- Behind the scenes, secret negotiations are underway aiming to reach an agreement between Israel and Syria—initially a security arrangement, followed later by a full normalization agreement between the two countries.
- The big question is whether Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, a former Salafi jihadist, is ideologically and politically capable of leading a revolutionary peace initiative.
In an interview with The New York Times on July 3, 2025, U.S. envoy to Syria Thomas Barak confirmed that serious talks were taking place between Israel and Syria, mediated by the United States, to restore calm along their shared border.
As of now, relations between the new Syrian government and Israel remain tense, particularly in light of repeated Israeli incursions into southern Syria and military operations against terrorist elements there. The goal of the talks is to reduce tensions and lay the groundwork for improved relations.
A few days ago, President Trump signed an executive order lifting decades of American sanctions on Syria. Barak explained that instead of exerting direct pressure, the administration set clear benchmarks for the Syrian government and expressed hope that tangible progress would be made.
These benchmarks include: reaching a peace agreement with Israel; integrating the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control northeastern Syria; and clarifying the fate of American citizens who disappeared during the civil war.
U.S. officials have voiced concern about the thousands of foreign fighters, most of them from jihadist groups, who entered Syria during the war. The Trump administration acknowledges that Syria cannot expel all those who remain and that removing them may even threaten political stability. Therefore, Washington expects a certain degree of “transparency” from Syria regarding the future roles of these former fighters.
On July 3, for the first time officially, the Syrian government clarified its position: “Any talk of an agreement with Israel can only occur after Israel fully complies with the 1974 disengagement agreement,” a political source said. He added, “The occupation of the Golan Heights is not negotiable.”
On the ground, tensions are rising.
Even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Israel has continued to maintain a military presence along the border, including within the demilitarized zone established by the 1974 disengagement agreement, and has built permanent bases on the slopes of Mount Hermon. Damascus, lacking the military capability to retaliate, has focused primarily on diplomatic efforts.
According to Israeli security officials, the political leadership seeks to expand the buffer zone to include not just the original strip but the entire area from south of Damascus to the 1967 border. The objective, they say, is to guarantee full military and aerial freedom of action for Israel, under the concept of a “sterile zone” free of future threats.
Inside Syria, public sentiment is increasingly focused on the need for stability and security, and on rebuilding the country after more than a decade of destruction. Security assessments suggest that many Syrians want peace—but not at the expense of national rights.
It is expected that the new Syrian government will first pursue a limited ceasefire agreement, and only afterward consider a comprehensive peace deal—provided it includes the return of the Golan Heights under international law. For the Trump administration, this is a major challenge. U.S. officials understand that any transformation in Syria will be slow.
Meanwhile, both Syrians and Israelis await to see whether Washington can secure a new ceasefire agreement that would de-escalate tensions along the border without igniting the sovereignty dispute over the Golan.
Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the new Syrian government has taken a restrained approach toward Israel, despite Israeli strikes in the Golan, Quneitra, and other parts of southern Syria. Damascus is focusing on domestic reconstruction and is trying to convey a message of non-hostility abroad—including toward Israel. For its part, Israel continues to assert: it has no intention of withdrawing from the Golan.
On June 28, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar declared: “The Golan will remain part of the State of Israel,” adding that “Israel is interested in peace with Syria, as long as our security interests are preserved.”
According to political sources, the Trump administration sees potential in the new regime in Damascus, particularly given its apparent disengagement from Iranian and Russian influence.
Syrian President Abu Muhammad al-Jolani confirmed on May 7, 2025, at a press conference in Paris that indirect contacts with Israel were underway.
Reuters reported that there had also been direct meetings aimed at preventing deterioration along the Syria-Israel border.
According to Arab media reports, the proposed agreement includes a gradual Israeli withdrawal from buffer zones captured at the end of 2024, including parts of Mount Hermon. In return, Damascus is expected to refrain from hostile actions and to consider eventual accession to the Abraham Accords.
Senior Israeli security officials say that an agreement is indeed possible—but that does not imply immediate normalization. The annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel remains the primary obstacle to a full peace treaty, and resolving the Golan issue is a fundamental precondition for any further progress. Israeli policymakers see a “historic opportunity” in Syria’s current weakened state following Assad’s fall.
Yet the central question remains: is the new Syria prepared to pay the political price of such a move, especially without the return of the Golan?
Security officials caution that Syria’s new government lacks broad domestic legitimacy to justify such a major territorial concession, and the Syrian public is not yet ready for reconciliation with Israel while the 1967 territories remain under Israeli control.
They argue that Syrian public opinion poses a significant hurdle.
Even if al-Jolani recognizes a strategic opportunity for peace with Israel, he will have to overcome deep internal resistance—not only from the general population but also from the security apparatus, opposition forces, and both former and current allies among religious and civil society leaders. Anti-Zionist ideology is deeply entrenched in Syrian state institutions, and the idea of broad normalization with Israel will be seen by many as treason.
And yet, this is precisely where al-Jolani surprises observers.
According to foreign diplomatic sources, he often asks visitors their opinion of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat—the man who dared to break a decades-old taboo and signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979.
Reportedly, al-Jolani has expressed admiration for Sadat’s bold move.
Even if Syrian public opinion does not currently support such a peace agreement, the resistance is not confined within Syria’s borders.
Israeli intelligence assessments indicate that any peace initiative between Damascus and Jerusalem would have to pass the filter of Turkish and Israeli interests inside Syrian territory. The Israeli security establishment believes that Turkey would not allow any agreement that does not serve its own strategic interests in Syria. Any Israeli-Syrian agreement would therefore require overt or covert understandings with Ankara.
The major question troubling both political and security decision-makers is whether al-Jolani—a former Salafi jihadist—is ideologically and politically capable of leading a revolutionary peace process.
The prevailing security assessment is that if a deal can be crafted that strengthens his domestic standing, facilitates Syria’s reconstruction, and keeps Israel out of Syria’s internal politics, then al-Jolani might indeed be the man to sign a groundbreaking agreement with far-reaching implications for the Middle East.
Until then, Israel must decide whether—after having previously signed an agreement with arch-terrorist and former Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, who violated the Oslo Accords and returned to terrorism—it is willing to take that risk again and sign a deal with another “terrorist in a suit,” al-Jolani, who might deceive Israel and the West, only to revert to terrorism once his grip on Syria is secure.
A senior Israeli security official was quoted as saying, “Although he shows an interest in President Anwar Sadat, who signed a peace treaty with Israel, there is serious doubt as to whether he is willing—or even capable—of following in Sadat’s footsteps.”
“At this point, it seems far more likely that al-Jolani plans to follow in the footsteps of Yasser Arafat,” he added.
