Israel Seeks a Decisive Resolution but Iran Still Remains a Threat

The confrontation between Israel and Iran has entered a new phase. Following missile barrages from Iran and Yemen aimed at Israeli population centers, and subsequent Israeli strikes inside Iran, both sides are walking a tightrope, projecting strength and sending clear messages while, for now, avoiding all-out war.

Yet beneath the headlines of missiles, aircraft, and military operations lies a more complex reality. Although Iran has been significantly weakened in recent years, it still retains substantial levers of power. Israel, for its part, remains far from achieving a strategic resolution to the Iranian threat.

Analysts at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA) assess that, despite the recent escalation, the current situation does not necessarily signal the start of a large-scale war.

Dr. Jacques Neriah, a senior researcher at the center, believes both sides are engaged in a relatively limited round of fighting. He expects several more days of strikes and counterstrikes before each concludes that military force alone cannot deliver a rapid victory.

Neriah cautions Israel against excessive optimism. Despite the heavy damage inflicted on Hizbullah, Hamas, and other Iranian assets, the broader strategic picture remains unresolved. Iran continues to operate, the Houthis have resumed attacks on Israel, and Hizbullah retains significant military capabilities. “Nothing has been resolved with Iran,” he said in recent interviews. In his view, it would be a mistake to assume the campaign is nearing its end simply because several axis leaders have been eliminated or certain organizations severely degraded.

A central question is how Iran continues to finance its regional activities despite years of economic sanctions.

Ella Rosenberg, a JCFA researcher specializing in Iran and terrorist financing, attributes much of the problem to the long-standing failure to enforce sanctions effectively.

“Not everything has to be kinetic,” she says. Rather than relying primarily on military strikes, far greater emphasis should have been placed over the years on disrupting supply chains, financial networks, and funding flows that sustain the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Rosenberg highlights a key paradox: while Iran’s overall economy has suffered greatly, the IRGC has not only preserved its power but, in some areas, even strengthened it. She stresses the need to distinguish between the Iranian state and the IRGC as a parallel economic and military entity. Ordinary Iranians endure inflation, unemployment, and economic hardship, while the IRGC benefits from diverse revenue streams, including oil sales, financial networks, and illicit activities.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to activate its network of proxies across the Middle East.

Yoni Ben Menachem, a senior JCFA researcher, warns that Israel misjudged the Houthis by assuming they had lost strategic relevance. Their prolonged absence from the fighting, he argues, was not a sign of weakness but an Iranian decision to preserve them for the right moment.

Ben Menachem notes that the Houthis give Tehran significant leverage over both the United States and the global economy. Beyond the threat to the Strait of Hormuz, they can disrupt the critical shipping route through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a particularly valuable asset at a time when Washington seeks to avoid instability in global energy markets.

In addition to external pressures, the Iranian regime faces mounting domestic challenges.

Sogand Fakhari, a JCFA Iran analyst, reports growing unrest inside the country. The recent restoration of internet access has once again highlighted deep public frustration and revived calls for protest.

While many Iranians remain wary of the heavy price of challenging the regime, Fakhari believes public anger continues to simmer, fueled by the ongoing economic crisis.

Another key factor is U.S. President Donald Trump. Researchers at the JCFA believe Washington’s current priority is stability, preventing an energy crisis and avoiding a conflict that could draw the United States into another Middle East war.

Neriah assesses that Trump is seeking an agreement that would break the current deadlock with Iran, even if critical issues, such as the nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy support, are deferred to later stages. In Jerusalem, however, there is concern that any partial deal would leave Iran’s core power structures largely intact.

Oded Ailam, a JCFA researcher and former head of the Mossad’s Counterterrorism Division, emphasizes that Israel must not lose focus on the Lebanese arena. He sees the current moment as a rare opportunity to weaken Hizbullah’s grip on Lebanon and empower local actors seeking to reduce Tehran’s influence.

Ultimately, the picture remains far from clear. Iran is under significant military, economic, and domestic pressure, yet it still possesses substantial instruments of power. Israel has dealt serious blows to key elements of the “Axis of Resistance,” but has not yet achieved a decisive strategic breakthrough. The United States, caught in the middle, is working to prevent further escalation and promote an arrangement that could restore regional stability.

As of the morning of June 8, 2026, all parties appear to be seeking a way out of the crisis without sliding into a broader war. The open question is whether the Middle East’s notoriously volatile dynamics will allow them to succeed.