Did the PA’s ‘Pay-for-Slay’ Policy Facilitate the October 7 Massacre?

Executive Summary

This study examines whether the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s long-standing statutory policy of remunerating and employing terrorist prisoners and released terrorists materially facilitated Hamas’s ability to prepare for and execute the October 7, 2023, massacre.

Rather than focusing solely on the moral or political implications of the policy, we examine its legal development, institutional implementation, financial scope, and practical consequences over more than two decades.

Documentary evidence includes:

• PA legislation, presidential decrees, implementing regulations, and official government decisions;
• Official statements issued by the PA, the PLO, and Palestinian leaders;
• Publications of the Israel Security Agency (ISA) and other official Israeli governmental sources;
• Palestinian budgetary documents and publicly available financial data;
• Independent analyses of Palestinian expenditure on terrorist prisoners and released terrorists; and
• Case studies of terrorists released from Israeli prisons who subsequently returned to terrorism, including individuals who participated in planning, financing, directing, or carrying out the October 7 massacre.

Principal Findings

The evidence demonstrates that:

• The PA established a comprehensive statutory framework governing financial benefits for terrorist prisoners and released terrorists.
• Over time, the remuneration system expanded beyond monthly salaries to include release grants, guaranteed employment within the PA apparatus, and continuing financial support where employment was unavailable.
• The legal framework progressively increased both the level of financial benefits and the institutional obligations imposed upon the PA toward terrorist prisoners and released terrorists.
• Numerous terrorists released under the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange resumed terrorist activity shortly after their release.
• Many of those individuals subsequently occupied senior positions within Hamas’ political, military, financial, and security leadership.
• Several beneficiaries of the PA/PLO remuneration system later played significant roles in planning, financing, directing, or participating in the October 7, 2023, massacre.
• Following October 7, neither the PA nor the PLO fundamentally abandoned the underlying policy of remunerating terrorist prisoners and released terrorists, notwithstanding changes to the administrative mechanisms through which payments were made.
• Publicly available financial information indicates that the PA/PLO has continued to devote substantial financial resources to this institutional framework.

Principal Conclusion

The evidence demonstrates that the PA/PLO’s remuneration policy was not merely a humanitarian welfare program or a series of isolated financial payments. Rather, it evolved into a comprehensive statutory and administrative framework that systematically rewarded terrorist imprisonment, guaranteed continuing financial support following release, and, in many cases, facilitated the reintegration of released terrorists into publicly funded employment.

The argument is not that the remuneration system alone caused the October 7 massacre, nor that every beneficiary returned to terrorism. Instead, the policy substantially reduced the personal and economic consequences associated with terrorist activity and materially assisted a significant number of experienced terrorists who later resumed terrorist activity. Several ultimately rose to senior positions within Hamas or directly participated in planning, financing, directing, or executing the October 7 massacre.

Broader Significance

The findings have implications extending beyond the events of October 7. They are relevant to continuing discussions concerning counter-terrorism financing, prisoner-release negotiations, international assistance to the Palestinian Authority, donor oversight, sanctions policy, and legal analyses concerning institutional support for terrorism.

By documenting the legislative evolution, administrative implementation, and operational consequences of the PA/PLO’s remuneration policy through primary documentary evidence, this article provides an evidentiary foundation for future legal, policy, and academic examination of the relationship between institutional support mechanisms and terrorist violence.

On the morning of October 7, 2023, more than 6,000 terrorists from Gaza, including members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, all internationally designated terror organizations, together with others, invaded Israel and carried out a heinous massacre. The terrorists flooded more than 30 Israeli towns, villages, kibbutzim, and a number of military installations.

Men, women, the elderly, the sick, children, and babies were murdered. Some were shot, others were raped.¹ Some were beheaded, many were tortured, others were burned alive. Approximately 1,200 people were murdered. Among those murdered were 822 civilians,² including 531 men and 291 women; 40 were children under the age of 18; 68 were foreign nationals. All that remained of some victims were their teeth, requiring the assistance of archaeologists to identify them.³ An additional 6,900 people were injured to varying degrees.

Over 250 hostages, most of them alive but also some bodies,⁴ were snatched by the terrorists to be used as leverage against Israel. A small number of the hostages were rescued in daring IDF operations,⁵ but most of them – both living and deceased hostages – were released in a number of deals with the genocidal terrorists. The last of the live hostages were released on October 13, 2025, after 737 days. The last body held hostage by the terrorists was recovered by IDF soldiers on January 26, 2026, after 841 days. In order to secure the release of the hostages, Israel released over 2,000 terrorists, including hundreds of murderers.

