Summary
Iran is facing a convergence of acute pressures that together place the state at a critical juncture. Strategic uncertainty following recent military confrontation, an unresolved nuclear dilemma, deepening economic distress marked by severe inflation and looming dollarization, and escalating political polarization are all straining the system.
At the same time, social and cultural conflicts—particularly over women’s rights, internet control, and generational change—are eroding public trust and social cohesion. While the leadership emphasizes external threats and ideological resilience, the most serious risk emerges from internal fragmentation, economic hardship, and declining institutional legitimacy.
Iran’s Public Discourse at a Breaking Point
Public discourse in Iran in recent days has been conducted with a sense of being at the edge. The memory of the “12-Day War” in the summer of 2025 continues to shape strategic thinking; the nuclear file has once again reached a decision point; domestic politics are tense between President Pezeshkian’s government and the conservative Majles; and the economy is sinking deeper into inflation that threatens to slide into dollarization.
Hovering above all of this is a recurring motif in the press: the danger of erosion in the regime’s legitimacy as a result of a combination of internal fragmentation, depletion of social capital, and sustained external pressure. The Iran Desk of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs summarizes the discourse in the Iranian press over recent days, as reflected in mainstream and reformist newspapers.
Between Transparency and the Bomb: Iran at a Doctrinal Crossroads in the Nuclear File
The nuclear issue has returned to the center of discourse as an arena in which not only foreign policy is decided, but also the future of the Islamic Republic itself. Opinion pieces in Arman-e Melli and other outlets emphasize that following the June 2025 attacks on nuclear facilities, Iran finds itself at a turning point: the debate is no longer merely about resuming negotiations, but about the nuclear doctrine itself.
On one side of the dispute stands the more cautious approach, warning of “serious threats to the future of the Republic” if the government does not immediately prioritize transparency in the nuclear file, constructive engagement with the UN Security Council, and the removal of sanctions. Failure, according to this line of thinking, could recreate conditions similar to those that preceded the Revolution.
Opposing them is a growing group of writers and analysts arguing that Iran’s doctrine since 2003—rejecting nuclear weapons and settling for civilian enrichment capabilities—has failed to achieve its objectives. In their view, Tehran should now move toward full nuclear deterrence, akin to India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Their opponents warn that such a shift would lead to total isolation, economic collapse, and global mobilization against Iran, arguing instead that the solution lies in significantly scaling back the program in exchange for broad economic assistance.
In relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the tone is tense. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi states that he is holding talks with a range of actors, including U.S. President Donald Trump, but admits that the situation is “by no means resolved.” Tehran responds with sharp criticism: the Foreign Ministry spokesperson accuses Grossi of ignoring the “non-technical reality” of the attack on Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel, and reminds that Iran–IAEA relations are anchored in law passed by the Majles, not in the personal will of UN inspectors.
In the background, Iran still holds approximately 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a central pressure lever. Meanwhile, former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposes a regional initiative named “Manara,” a research and civilian nuclear-promotion network in the Middle East, emphasizing that the only nuclear problem in the region is Israeli weapons, not Iran’s program.
The Battle Over Direction: Clashing Doctrines at the Heart of the Nuclear Crisis
Iran’s regional and global interactions are portrayed along three axes: the struggle against “American-Zionist hegemony,” strengthening regional cooperation based on modat (friendship), and tightening ties with the East, particularly Russia and China.
The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy is interpreted in the press as a shift from “Iran-centric” focus to a China-centric one. Iran is presented less as a primary threat and more as a “secondary regional issue.” Commentators describe this as both an opportunity and a threat: an opportunity because direct pressure may ease, and a threat because the vacuum could allow Israel to initiate harsher actions. Ebrahim Mottaqi in Etemaad argues that the strategy is designed to “manage the Iran issue at the lowest possible cost.” At the same time, Washington faces sharp criticism for seizing a Venezuelan oil tanker in the Caribbean, described in the Iranian press as “state piracy” aimed at asserting American control over Venezuela’s resources.
Israel continues to be portrayed as the root of the regional crisis. President Masoud Pezeshkian repeatedly uses international platforms to attack the “double standards” of the powers that grant the “Zionist regime” a status of “security exceptionalism.” According to him, this is what enabled Israel to attack the Islamic Republic in June 2025. Reports depict Israel as a country in internal crisis, including claims of mass resignations by hundreds of senior officers and an economic cost exceeding $100 billion from the Gaza war.
