The recent events in Syria – specifically the massacre carried out against the Druze community in Suwayda and the subsequent flare-up between Israel and Syria – have overshadowed the dramatic tectonic changes unfolding in Lebanon.
During his third visit to Lebanon, U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack stated at a press conference that the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, established on November 24, 2024, had failed. Barrack outlined the reasons for the failure, singling out Hizbullah’s refusal to disarm and the Lebanese government’s inability to disarm the Shiite militia.
Barrack emphasized that it was now up to the Lebanese government to find an internal solution, as the U.S. was in no position to ask Israel for further concessions. These would have been contingent on commitments expressed by the Lebanese government and agreed upon by Hizbullah concerning the necessity of disarming the terrorist group.
These statements followed a series of provocations by Hizbullah, which were met with acceptance by the Lebanese government. During the Ashura ceremonies, Hizbullah held an armed parade in the streets of Beirut. Though some participants were apprehended with a promise of prosecution, they were later released.
Hizbullah Secretary General Naim Qassem reiterated that Hizbullah would not disarm as long as Israel continued to occupy South Lebanon. This stance was further justified, in his view, by the jihadist attacks against the Druze in Suweyda and the Alawites in northwestern Syria.
Hizbullah and its supporters argued that the militia could not disarm while facing a potential jihadist threat from Syria, as had occurred during 2011–2013. Tensions were also heightened by organized protests in Tripoli, where demonstrators hailed the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa. This came amid reports suggesting that Tripoli, a Sunni-majority town, might one day be annexed to Syria, mirroring its pre-1920 status before the French mandate added it to Lebanon.
Further compounding the situation, Barrack was dismayed to discover that the Lebanese government’s answers to U.S. inquiries mirrored Hizbullah’s public positions. The reality became clear: Hizbullah never intended to disarm. While the Lebanese army appeared to uncover weapons caches in the south, the most strategic Hizbullah positions remained untouched. Israel, well aware of this duplicity, continued intermittent strikes on Hizbullah operatives and positions in both southern and northern Lebanon.
Buoyed by a landslide victory in municipal elections, Hizbullah continued to defy both the Lebanese government and the U.S. It rejected the Lebanese Central Bank’s Directive 170, which targeted Hizbullah’s parallel banking structure, particularly its financial arm, Al-Qard Al-Hassan (“The Benevolent Loan”). This organization operates outside Lebanon’s formal banking system. In a defiant response, Hizbullah announced the opening of four new branches, raising the total to forty.
Recently, Hizbullah declared that it had completed a reorganization and replenishment of its arsenal and was ready to confront Israel again when the time comes.
To add insult to injury, an agreement announced in June – during the high-profile visit of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas – called for the disarmament of Palestinian factions in 12 refugee camps in Lebanon. The process was to begin with three camps in the Beirut area. However, the June 15 start date came and went, and the agreement remained merely ink on paper.
Given the U.S. assessment that no meaningful progress is occurring, the central question now revolves around what comes next. Lebanese media, spanning the political spectrum, are painting a nightmare scenario: Israel may resume military operations against Hizbullah once it becomes evident that Hizbullah will not yield to pressure and the Lebanese government is incapable of fulfilling its promises, continuing instead a cat-and-mouse game with the U.S. envoy.
Some even speculate that Israel may launch a preemptive strike to deliver a crushing blow to Hizbullah, compelling it to capitulate or negotiate.
For the time being, the U.S. appears to lack a concrete strategy. Barrack has proposed that the Lebanese government initiate negotiations with Hizbullah’s so-called political wing. He also suggested that Hizbullah be asked to disarm its long-range weapons, which threaten Israel’s security. So far, there has been no response to these proposals.
Meanwhile, the U.S. (alongside Qatar) continues to fund the salaries of the Lebanese army and supply weapons and training. The hope remains that the army will one day overcome sectarian divisions and enable the government to assert sovereignty over the entire country.
However, it is increasingly unlikely that the U.S. will invest significant diplomatic capital in supporting Lebanon at international forums as long as Hizbullah maintains its grip on the country’s finances and no structural reforms are adopted.
The rapidly evolving situation in Syria and the possibility of a jihadist incursion across the border is also drawing attention. Such a development could momentarily sideline efforts to disarm Hizbullah, as focus would shift toward confronting an existential threat – one that could disrupt Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance and plunge the nation into civil war.
