hamas’s disarmament provisions remain unfulfilled, Israel’s sworn enemies now participate in Gaza’s governance structure without its concurrence, and Hamas is being rewarded by the international community for its barbaric attack on October 7. As senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad claimed, “The initiative by several countries to recognize a Palestinian state is one of the fruits of October 7. We proved that victory over Israel is not impossible, and our weapons are a symbol of Palestinian dignity.”²

II. The Trump 20-Point Plan: Promises and Reality

When President Trump unveiled his peace plan in October 2025, it was hailed as a breakthrough after two years of devastating conflict.³ The framework called for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages within 72 hours, a partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Phase Two would see Hamas disarmament, the deployment of an International Stabilization Force, and the establishment of an interim technocratic government overseen by a Board of Peace. Ultimately, governance would transfer to a reformed Palestinian Authority, opening what the plan described as “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”⁴

The plan’s architecture reveals a distinctly Western, and specifically American, approach to conflict resolution: identify mutual interests, establish enforceable mechanisms, and trust that rational actors will honor commitments when incentivized to do so. It is the framework of a business negotiation, complete with phases, deliverables, and oversight committees. Trump himself described it as “the deal of the century,” language that betrays the fundamental misconception at its core.⁵

The reality is that Hamas agreed to release hostages, the only provision it has meaningfully honored, while explicitly rejecting the disarmament requirements that constituted the plan’s central security guarantee. On October 3, 2025, Hamas announced it would release Israeli prisoners “according to the exchange formula contained in President Trump’s proposal,” but noted that other parts of the plan “require further consultations among Palestinians.”⁶ This carefully worded acceptance was treated as a comprehensive agreement. It was anything but.

III. The Western Blind Spot: Misunderstanding the Jihadist Mindset

The Trump plan’s fundamental flaw lies not in its specific provisions but in its underlying assumptions. Western diplomacy operates on the premise that all parties to a conflict ultimately seek security, prosperity, and a sustainable modus vivendi. This framework has produced successes—the Camp David Accords, treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and the Abraham Accords demonstrated that agreements with rational state actors are achievable.

But Hamas is not a rational state actor. It is a jihadist organization whose worldview is explicitly and unambiguously religious—and whose religious convictions render the very concept of permanent peace with a Jewish state not merely undesirable but theologically impermissible. The 1988 Hamas Charter is unequivocal: “There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and a kind of child’s play.”⁷ This is not rhetorical positioning; it is doctrinal commitment.

The Hamas worldview divides existence into Dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) and Dar al-Harb (the house of war). The land of Israel, conquered in the seventh century, is considered Islamic waqf—an endowment consecrated for Muslim generations until Judgment Day. Article 11 of the charter states that “no one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part of it.”⁸ This is not a negotiating position that can be softened by economic incentives or security guarantees. It is a religious absolute.

Western policymakers’ inability to grasp this distinction has proven catastrophic. The very concept of a “ceasefire” carries different meanings across this cultural divide. In Western diplomatic parlance, a ceasefire is a step toward lasting peace—a de-escalation that creates space for political resolution. In Islamic jurisprudence, what Hamas has agreed to is a “hudna:” a temporary truce permitted when Muslims are weak relative to their enemies, designed to provide time to regroup and gather strength before resuming jihad.⁹

The West briefly understood this distinction when confronting ISIS. The UK House of Commons Select Committee concluded in 2014 that “a political solution to defeat ISIS cannot be achieved” because “any such solution would require negotiation and compromise with ISIS,” which was “not practically possible given the organizations… lack of legitimate and coherent political objectives around which a negotiated solution could be built.”¹⁰ U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2014, was equally blunt: “There is no negotiation with ISIL. There is nothing to negotiate.”¹¹

ISIS and Hamas share the same Salafi-jihadist ideology. Both emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood intellectual tradition. Both reject the legitimacy of international law, national borders, and any political settlement short of Islamic rule. Both consider violence against Jews and other “enemies of Islam” not merely permissible but religiously obligatory. Yet while the international community correctly concluded that ISIS needed to be destroyed rather than negotiated with, Hamas, as part of the Palestinian struggle and through decades of sophisticated propaganda positioning itself as a “resistance” or “liberation” movement, has convinced large segments of Western opinion that it is part of a legitimate national struggle for Palestinian liberation rather than a jihadist campaign for Israel’s annihilation.¹²

The Trump plan, structured precisely as a business deal, exemplifies this cognitive failure. It assumes that Hamas, like a corporation facing hostile takeover, will rationally calculate costs and benefits and choose survival over ideology. But Hamas does not think in these terms. Its leaders have repeatedly stated their willingness, indeed, their theological eagerness, to sacrifice the population of Gaza for the cause of jihad. Senior Hamas official Ghazi Hamad declared after October 7 that Hamas would repeat the attacks “time and again until Israel is annihilated,” expressing willingness to “sacrifice martyrs” for this goal.¹³ This is not the language of a rational, credible, normal, and bona fide negotiating partner and of a party to be relied upon and trusted.