IRGC spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naeini proudly reiterates the equation of response: “If they attacked our fuel storage facilities in Tehran, five hours later we attacked the Haifa refinery twice.”
Relations with Lebanon are described as “on a knife’s edge.” Iran seeks to open a “new chapter” of cooperation, but Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji declines an invitation to visit Tehran and proposes meeting Araghchi in a neutral third country. Iranian media accuse him of “playing chess against Iran” and portraying Iran’s role in Lebanon as “entirely negative.” Araghchi responds that there is no need for a neutral country when diplomatic relations are intact, expresses willingness to visit Beirut, and explains Rajji’s reluctance as a consequence of Israeli occupation and attacks. Against the backdrop of international pressure to disarm Hizbullah, Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem declares that “even if the skies fall, we will not disarm,” while Ali Akbar Velayati again defines Hizbullah as “a central pillar of the resistance front,” enjoying full support from Tehran.
Pezeshkian and Putin emphasize the importance of the “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement,” with Putin pledging continued support for Iran in the international arena. Official figures cite a 13 percent increase in annual trade and an additional 8 percent growth over the past nine months. Nevertheless, critical voices in Iran argue that during the 12-Day War, Russia and China limited themselves to political support and failed to provide more tangible backing.
With China, the discourse is far warmer. Relations are framed as part of a shared strategy against American unilateralism. It is noted that “Iran and China are approaching 55 years of relations” and that China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil under sanctions. Both countries emphasize that their relationship is “based on choice, not coercion.” China is also presented as the key mediator that brought about reconciliation between Tehran and Riyadh, now described as being in a phase of “scheduled roadmaps and implementation.”
In Tehran, the concept of modat (friendship) and regional initiatives such as “Manara” are promoted as frameworks for economic, security, and energy cooperation, alongside constant denunciation of “foreign forces.” A trilateral meeting with Saudi Arabia under Chinese auspices addressed economic cooperation and efforts to curb “Israeli aggression.”
At the same time, Iran hosts a summit of neighboring states on Afghanistan, even without representation from the Taliban government, which chose not to attend. The Iranian message is that Afghanistan’s stability is a “strategic necessity” for the entire region, not only for its western neighbor.
Resignations, Radicalization, and Paralysis: Internal Political Pressure
On the domestic front, tensions are sharpening between Pezeshkian’s relatively moderate government and the radical usulgarai faction in the Majles, amid fears of erosion in the legitimacy of the entire system.
The press reports a “domino effect of resignations” within the government, including Zarif and former Central Bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, explained as the result of political pressure and dissatisfaction with economic outcomes. Arman-e Melli attacks the Majles for its “excessive focus on radical representatives,” which prevents practical solutions. Moderate figures call for “reasonable proposals” from parliamentarians in Pasteur Street—namely professional dialogue on housing, budgeting, and pollution—rather than constant confrontation.
Another fault line concerns the legitimacy of parallel legislative bodies. Journalists and constitutional critics lambast the proliferation of supreme councils—from the Cultural Revolution Council to the Supreme Cyberspace Council—that effectively usurp Majles authority through mechanisms such as Article 85 of the Constitution. They warn that concentrating legislative power outside parliament, as occurred during the 2019 fuel price hike, leads to “tyrannical behavior.”
At the municipal-political level, Tehran Province plans to implement proportional representation for city council elections for the first time in May 2026 as a pilot. Reform supporters see this as a vital step toward building a genuine party system, while the Stability Front fears losing “the selection of the best” and turning the council into a “joint-stock company” representing sectoral interests rather than revolutionary vision.
Inflation Devours Wages: The Economy Nears a Breaking Point
The economic crisis remains the red thread. Point inflation is estimated at around 66 percent, and the unofficial dollar rate is gradually climbing toward 130,000 tomans. Gold and foreign currency prices are soaring, and commentators warn of the danger of “dollarization”—an economy in which the public loses faith in the national currency and prefers to store value in dollars. The wages of public employees and pensioners, it is written, are “washed away like in a flood.”
