Summary
Iranian media in early December 2025 highlight a growing contradiction: Iran projects diplomatic strength and nuclear defiance abroad (via ties with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China, and threats like NPT withdrawal), while at home it faces escalating political infighting, severe inflation, a controversial fuel-price reform, chronic energy shortages, and widening social tensions.
President Pezeshkian’s softer reformist message collides with a hard line Majles and the Revolutionary Guards’ militarized posture. Disputes over women’s rights, digital privacy, and air-pollution failures show a society under strain, making Iran outwardly assertive but internally brittle.
Iran enters December 2025 with a sharp gap between the image it is trying to project outward and the complex reality bubbling inside. While Tehran boasts an impressive diplomatic wave involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and its eastern partners, alongside renewed rigidity on the nuclear front vis-à-vis the West, deep cracks in the regime are only widening: power struggles between President Pezeshkian and the Majles, a fuel crisis and surging inflation, the unraveling of social stability, and a fight over women’s rights and privacy. The exterior appears assertive; the interior is fragile. The Iran Desk of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs summarizes the discourse in the Iranian press.
The nuclear arena, the snapback, and a possible exit from the NPT
On the nuclear issue, the press stresses an unwavering principled line: negotiations have meaning only if conducted with mutual recognition of rights and concerns, not under sanctions and threats. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterates that the Islamic Republic’s position “has always been clear”: Iran will not relinquish enrichment itself, even as it declares readiness for “zero bombs.”
The narrative reaches back to previous talks in which, he says, Iran was “very close to an agreement” but “forces that wanted war” in Washington torpedoed it. Araghchi even claims that “Israel’s first missile hit the middle of the negotiating table”—a phrase meant to portray Israel not only as a military enemy but also as a destroyer of diplomacy.
France is trying to lead a European line to renew talks, but Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei cools expectations: “Which table are we returning to?” he asks, adding that Europeans refuse to play an independent role and keep pointing Iran to the American address. Thus a narrative is built of Europe as a spineless “extension” of Washington.
A joint letter from Iran, Russia, and China to the UN stresses that activating the snapback mechanism was “illegal,” and notes that UN Security Council Resolution 2231 expired on October 18, 2025—marked in the Iranian press as the day when, in their view, “the Iranian nuclear file should be removed from the international agenda.” At the same time, Tehran is suspending parts of its cooperation with the IAEA, arguing that the Agency cannot allege violations while facilities under its independent monitoring are being militarily attacked.
The result is stalemate: a regime presenting itself as having passed the test of the “12-Day War” and refusing to return to negotiations under old rules, facing a West that continues sanctions and pressure. The diplomatic space is shrinking, and the threat of leaving the NPT is becoming a more open part of Iran’s toolbox.
External front: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Israel
Against the nuclear deadlock, discourse focuses on a wave of diplomatic visits to Tehran: senior delegations from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea. The press depicts this as an attempt to build regional “tactical synergy” and a shared response to sanctions and Israeli aggression.
During Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit, President Pezeshkian emphasizes borders as civilian rather than military spaces: “Across borders where trade, science, and culture pass, terrorism and weapons will never pass.” The official message is stronger trade ties, political coordination, and security cooperation. Yet commentary pages show reservations: veteran writers note that Ankara’s regional policy shifts frequently—from Syria to the Caucasus—and warn against overreliance on a partner seen as more tactical than strategic.
The parallel visit by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Saud bin Mohammed al-Sati is viewed as a continuation of the historic thaw between Tehran and Riyadh over the past two years. Baghaei stresses that “both countries are determined to continue the growth trend,” and that strengthening bilateral ties is key to stability in West Asia. Officially, Tehran denies that Saudi Arabia is mediating with Washington, but the press dwells on whether Mohammed bin Salman can serve as a “bridge,” alongside continued conditioning of normalization with Israel on the creation of a Palestinian state.
Meanwhile, Iran’s outward gaze sees the United States not only as a rival in the Middle East but also as a destabilizing actor elsewhere. American steps in the Caribbean, including threats to close Venezuela’s airspace, are framed as the revival of the “Monroe Doctrine.” The Foreign Ministry spokesman calls these actions “the greatest threat to international security” and a “blatant violation of international law,” urging countries to “stand up to America’s unilateral and aggressive actions.”
Attention is also directed at Israel. Reports on turmoil surrounding Benjamin Netanyahu’s clemency request and its implications for the judicial system are translated in Tehran into a “structural crisis” in the rival state. Opinion pieces depict Israel as trapped in a “structural dead end,” trying to project strength outward while weakening inward—an account that serves Iranian “reverse deterrence” propaganda.
The political front: Pezeshkian vs. the Majles and the Revolutionary Guards
Internally, the struggle among regime institutions is becoming more overt. President Masoud Pezeshkian, elected as a “soft reform” candidate, repeats messages of dialogue, participation, and non-coercion: “You can’t change society through threat or compulsion,” he says, calling to root change first and foremost in “integrity” within family and social circles.
Opposing him is the 12th Majles, dominated by hard-line factions. They are advancing initiatives to impeach five cabinet ministers, claiming the government cannot handle the economic and social crises. Political commentators emphasize that this is not only a “fitness test” of ministers but a systemic attempt to weaken the president and portray him as incapable opposite conservative parties in parliament.