The attack was carried out under a covering barrage of more than 3,000 rockets and mortars fired by the terrorists, indiscriminately targeting Israel’s civilian population.⁶ As a result of the attack and the destruction caused, tens of thousands of Israelis were evacuated from their homes in the areas adjacent to the Gaza Strip.

This article will demonstrate how the Palestinian Authority’s (PA)/Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terror-rewarding ‘Pay-for-Slay’ policy knowingly facilitated the October 7 massacre.

While most of the attention, to date, regarding the PA/PLO’s ‘Pay-for-Slay’ policy has centred on the payments to the terrorist prisoners, this article, as will be explained below, will focus more on the PA/PLO’s payments to the released terrorists.

The Thesis in a Nutshell

As will be demonstrated below, many of the Hamas terrorists who planned and executed the massacre were receiving payments from the PA/PLO, as “employees” of the PA, simply as a result of their involvement in terror. The PA/PLO had full knowledge that it was paying and rewarding terrorists, and openly admitted the practice. By “employing” the terrorists and paying them hefty salaries, the PA/PLO enabled and rewarded the terrorists for continuing to pursue their terror activities. If the terrorists were required to actually work, instead of living on the PA/PLO terror payments, they would not have been able to dedicate themselves to planning and executing the massacre. Thus, the PA/PLO terror-reward policy was a substantial factor that enabled the Hamas leadership to plan and execute the massacre. These payments were, of course, in addition to the payments the terrorists expected to receive while in prison.

Accordingly, the PA/PLO’s responsibility for the October 7 Massacre is not limited to its general incitement and promotion of terror, is not limited to its ex post facto ratification⁷ of all the terrorist attacks by paying the terrorist prisoners a financial reward that they refer to as a salary. Rather, the PA/PLO’s responsibility for the October 7 massacre also rests on the fact that they employed terrorists, simply for being terrorists, and those terrorists, while in the employ of the PA, carried out the massacre.

The PA/PLO’s ‘Pay-for-Slay’ Policy

The PA/PLO’s terror-rewarding ‘Pay-for-Slay’ policy consists of two elements. One element of the policy is to pay monthly salaries to terrorists who have been arrested by Israel and to released terrorists. The second element of the policy is to pay monthly allowances to injured terrorists and to the families of dead terrorists. Even though the two elements are technically separate, their common goal is to ensure the payment of a financial reward for participating in terror against Israel.

It is important to explain why attributing the terror-rewarding policy to both the PA and the PLO is crucial.

According to its own admission,⁸ the PLO has been paying financial rewards to terrorist prisoners since the 1970s. Once established, the PA took over the onus for these payments.⁹

While for many years the PA made these payments openly, through the PA Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs,¹⁰ on different occasions the PA/PLO attempted to hide them. For example, in 2014, the PA, facing increasing international diplomatic pressure, claimed to have closed the Ministry and replaced it with a newly formed PLO Commission of Prisoners’ Affairs.

In reality, as exposed by Palestinian Media Watch,¹¹ all the PA/PLO did was transfer the payments to the terrorists from the relatively transparent PA financial records, to the completely non-transparent PLO. This ruse continued until 2018, when the PA Ministry of Prisoners’ Affairs reappeared on the PA financial records.¹² In 2020, the PA again erased the ministry from its financial reports, and reverted to making the payments through the PLO.¹³

Irrespective of the specific mechanism chosen, there is no question that the PA and the PLO, jointly, fund and are responsible for the payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners.

In contrast to the PA/PLO payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners, the payments to the injured terrorists and the families of dead prisoners, has, for most of the period, been paid directly by the PLO. According to sworn testimony¹⁴ of Khaled Jabarin provided by the PA/PLO, the PLO has been paying allowances to injured terrorists and the families of dead terrorists since 1968. After the PA was created, the PLO department responsible for the payments was incorporated into the PA Ministry of Welfare. In 2005, the department reverted to the PLO. Under cross-examination, Jabrin certified that the PLO department responsible for the payments receives its entire budget from the PA.¹⁵

Taken together, these practices demonstrate that the allocation of payment responsibilities between the PA and the PLO has been administrative rather than substantive. The payment practices of the PA and PLO demonstrate that both entities regard themselves as jointly responsible for providing financial support to terrorist prisoners, released terrorists, injured terrorists, and the families of deceased terrorists. In practice, responsibility for making these payments shifts between the PA and the PLO based on political expediency and efforts to obscure the source of the funding. Accordingly, responsibility for the entire “Pay-for-Slay” payment system should be attributed jointly and severally to both the PA and the PLO.