The Central Bank is attempting to respond with a six-point package designed to increase foreign-currency allocation to exporters, deepen the secondary market, and curb speculation. Simultaneously, the government is advancing fuel-price reform with three pricing tiers, including a rate of 5,000 tomans per liter for high consumption. The revenues are intended to cover the production gap, consumption (about 25 million liters per day), and possibly finance the electronic food-voucher program (Kalaberg).
The subsidized exchange-rate policy—28,500 tomans per dollar for essential imports—faces criticism from both sides. Agriculture Minister Nouri Ghezeljeh argues that the subsidized rate does not cover production costs, while others point to “enormous rent-seeking, speculation, and corruption” generated by the multi-rate system.
Criticism extends beyond the macro level. Banks are accused of preferring speculation and short-term investments over financing long-term, high-risk projects. Asr-e Qanun reports that a $7 billion investment plan in the Azadegan oil field has stalled due to “financial paralysis” and the banking system’s reluctance to expose itself to sanctions risk.
The Hijab as a Political Weapon: When Clothing Becomes the Republic’s Last Line of Defense
In civil society, a multi-layered struggle is underway over identity, women’s rights, and the role of the middle class. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei calls for changing the Republic’s “media configuration” to confront the West’s “soft war.” According to him, “the main objective of enemy pressure is to change the religious, historical, and cultural identity” of the nation. He calls for moving from a defensive posture against rumors to an “offensive” targeting the weaknesses of Western culture—family crisis, morality, and human-society relations.
On another level, the Friday prayer imam of Mashhad, Hassan Alam-ol-Hoda, defines the absence of head covering as a “cultural virus,” arguing that the hijab has been part of Iranian identity since the Sassanian period. A spokesperson for the Stability Front warns that if the absence of hijab becomes the norm, “even missiles will not be able to defend the Islamic Republic.”
Against this backdrop, legislation advancing in the Majles limits financial liability for paying mehrieh (dowry). Women’s rights activists see this as “a severe blow” to women’s economic security and call on lawmakers to stop focusing on reducing mehrieh and instead enact legislation guaranteeing protection from domestic violence. At the same time, voices emphasize that women’s integration into politics and management is not a “privilege” but a national necessity—yet the gap between this discourse and actual legislation only underscores the contradiction.
The continuation of broad internet filtering and the handling of the “white SIM cards” affair sharpen feelings of injustice among the middle class. Mardom-Salari speaks of “middle-class terror”: the deactivation of unfiltered SIM cards given to journalists and officials during the crisis is perceived as an act of “symbolic violence” and an attempt to undermine the educated elite’s national commitment. Moderate voices call on Pezeshkian to openly explain to the public what prevents him from fulfilling his promise to lift filtering, and to clarify where the process is blocked—within the government, the Majles, or the supreme councils.
The Struggle Over the Future: Generation Z Versus an Education System That Does Not See It
Alongside the central discourse, several additional issues emerge. The water crisis is defined as the product of “mismanagement” no less than drought, involving over-extraction and misguided prioritization. Air pollution in major cities is attributed to the use of mazut fuel in power plants, and red flood alerts have been declared in four southern provinces.
From the sports arena, qualification for the 2026 World Cup in the United States is accompanied by controversy following the U.S. refusal to grant visas to some members of the delegation. Iran protested to FIFA. Meanwhile, remarks by football commentator Javad Khiabani—who claimed football is an “ungentlemanly” sport full of deception—sparked an uproar, widely interpreted as a metaphor for the broader social condition.
Looking at social networks and Generation Z in Iran, there is widespread opposition to the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution’s decision to give the matriculation exam a 60 percent weight in university admissions, on the grounds that it ignores deep qualitative gaps between schools. At the same time, the President’s Office establishes a “Generation Z Advisory Council” aimed at bridging generational gaps and better understanding the language of the younger generation, already identified as a central force for change.
Above all, the Iranian press in recent days reflects a reality in which every front—nuclear, economic, internal politics, women’s identity, and the younger generation—is stretched to the limit. The leadership seeks to project self-confidence toward the West and ideological certainty against “cultural invasion,” but between the lines a concern emerges: if the system fails to stabilize the currency, restrain political fragmentation, and provide the public with a basic sense of justice, the most dangerous threat to the Islamic Republic will not come from outside, but from within.