Ezatollah Zarghami, former head of state broadcasting and now a member of senior institutions, describes a situation in which the Supreme Leader calls for supporting the government, yet MPs continue “political games.” Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf tries to mediate: on one hand stressing a “family-based governance” and “gender justice” rather than “gender equality,” and on the other admitting current digital filtering mechanisms are “wrong” and promising that the issue—including unblocking Telegram—is being addressed.
Against this backdrop, the Revolutionary Guards continue projecting military power. The “Sahand 2025 Exercise” in East Azerbaijan, a joint anti-terror drill led by the Guards’ ground forces alongside Russia and China, is presented as proof that any attack on Iran would face a broad “common front.” The exercise also highlights Tehran’s role as a “pillar in the fight against terrorism” within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—messaging aimed more at eastern audiences than western ones.
The economy: fuel reform, inflation, and an energy crisis
No message about “regional strength” can conceal the depth of Iran’s economic crisis. Economic discourse centers on a controversial fuel reform amid soaring inflation and currency erosion.
The government is promoting a third gasoline price tier—5,000 toman per liter—for those exceeding quotas, for new vehicles, and for station fuel cards. Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani frames this as structural necessity: consumption is about 133 million liters per day, while domestic production is only around 110 million. The gap, she says, forces Iran to import fuel at a cost of about $6 billion annually. The reform, she argues, will also fund support mechanisms like food cards (“kalabarg”), and its inflationary effect will be “negligible—about two-tenths of a percent.”
Economic pages strike a different tone. Economists and opposition commentators warn of an “inflation tsunami.” Mahmoud Jamsaz explains that the inflation driver is not the lowest price but the highest one; fuel reform will lift the price anchor upward. Others describe it as a “temporary painkiller” masking structural budget deficits rather than solving root causes.
Meanwhile, the rial continues to weaken. Reports cite a free-market dollar rate above 118,000 toman, while the central bank reports annual inflation around 41% in Aban. Food prices, however, have risen over 66%, deepening the fracture among middle and lower classes. The professional consensus in economic papers is clear: Iran needs a unified exchange rate, an end to money printing, and restored fiscal discipline, but the political system struggles to advance painful steps.
The chronic energy crisis has become a constant theme. Gas and electricity shortfalls threaten key industries from steel to petrochemicals. Pezeshkian issues a “serious warning” to car manufacturers, demanding faster transition to fuel-efficient models, while Energy Minister Abbas Ali Abadi paints an optimistic future, claiming Iran has become a “large workshop for renewable energy development.” On the ground, the public sees more power outages than wind turbines.
Society, women, and rights space
Economic and political cracks are also reflected socially, especially around gender, privacy, and environmental pollution.
At center stage is a new law lowering the mahr (dowry) ceiling that can lead to jailing a non-paying husband from 110 gold coins to only 14. Supporters present this as mercy toward men imprisoned for debts they cannot pay. Critics—led by Majles member Fatemeh Fallahi—see it as stripping away one of the few remaining protections for women in an unequal legal and economic system. “Wouldn’t it have made more sense to deal with those who destroyed this people’s economy?” she asks, directing blame toward major power-brokers.
Khamenei himself intervenes, redefining the “ideal woman”: “A woman is not a laborer in the house but the manager of the house,” he says, criticizing “decadent Western-capitalist culture” that treats women as objects. The message is double-edged: recognition of women’s importance, but within a clear hierarchy grounded in a patriarchal family model.
A heated debate is also unfolding over digital rights and privacy. Arrests of actors at a private party and the activation of “morality patrols” via SMS spark protest from the Cinema Actors Union, which calls it a “blatant violation of Islamic and legal principles.” Zarghami, a member of the Supreme Council for Cyberspace, admits filtering foreign platforms harms many users’ livelihoods and implicitly concedes current policy does not truly meet the challenges of the digital age.
Air pollution has joined this arena, reaching “emergency” levels in Tehran and other cities. Reports cite about a 20% rise in mortality, blaming lack of enforcement of the “Clean Air Law” and political unwillingness to confront industrial interests. Supplying low-sulfur mazut to power stations is presented as a temporary step, not a long-term strategy.
Tectonic shifts over soft ground
The Iranian press in early December 2025 paints a reality of tectonic movement in the regional arena—rapprochement with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, cooperation with Russia and China, and attempts to bypass Washington—built atop soft and fragile internal ground. Externally, Iran seeks to project steadfastness against snapback measures and to measure itself against the supposed weakening of Israel and the United States. Internally, it faces deepening inflation, controversial fuel prices, a struggle over women’s rights, and rising frustration at state intrusion into private and digital life.
In this tension stands President Pezeshkian—between his call for “democracy without coercion” and a parliament threatening impeachments, between Revolutionary Guards projecting military power and a civil society whose strength is eroding. If the regional diplomatic wave supplies the regime with economic and political oxygen, it may postpone internal reckoning. If not, accelerating economic and social erosion could turn structural cracks within the Islamic Republic into a genuine rupture.