The PA/PLO Payments to Terrorist Prisoners

According to Adv. Juad Amawi’s “expert opinion”¹⁶ and who testified on behalf of and at the request of the PA, the PA has been paying salaries to terrorists held in Israeli prisons since May 1995.¹⁷

Initially, the salaries were paid based on internal administrative decisions of the PA-PLO.¹⁸ From the outset, the PA/PLO even used aid donated by the international community to help establish the PA in order to pay the terror-rewards.¹⁹ In 2004,²⁰ ostensibly as a result of heightened international scrutiny of its finances, the PA was required to pass legislation to regulate the practice.

The 2004 PA Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners

Accordingly, in 2004, the PA passed the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners [Hereinafter: “The Law of Prisoners”]. The law was partly declarative and partly operative. The evolution of the legislation demonstrates that the PA did not merely tolerate the payment system but progressively entrenched it in statutory law.

From a declarative perspective, the new law provided the foundation for the connection between the PA and all the terrorists by stipulating that, “The prisoners and released prisoners are a fighting sector and an integral part of the fabric of the Arab Palestinian society.”²¹ Reinforcing the connection of the PA to all the terrorists, irrespective of their organizational affiliation, the law added that the PA was prohibited from signing or participating in the signing of any peace agreement unless all the Palestinian terrorist prisoners are released.²²

From an operative perspective, the law defined the term “prisoner” as all persons “imprisoned in the occupation’s [Israel’s] prisons as a result of his participation in the struggle against the occupation.”²³ The law further provided that the PA would give all the prisoners a monthly allowance to be used in the prison canteen²⁴ and a monthly salary.²⁵

In addition to regulating the payment of the salaries to the terrorist prisoners, the law also provided that one of the ways in which the PA would act to achieve its goals by guaranteeing employment for released terrorist prisoners.²⁶

The First PA Regulations to Implement the Law of Prisoners

To implement the Law of Prisoners, in 2006, the PA government adopted and published “Regulations of the Law Government Decision – 2006: Regarding the Regulations of the Law of Prisoners and Released Prisoners.” These regulations fundamentally changed not only the PA’s payments to the terrorist prisoners, but also provided the basis for the integration of the released terrorists into the PA apparatuses.

In the regulations, the PA raised the salaries paid to the terrorist prisoners.²⁷ Instead of paying a fixed monthly salary to all the terrorists, irrespective of the time served,²⁸ the new PA directive established a graduated pay scale with monthly salaries rising according to the time served in prison, as set out in the following chart:²⁹

The new regulations also provided for additional payments for married terrorist prisoners; for terrorist prisoners who have children; and for terrorist prisoners who were residents of Jerusalem.³⁰

In addition, the regulations provided that the PA would pay newly released terrorists an immediate grant, ranging from $500 for terrorists who spent less than a year in prison, rising to $10,000 for terrorists who spent more than 25 years in prison.³¹

As regards the released terrorists, the regulations implemented the law providing that they had a right, subject to certain criteria, to be guaranteed a position in the PA apparatus.³² The rank of the position to which the terrorist would be appointed, together with the corresponding salary, was determined according to the cumulative period the terrorist had spent in prison and the terrorist’s educational qualifications.³³ If the PA did not find a vacant position, the released terrorist would be paid a fixed monthly salary.³⁴ Released terrorists who had spent less than five years in prison were guaranteed unemployment benefits for six months.³⁵

Accordingly, by 2006 the PA had moved beyond merely rewarding terror activities and the subsequent imprisonment. Through the regulations it established a formal mechanism for integrating released terrorists into the governmental apparatus or, where no position was available, guaranteeing them a continuing state-funded income as constructive employees.

The PA Raises Salaries to the Terrorist Prisoners

In 2010, the PA adopted amended regulations,³⁶ which were also based on the Law of Prisoners.³⁷ The new regulations again raised the salaries paid to the terrorist prisoners according to the following chart:³⁸

The new regulations also provided for additional monthly payments for married terrorist prisoners;³⁹ terrorist prisoners with children;⁴⁰ and terrorist prisoners who were residents of Jerusalem⁴¹ or Israeli citizens.⁴²

In his testimony in court,⁴³ Amawi certified that all Palestinian terrorist prisoners including, but not limited to, members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are paid salaries by the PA. Interestingly, the only Palestinian terrorists that Amawi excluded from receiving payment of the PA salaries are members of Al-Qaeda. When pushed to explain how this approach was based in the definitions of the Law of Prisoners and the pursuant regulations, Amawi was unable to explain.⁴⁴

The statutory framework described above formed the legal basis for the continued remuneration and employment of terrorists released including in the subsequent terrorist exchanges.

