Summary
Israeli public opinion on Palestinian statehood has remained remarkably stable, with roughly two-thirds opposed across repeated surveys since May 2024. Opposition persists even when statehood is tied to Saudi normalization or framed as a future possibility following Palestinian reforms. Meanwhile, concern about threats originating from the West Bank has risen substantially, alongside broad support for military buffer zones. The overall picture is of an electorate prioritizing security guarantees, territorial defensibility, and preventing the rebuilding of hostile military capabilities over diplomatic concessions.
Key Takeaways
- Opposition to Palestinian statehood is persistent and broad. Across seven surveys spanning 30 months, overall opposition remained between 64% and 68%, suggesting that neither changing diplomatic formulations nor incentives such as Saudi normalization substantially alter public attitudes.
- Security concerns increasingly center on the West Bank and defensible borders. Concern about an October 7-style attack originating from the West Bank rose from 62% to 77% overall, reaching 86% among Jewish Israelis. At the same time, 71% support maintaining military buffer zones along key fronts.
- Iran and Hamas remain the most urgent perceived threats. Iran’s military rebuilding and Hamas’s reconstitution rank highest, while Turkey is widely regarded as dangerous but less immediately pressing. These priorities suggest that future diplomatic initiatives will face strong expectations to address concrete security risks.
Whatever the outcome of the October 27, 2026, election, Israel’s next prime minister will arrive for the first day in office with the same dilemma on the table. Intense international pressure to bring the active fronts, first and foremost Gaza, to a close. Parallel pressure to reach arrangements on the Lebanese and Iranian fronts. And above them, a demand already being voiced openly in Western capitals: an Israeli declaration of willingness, in principle, to establish a Palestinian state, “after reforms.”
The next prime minister will come to that table with a public that has already answered the question in seven consecutive surveys.
Since May 2024, the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs (JCFA) has tracked Israeli public opinion on the issue through a series of surveys conducted by Lazar Research, headed by Dr. Menachem Lazar, using the Panel4All online respondent panel. Seven polls have been conducted, each based on a representative sample of approximately 700 Jewish and Arab respondents aged 18 and over, with a maximum sampling error of 3.7%. The latest poll was conducted September 2-4, 2026, among 703 respondents.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the longest continuous public opinion tracking conducted in Israel on the issue of Palestinian statehood since October 7. Across all seven polls, there has been no change in the public’s position.
Three Scenarios, the Same Answer
In the latest survey, 67% of the public oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines. Among Jewish respondents, opposition stands at 75%. Only 7% support such a state unconditionally.
When normalization with Saudi Arabia is added to the equation, the answer barely changes: 63% oppose it, including 71% of Jewish respondents.
And when the request is reduced to its most symbolic form, an Israeli declaration of support for a future Palestinian state after the Palestinians carry out reforms, 52% still oppose it, including 59% of Jewish respondents.
What Is Happening Beneath the Surface
Across the seven surveys conducted over 30 months, opposition to a Palestinian state among the full sample ranged from 64% to 68%. Total support, conditional and unconditional combined, did not exceed 25% in any survey.
Among Jewish respondents, the range was wider, from 72% to 79%. Opposition stood at 79% in May 2024, at the height of the shock, softened to 72% in September of that year, rose again during 2025, and stands at 75% in the current poll. The Jewish public has not remained static. Its position softened somewhat during 2024 and has since returned close to its starting point. The relative flatness of the overall figure is largely the result of the Arab subsample moving in the opposite direction.
The first poll, conducted in May 2024, included a transition table cross-referencing respondents’ positions before and after October 7. Of those who had opposed a Palestinian state from the outset, 97% remained opposed. Among unconditional supporters, 82% maintained their position. But one-third of conditional supporters, those who had been willing to accept a Palestinian state provided it recognized Israel and was demilitarized, shifted to outright opposition.
Concern Over the West Bank Is Growing
Unlike the question of Palestinian statehood, one figure in the series has risen consistently and sharply. In February 2025, 62% of the public expressed concern about an attack similar to October 7 originating from the West Bank. By September 2026, that figure had risen to 77%. Among Jewish respondents, the increase was even sharper, from 68% to 86%.