IV. Hamas Reconstruction: Buying Time While Rebuilding

Understanding the “hudna” concept illuminates Hamas’s behavior since the ceasefire. Every delay in hostage releases, every procedural complication, every demand for additional time—all served the strategic purpose of extending the period of military reconstitution. U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that Hamas recruited between 10,000 and 15,000 new fighters during the ceasefire period¹⁴—demonstrating the organization’s ability to survive Israel’s military campaign and extract concessions.

The physical reconstruction has been equally systematic. Intelligence assessments suggest that 60-80% of Hamas’s tunnel network, estimated at over 500 kilometers before the war, remains intact or has been rebuilt.¹⁵ The organization maintains an estimated 20,000-30,000 fighters and approximately 60,000 rifles, most of them AK-47s.¹⁶ Rearming continues through multiple channels: local weapons production in Gaza, diversion of humanitarian aid materials to military purposes, and drone smuggling operations through Egypt.

Most significantly, Hamas has reasserted administrative and security control over substantial portions of the Strip. Its police force operates openly, its courts adjudicate disputes, and its welfare networks distribute aid—or withhold it from those deemed insufficiently loyal. The organization that was supposed to be dismantled has instead consolidated its position as Gaza’s de facto government, now with international legitimacy conferred by its participation in Trump’s peace framework.

V. The Disarmament Failure

The Trump plan’s security architecture rests on Hamas disarmament—the dismantling of terror infrastructure, the surrender of heavy weaponry and, ultimately, the collection of small arms through a proposed “buy-back” program. While this was always aspirational; it now appears to be clearly illusory.

Hamas has indicated willingness to surrender heavy weapons—RPGs, rocket launchers, missiles—that are in any case difficult to conceal and increasingly vulnerable to Israeli intelligence.¹⁷ But it has categorically refused to relinquish small arms. Khaled Mashaal, chairman of Hamas’s political bureau, called disarmament “like stripping the soul of the resistance,”¹⁸ language revealing that armed struggle is not Hamas’s means to an end but its essential identity.

Israel has argued, correctly, that AK-47s are what Hamas uses to maintain control over Gaza’s population, to enforce compliance, silence dissent, and ensure that humanitarian aid reaches supporters rather than critics. An organization permitted to retain 60,000 rifles is not disarmed in any meaningful sense; it is simply an organization that has traded some rockets for international legitimacy while preserving the coercive capacity essential to its rule.

The U.S. administration has downplayed these concerns, insisting that “enough progress” has been made to proceed with Phase Two. But the gap between American optimism and regional reality grows wider by the day. Israel has issued a two-month ultimatum for meaningful disarmament, warning that failure will trigger renewed military operations.¹⁹ Yet any such action could likely cast Israel as the aggressor violating an internationally endorsed peace framework, precisely the strategic trap Hamas intended to create. Ironically, those seeking to view Israel in such light would choose to close a blind eye to the basic violations by Hamas of its commitment to disarm.

VI. The Board of Peace: Enemies at the Table

Perhaps no element of the Trump plan has proven more damaging to Israeli interests than the composition of the Board of Peace. Announced at Davos on January 22, 2026, the eleven-member Gaza Executive Board includes Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Qatari diplomat Ali Al-Thawadi,²⁰representatives of two nations that have provided Hamas with financial support, diplomatic cover, and physical sanctuary for its leadership throughout the conflict.

The inclusion of Turkey and Qatar was accomplished without Israeli concurrence and, according to Netanyahu’s office, without prior consultation.²¹ Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called Hamas a “liberation group” and refused to designate it a terrorist organization.²² Qatar continues to host Hamas’s political bureau in Doha, providing the organization’s leadership with luxury accommodations.

While this might be seen by Trump as essential for wider international acceptance, what it means in practice is that Hamas’s closest international allies now hold formal positions in Gaza’s governance structure—positions from which they can advocate for Hamas’s interests, channel resources to its rebuilding efforts, and provide early warning of Israeli military planning. The fox has not merely been invited into the henhouse; it has been given a seat on the board of directors.

VII. The Path to Palestinian Statehood: Is Hamas’s Propaganda Being Actualized?

The Trump plan explicitly envisions “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood” contingent on Palestinian Authority reforms and the successful implementation of earlier phases.²³ The PA has announced commitments to elections within one year, curriculum reforms, and the termination of payments to families of terrorists. Saudi Arabia has offered to supervise these reforms.²⁴ Whatever skepticism one might harbor about the sincerity or sustainability of such commitments, the pathway itself now exists in formally endorsed international documentation.