The Deal to Free Kidnapped Israeli Soldier Gilad Shalit

Before continuing the discussion regarding the PA payments to the terrorist prisoners and the released terrorists, it is critical, as will be shown below, to provide a brief summary of the deal to free kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

In June 2006, terrorists from Gaza infiltrated Israel, murdered two Israeli soldiers,⁴⁵ a third was seriously injured, and Shalit was taken captive.

In 2011, Israel and Hamas reached a deal to secure Shalit’s release in exchange for releasing 1,027 terrorists. The deal had two parts. In the first part, Israel released 477 terrorists, 450 men and 27 women. Most of those released were serving life sentences for their part in murders.⁴⁶ Of the men released, 131 were allowed to return to their homes in the Gaza Strip; 6 Israeli-Arab terrorists were allowed to return to Israel;⁴⁷ 110 were allowed to return to their homes in Judea and Samaria; an additional 203 residents of Judea and Samaria were expelled from the area, of whom 163 were expelled to Gaza and 40 were required to leave Judea, Samaria, and Gaza entirely, whether temporarily or permanently.

In the second part of the deal, an additional 550 terrorists were released to their homes.

The terrorists released to Gaza included many of the terrorists who planned and executed the October 7 massacre. Included among them were Yahya Sinwar, later crowned as the head of Hamas in Gaza, and who was a principal driving force behind the massacre.

When the first group was released, PA Chairman, Mahmoud Abbas held a special ceremony in Ramallah to greet and welcome them.⁴⁸ Shortly after their release, the PA decided to allocate $5 million⁴⁹ for a “Presidential gift as token of honor to prisoners… monetary release grants to all the released prisoners, without exception, both to those released to their homes and to those who were expelled.”⁵⁰

The PA Amends the Law of Prisoners

In 2013, in the aftermath of the 2011 deal to secure the release of Shalit, the PA amended the Law of Prisoners.

In place of the general provision of the original law, that provided that one of the ways in which the PA would implement the law would be by providing jobs to the released terrorists,⁵¹ the PA added a specific provision providing that the “State [of Palestine]⁵² would act to provide positions to the released prisoners.”⁵³

In the event that the PA would be unable to guarantee a position, the PA would be required to pay every released terrorist prisoner who spent five to ten years in prison, a monthly sum.⁵⁴

As regards released terrorist prisoners who spent over ten years in prison, the amendment to the Law of Prisoners provided that they would be employed with a salary in the “state institutions.”⁵⁵

The amendment also provided⁵⁶ that the PA would continue to pay the salaries of terrorist prisoners who were, upon their arrest, PA employees,⁵⁷ and that if the salary due to the terrorist prisoners who were not PA employees prior to their arrest is higher than the salary the PA employee earned prior to his arrest, the PA would pay them the higher salary.⁵⁸

Another substantial provision of the amendment referred specifically to the terrorists who were released in the Shalit deal and were expelled from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. To cater to these released terrorists and ensure that they would be entitled to a salary from the PA, the amendment to the Law of Prisoners specifically provided that the provisions of the law would also apply⁵⁹ to released terrorists who had been expelled.

The significance of these legislative changes became apparent in the years that followed, as many of the released terrorists who benefited from the PA’s statutory employment and remuneration scheme resumed or continued terrorist activity.

New Regulations to Provide for Released Terrorists

Following the amendment to the law, in November 2013, the PA adopted “Government Decision No. 15 of 2013 – Regulation for Ensuring Jobs for Released Prisoners” to implement the amended Law of Prisoners. These regulations have been in force since their adoption, or at the very least until February 2025.⁶⁰

The new regulation implemented the new commitment of the PA to provide positions to prisoners, based on the time they spent in prison, their education and training and the ability of the PA to place them in positions.⁶¹

To cater to these criteria the new regulation provided a stepped approach.