The political breakdown shows that this concern crosses political camps. Among right-wing respondents, it remained high throughout the period and reached 86%. Among left-wing respondents, who were evenly divided at the beginning of the period, the balance had reversed by September 2026: 58% expressed concern, compared with 32% who said they were not concerned.
The finding is consistent with research by Lt. Col. (res.) Adv. Maurice Hirsch of the JCFA on the scale of the Palestinian Authority security forces’ armament and the “turning of the guns” scenario, the possibility that forces trained and equipped under the Oslo Accords could be turned against Israeli communities. When the public ranks the threats the next government should address, the “turning of the guns” scenario in the West Bank receives a score of 3.6 on a scale of 1 to 6, placing it third, ahead of Hezbollah’s reconstitution in Lebanon.
Defensible Borders: A Broad Consensus
On the question of buffer zones, the public expresses a firm position. Seventy-one percent support Israel maintaining a military buffer zone inside the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria: 57% define this as an essential security requirement, while another 14% are willing to accept it as a temporary arrangement. Among Jewish respondents, support reaches 80%, while only 13% oppose it.
Support crosses political camps. On the right, 78% define such buffer zones as essential. In the center, 62% support them overall, as do 43% on the left. Among religious and Haredi respondents, support stands at 83% and 81%, respectively. In February 2025, 71% supported the general concept of buffer zones along the borders with Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza.
Iran and Hamas at the Top, Turkey Well Behind
The public ranks the threats facing the next government in a clear order. At the top is Iran’s rebuilding, including the renewal of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, with a score of 4.3 on a scale of 1 to 6. This is followed by Hamas rebuilding its capabilities in Gaza, at 4.2. Among Jewish respondents, the two threats share the top ranking, each scoring 4.4. Among Arab respondents, the picture is different: actions by Jewish extremists in the West Bank rank first at 4.1, followed immediately by the Iranian threat at 4.0.
The responses regarding Turkey are less consistent. When ranked among other threats, Turkey is near the bottom of the list, at 2.8, with no difference between Jewish and Arab respondents. But when asked about Turkey directly, 68% of the public overall and 77% of Jewish respondents agree that Turkey poses a dangerous security threat to Israel. Sixty percent support military action to prevent Turkey from establishing infrastructure and bases in Syria, while 70% believe Israel should establish red lines and pursue diplomatic efforts with the United States to restrain Turkey. The public sees Turkey as dangerous, but does not regard it as urgent.
On foreign policy issues, two topics shared the top ranking, each with a score of 3.8: establishing a regional alliance to counter the “Mecca” axis of Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and expanding the Abraham Accords to additional countries. They were followed by the “Mamdani effect”, the rise of anti-Israel and antisemitic forces in the United States, at 3.7.
The Bottom Line
The message to policymakers after the election is not simply “no.” It goes further than that.
First, there is no price. The public was asked the question three times in different formulations over 30 months, including in its most symbolic version, and each time responded in the same way. The prevailing assumption in Western capitals, that the right incentive, Saudi or otherwise, would be enough to change the Israeli equation, has been tested empirically, and the answer is clear.
Second, this is not the position of a single political camp. On the question of buffer zones, there is a majority across all three political camps. On the question of concern about an October 7-style attack originating from the West Bank, a majority on the left now also expresses concern. A prime minister who interprets the opposition as a position of the right will misread the political map, as will anyone who assumes it can be bridged by a different coalition.
Third, the opposition is focused. The most significant shift in the survey series was recorded not on the question of statehood, but on the question of the Palestinian Authority as a partner in a postwar arrangement for Gaza. The public rejects the proposed partner: the PA in its current form, and even after reforms. This reflects a lack of trust in the institution itself.
Fourth, while the world debates the establishment of a Palestinian state, the Israeli public is preoccupied with the opposite question: whether the West Bank will become the next front. Eighty-six percent of Jewish respondents are concerned that it will. A diplomatic plan that does not address this question will not win public support, because it answers a question the public is no longer asking.
The surveys were conducted by Lazar Research, headed by Dr. Menachem Lazar, using the Panel4All online respondent panel. The latest poll was conducted September 2-4, 2026, among 703 Jewish and Arab respondents aged 18 and over, with a maximum sampling error of 3.7%.