In September 2025, France, UK, Canada, Australia, and others in the UN General Assembly engaged in a legally meaningless act of recognition of a non-existent Palestinian state, demonstrating the momentum created by the propaganda machine of Palestinian leadership and its jihadist supporters.

This is precisely what Hamas claims is “one of the fruits of October 7.” While Hamas’s stated directive is to annihilate Israel and kill Jews, they spin the narrative that they are political partners in liberating the Palestinian people through statehood against an oppressive Zionist entity.

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point documented Hamas’s strategic objectives in the years preceding the attack: derail the Abraham Accords normalization process, restore the Palestinian issue to international prominence, and create conditions for diplomatic momentum toward statehood.²⁵ Senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya stated explicitly that “Hamas’s goal is not to run Gaza… we woke the world up” to the Palestinian cause.²⁶ A Hamas manifesto circulated in December 2025 portrayed October 7 as a “rebirth” that had “justified all costs.”²⁷ Hamas’ claimed interest in a Palestinian state is merely subterfuge for jihadist destruction of Israel, conveniently packaged for Western proclivities.

By any measure, Hamas’s objectives are being achieved. The Abraham Accords expansion has stalled. The Palestinian issue dominates international diplomacy as it has not since the Second Intifada. And Palestinian statehood, previously a distant aspiration opposed by successive Israeli governments and largely sidelined in American policy, now appears in the framework document of a Trump administration peace plan, endorsed by the UN Security Council.

The bitter irony is inescapable. Hamas launched an attack of unprecedented brutality, murdering over 1,200 Israelis and taking more than 250 hostages. Israel responded with a military campaign that devastated Gaza. And the result is that the Palestinian leadership and Hamas stand closer to their stated political objective than at any point in history, while Israel finds itself more diplomatically isolated and strategically constrained than before October 7.

VIII. Israel’s Constrained Position

Israel today occupies approximately 53-58% of Gaza territory along the so-called “Yellow Line,” but this presence is defensive rather than operational. IDF officers report being “under strict orders to only engage if in immediate danger.”²⁸ The posture is one of containment, not campaign; the mission is to hold ground, not to advance objectives.

This constrained position reflects the strategic trap into which Israel is being maneuvered. Having agreed to the Trump framework, under intense American pressure and the moral imperative to recover hostages, Israel cannot resume offensive operations without being cast as violating an internationally endorsed peace process. Palestinian casualties from this point forward will be framed as Israeli aggression against a “cooperative” Hamas that “honored its commitments” by returning hostages.

The world has been convinced that Hamas fulfilled its obligations while Israel remains the obstacle to peace. Despite Hamas deliberately delaying hostage returns and refusing to disarm, they are perceived as cooperative partners. This narrative inverts reality, but narrative, not reality, drives international policy.

The two-month ultimatum Israel has issued regarding disarmament reveals the depth of this dilemma. If Hamas fails to disarm (as it most likely will), Israel faces a choice between accepting permanent Hamas military capacity or resuming operations that may prejudice whatever international support remains. Neither option serves Israeli security interests; both represent variations of defeat.

Hence the likelihood that Israel will allow this to happen is highly doubtful if not impossible. After fighting the recent war and after the huge sacrifices in the lives of its soldiers and citizens, Israel is committed to preventing a resurgence of any Hamas military capacity.

IX. Conclusion: The Paradox of Victory

Israel achieved its immediate humanitarian objective: all hostages, living and deceased, have been returned. This accomplishment, purchased at tremendous cost, fulfilled the most sacred obligation a state owes its citizens. For the families of those taken on October 7, closure—however painful—is finally possible.

Yet strategic assessment must extend beyond immediate outcomes. By every metric that matters for long-term security, Israel’s position is challenged. Hamas survived; it is rebuilding. Hamas retains its weapons, territory, administrative control, and ideological commitment to Israel’s destruction. Its international patrons now participate in Gaza’s governance. The pathway to Palestinian statehood, one of the goals of the October 7 massacre, has been formally posited and received UN Security Council approval.

The Trump peace plan, for all its ambition, was built on a category error: the assumption that business-deal logic could resolve a religious-jihadist war. Hamas accepted the parts that served its interests—international legitimacy, reconstruction funding, time to rebuild—while rejecting those that threatened its existence. The result is not peace but what one analyst called “an intermission before the next war,”²⁹ a pause that benefits the party using it to prepare for resumed conflict.

In achieving the humanitarian victory of returning the hostages, the question remains whether Israel prevailed in the war against Hamas from a tactical and ideological perspective. Hamas is now viewed by the world as the compliant activist who wants to rebuild Gaza and realize Palestinian freedom from Zionist oppression.

Israel must do what it needs to defend its rights, security, interests, and credibility, irrespective of global opinion that will never accept anything Israel does.

This must be above and beyond any “deal of the century.”

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Notes