First, the new regulation provided that all released terrorists who had spent more than a year in prison, and who submitted a request to receive a position in the public sector – the PA – would receive preferential treatment in employment.⁶² The rank of the position of the released terrorist is set according to a table appended to the regulation, while his salary would be set according to the pay scales of civilian and military employees of the “State.”⁶³

Second, the new regulation provided that released terrorists who spent between five and ten years in prison and for whom no position was available, were to receive a fixed salary,⁶⁴ provided they met bureaucratic requirements and had no regular source of income exceeding 1,450 NIS per month.⁶⁵ The basic fixed salary was set at 1,500 NIS per month, with additions for a spouse,⁶⁶ children under the age of 18,⁶⁷ and 100 NIS for every year the terrorist spent in prison. The fixed salary would cease⁶⁸ if the terrorist obtained a permanent source of income exceeding 1,450 NIS, if the terrorist is requested to fill a position that has become available, if the terrorist is rearrested (in which case the terrorist would receive the salary of a prisoner), if the terrorist is required to undergo training and refuses, or if the terrorist fails to meet the bureaucratic requirements.

Third, the new regulation provided that terrorists who had spent ten or more years in prison will be “employed with a salary” in the “State institutions.”⁶⁹ While the basic provision of the regulation uses the term “employed,” a further provision demonstrates the fictional nature of the employment. According to the additional provision,⁷⁰ every released terrorist who is employed under this general provision is required “to comply with official decisions of the “State institutions,” and, critically, “to present himself for work, if he is required to do so [emphasis added].”

The salary paid to these terrorists by the PA is based on employment scales that appear in an appendix to the regulations. According to the appendix, the level of the position in which the terrorist is “employed” is based on the time the terrorist spent in prison.

Thus, a released terrorist who spent ten to 15 years in prison, is given a civilian ranked position of “Director A,” with a corresponding military rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. A released terrorist who spent 15 to 20 years in prison, is given a civilian ranked position of “General Director A’ 4,” with a corresponding military rank of Colonel. A released terrorist who spent 20 to 25 years in prison, is given a civilian ranked position of “Deputy Director-General A’ 2,” with a corresponding military rank of Brigadier General. A released terrorist who spent 25 to 30 years in prison, is given a civilian ranked position of “Director General [of a Ministry],” with a corresponding military rank of General. A released terrorist who spent more than 30 years in prison is given a civilian ranked position equivalent to that of a “Minister [in the PA government],” with a corresponding military rank of General.

In other words, according to these regulations, released terrorists who spent ten or more years in prison are guaranteed “employment” and a salary from the PA, and their only commitment is to present themselves for work, if actually required to do so.

It is not unreasonable to speculate, that the new regulations created a situation, criticized in 2017 even by Aman,⁷¹ in which the number of Generals in the PA had risen from 47 in 2013, to 144 in 2017, the number of Brigadier Generals had risen from 195 in 2013 to 503 in 2017, the number of Colonels had risen from 412 in 2013, to 1,950 in 2017, and the number of Lieutenant-Colonels had risen from 1,844 in 2013, to 4,051 in 2017.⁷²

The Additional Benefits of the PA/PLO’s “Pay for-Slay” Policy

In addition to the direct payments to the imprisoned and released terrorists, the different PA regulations guarantee other benefits to the terrorists and their families.

Released terrorists who spent over five years in prison (3 years for women) are entitled to an exemption from paying university fees,⁷³ an exemption for paying health insurance,⁷⁴ and an exemption from paying for training courses.⁷⁵ The children of terrorist prisoners are entitled to an exemption from paying school fees.⁷⁶ Released terrorists who spent over 20 years in prison are entitle to an exemption for paying taxes to buy a new car.⁷⁷

How Does the PA/PLO Pay the Terror-Rewards?

For many years, the PA paid the terror-rewards through the banks operating in the territories under the control of the PA. This situation changed drastically after Palestinian Media Watch wrote to those banks, in April 2020, and threatened that their continued cooperation with the PA to facilitate the payment of the terror-rewards would potentially expose them to both criminal and civil liability.⁷⁸ Responding to the warning, the banks initially refused to accept the terror payments⁷⁹ and it was later reported that they had closed no fewer than 35,000 bank accounts.⁸⁰

After the closure of the accounts, the PA scrambled to find alternative solutions. First, they decided to establish a new bank.⁸¹ Then they decided to make the payments through the PA Post Office. After this method met with harsh criticism from the terrorists and their families,⁸² the PA developed a new system based on allegedly⁸³ stand-alone ATMs.⁸⁴

Since the payment of the terror-rewards to the terrorists in Gaza posed a specific obstacle, the PA adopted a system of making the payments through “authorized money changers” in the Gaza Strip.⁸⁵

The PA/PLO’s responsibility for the October 7 Massacre

As explained above, the PA/PLO’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy is not limited to paying salaries to imprisoned terrorists. Rather it is a comprehensive policy that rewards and caters to both the imprisoned terrorists and, most pertinently for this analysis, released terrorists.

