This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post on April 26, 2025.
In a quietly shifting regional order, Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, are recalibrating their positions toward U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, not because they trust Iran but because they fear being left behind by Washington and outmaneuvered by Israel.
Ironically, these talks, intended to contain Iran, may end up empowering it and tilting the geopolitical balance further away from traditional American influence.
The muted Arab response to the revived U.S.-Iran nuclear talks is not an endorsement; it is a hedging strategy. While the Gulf states and Egypt still perceive Iran as a primary threat – militarily, ideologically, and through its regional proxies – they are increasingly adopting a posture of quiet observation and, in some cases, tacit accommodation. This behavior is less about rapprochement with Tehran and more about skepticism toward Washington’s long-term reliability.
One major reason is Israel. Since the October 7 Hamas attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza, Israel has taken a more autonomous path, acting militarily with limited regard for U.S. or Arab interests.
This has strained its traditional strategic alignment with Washington and alienated potential Arab partners who had cautiously embraced the Abraham Accords era. A senior Gulf diplomat was recently quoted in Asharq Al-Awsat saying: “We no longer know what Israel wants, and we are not sure the U.S. knows either.”
The Trump administration’s response has been telling. In March 2025, the U.S. imposed new tariffs on Israeli tech exports, including a 17% duty on key defense electronics. Though officially framed as a trade adjustment, this move was widely interpreted in regional capitals as a form of political leverage – a subtle message to Israel to temper its resistance to the nuclear talks with Iran.
U.S. pursuing a nuclear agreement with Iran
Meanwhile, the U.S. pursuit of a nuclear agreement with Tehran – likely permitting Iran some level of uranium enrichment – has emboldened other regional powers to accelerate their own nuclear programs. In Egypt, construction continues on a civilian nuclear power plant in El Alamein with Russian financing and technology, part of a broader strategic partnership with Moscow. Though officially non-military, the timing is notable. Egypt’s growing comfort with alternative alliances is no longer subtle.
This was further underscored in April 2025 when Egypt and China conducted an unprecedented joint military training exercise on Egyptian soil. This marks the first time Beijing has engaged in direct military drills with a major Arab military power in the Middle East. While the stated objective was counterterrorism, the symbolism is unmistakable: Cairo is expanding its security relationships eastward, signaling to Washington that alternatives exist if American commitments waver.
Saudi Arabia is on a similar trajectory. Its “Saudi National Atomic Energy Project,” a flagship initiative under Vision 2030, is rapidly progressing, with the Kingdom openly considering nuclear cooperation with China and Russia, especially if the U.S. refuses to offer domestic enrichment rights as part of a broader normalization deal with Israel. In this context, Iran’s potential nuclear legitimization becomes a powerful diplomatic currency for Arab states seeking their own nuclear thresholds.
What we are witnessing is the early formation of a multipolar Middle East, where the United States is no longer the unchallenged patron and where alliances are shaped less by ideology and more by pragmatic hedging. Arab states are learning to live with ambiguity and, in some cases, are using it to negotiate better terms with all sides: Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and even Tehran.
For Israel, the strategic dilemma is acute. If it continues unilateral military operations against Iranian targets – as seen in recent airstrikes in Syria and covert actions in Natanz – it risks deepening its isolation. On the other hand, playing along with the U.S.-led negotiations could jeopardize its redlines on nuclear proliferation and embolden Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.
Yet, paradoxically, this volatile mix might catalyze the long-delayed normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh could position normalization as a balancing act, countering its cautious thaw with Iran by embracing a strategic relationship with Israel. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may be calculating that deepened ties with Israel are the price of enhanced influence in Washington.
In the end, the United States must decide whether it still seeks to be the anchor of stability in the Middle East or merely one player among many. If the former, it must restore trust with its traditional allies – not only through arms deals and summits but by aligning its strategic choices with their existential concerns.
Nuclear diplomacy with Iran may be necessary. But if pursued without carefully managing Arab perceptions and Israel’s insecurities, it risks unintentionally accelerating a new Cold War in the Middle East, one where the U.S. is neither feared nor fully trusted and where its allies are quietly building alternatives.
