Iran knows that the ceasefire in Lebanon is critical to salvaging what remains of Hizbullah and that the fighting must stop. Beyond the loss of their most powerful proxy, the Iranians are worried about losing the psychological war as Israelis return to their homes in the north of the country, UN Resolution 1701 is implemented, and international forces are deployed in southern Lebanon. They are also concerned about their failure to unite the different fronts and their inability to put a halt to the fighting in Gaza.
The Iranians know that, from a propaganda standpoint, they must contend with the scenes of devastation in Lebanon, the destruction of Hizbullah’s chain of command, and the pulverizing of much of its missile and rocket arsenals. Hence, the most important message in the Iranian propaganda strategy is equivalency. In Iran’s script, Hizbullah was not defeated, just as Israel did not win; the central narrative is that “Israel bombs Beirut—and Hizbullah bombs Tel Aviv,” as Hizbullah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, who is not as practiced as Nasrallah was in public speaking, was directed to declare in his speech.
In their psychological war, the Iranians seek to retain the image of an upper hand in negotiations on an agreement by rejecting or adding clauses. They also view the Israeli Home Front Command’s warning of stepped-up Hizbullah barrages while the talks were underway as a psychological gain. At the same time, not only anti-Hizbullah commentators but even its supporters raise the issue that Hizbullah, initially, claimed its reason for entering the war was to support Gaza.
These analysts also wonder why Hizbullah did not agree to an earlier ceasefire—instead absorbing escalating blows as the Lebanese capital, already heavily damaged since the massive port explosion of ammonium nitrate in August 2020. They also raise the regional issue, noting that neighboring countries “didn’t shoot a paper airplane at Israel” and complaining that “the resistance axis stopped supporting Gaza to save itself.” This seems aimed at the fact that Hizbullah and its Iranian patron did not condition the ceasefire on Gaza despite the centrality Nasrallah gave it at the outset of the war.
The Iranians crafted propaganda messages that portrayed Israel as signing an agreement due to capitulation, failure to achieve the war’s objectives in the north, and haltingly returning Israel’s northern residents to their homes after finding itself unable to destroy and disarm Hizbullah.
For example, according to Iran, Israel defines the agreement as a ceasefire to present it as a strategy and not as a defeat, with the propaganda connotation of a hudna—the Islamic term for a temporary truce allowing reorganization for renewed hostilities. In other words, this agreement, it is implied, is a catalyst for Hizbullah’s rebuilding and rearming by its Iranian patron alongside the combat experience it has gained.
To bolster their argument, the Iranians say the disputes over the agreement indicate how fragile and temporary it is, a deal that can be relinquished while reorganizing and rearming. The Iranian regime is also trying to convey the message that even though an arrangement was signed, agreements on paper have no significance and it is the reality on the ground that counts. For example, regarding UN Security Council Resolution 1701, they stress that “the clause on withdrawing beyond [north of] the Litani, which was laid down back in 2006, did not prevent an inch of Lebanon from belonging to the resistance.” In other words, Hizbullah’s removal from the south is of no significance because the group was “born among the residents of southern Lebanon,” where its Nasser, Aziz, and Radwan units spawned and will continue to operate in the future.
Two issues, however, trouble the Iranian propagandists. One is that the agreement was not conditioned on a ceasefire in Gaza. In propaganda terms, they have a hard time explaining Hizbullah’s consent to this failure and, worse, the Iranian regime’s approval of it. They make do with declarations about Hizbullah’s sacrifices for Gaza and aver that Gaza will not be neglected.
The second issue is the Israeli residents’ return to their homes in the north as an image of Israeli victory. To balance the picture they invoke psychological intimidation, asserting that “the nightmares about an October 7–type ground invasion by Hizbullah will accompany the northern settlers every day and every hour.”
All in all, the Iranians view the agreement as a temporary one, enabling the rescue of Hizbullah as the first stage of rehabilitating it for a further campaign against Israel. The real test, as they see it, will be Israel’s response to the rehabilitation and, specifically, the first arms transfer to Hizbullah. Experience in Lebanon and Gaza leads them to believe that Israel will not respond. For them, the words “agreement,” “declaration,” and “threat” have no meaning. Only a firm Israeli response to the first violation, on Lebanese soil, will prove them wrong. As an Arab proverb says, “When the test comes, the person is either honored or humiliated.”