While the imprisoned terrorists enjoy a monthly salary and a host of other benefits during the period of their incarceration, the PA/PLO also provides the released terrorists with an extensive package. In practice, according to the PA regulations, released terrorists who spent more than five years in prison are entitled to a salary for the rest of their lives. Released terrorists who spent ten years in prison are guaranteed a position in the PA, together with a salary commensurate with the time they spent in prison.

Over the years, hundreds of terrorists have been released to Gaza. While comprehensive data on the subject is unavailable, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) during the period starting January 2017 through September 2023, some 665 released terrorists passed through the Erez crossing between Israel and Gaza.⁸⁶

These statistics do not include the terrorists who were released, as noted above, as part of the deal to free Shalit.

Publications of the Israel Security Agency (ISA) over the years have documented the direct involvement of terrorists released in the Shalit deal in terror. Each of these terrorists were entitled to a receive a payment from the PA/PLO based on their participation in terror and the time they spent in prison. These include, but are not limited to, the following examples:⁸⁷

• In January 2013, the ISA exposed⁸⁸ a terror cell that had been operating from Hebron. According to the report, the cell was operated by Husam Badran. Badran was arrested in April 2002 and was sentenced to 17 years in prison for his part in multiple terrorist attacks. As part of the Shalit deal, he was expelled to Qatar after spending over 9 years in prison.
• In April 2013 Israeli security forces reported on the arrested Amir Barkat.⁸⁹ In his interrogation, Barkat confessed to meeting Amir Dukan in Saudia Arabia, and accepted his offer to carry out terrorist attacks in exchange for payment of $60,000. Dukan was also involved in attempts to smuggle Hamas funds into Judea and Samaria.⁹⁰ Dukan, a terrorist who belonged to the Tanzim/Fatah, was arrested in April 2003,⁹¹ and sentenced in 2004 to six life sentences,⁹² was expelled to Gaza as part of the Shalit deal, after spending seven years in prison.
• In March 2013, Israeli security forces reported on the arrest of Manjeb Juneidi⁹³ in November 2012. Juneidi’s interrogation revealed that he had been recruited by Basel Himuni to recruit other terrorists and to carry out terrorist attacks. Himuni, a member of Hamas, was arrested in October 2004 and had been sentenced to 23 years in prison before his release in the Shalit deal and his expulsion to Gaza. Himuni had spent about seven years in prison.

The report of the ISA also referred to a previous incident in which another terrorist, Fadi Abu Daoud, confessed that he had been recruited by Khaled Taha, who instructed the former to set up a terror cell that would carry out suicide bombings and shootings. Taha, who had been arrested in August 2004 and was sentenced to 16 years in prison, was also released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza. Taha had spent about seven years in prison.

• In June 2013, Israeli security forces arrested Attallah Saad.⁹⁴ His investigation revealed that he had been recruited by Hashem Khajaz to carry out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. Khajaz, a member of Hamas, was arrested in December 2003 and had been sentenced to ten life sentences for his part in multiple terrorist attacks in which a number of people were murdered, before his release in the Shalit deal and his expulsion abroad. Khajaz had spent about eight years in prison.
• In December 2013, the ISA reported⁹⁵ that Hamas continued its efforts to promote terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks, kidnappings and murders, against Israeli targets and that terrorists released in the Shalit deal to Gaza were directly involved. The terrorists mentioned included Ali Qadhi, who would later participate in the October 7 massacre⁹⁶ and Mazen Fouka. Fouka was arrested in August 2002,⁹⁷ and was convicted for his part in a suicide bombing. While he was sentenced to nine life sentences,⁹⁸ he was released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza.⁹⁹ Fouka had spent over nine years in prison.
• In April 2015, the ISA reported¹⁰⁰ that it had thwarted the activities of Hamas members transferring funding from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria. The report included reference to Ahmad Diriya. Diriya was arrested in May 2002 and was serving a life sentence. As part of the Shalit deal, Diriya was expelled to the Gaza Strip. Diriya had spent over nine years in prison.
• In July 2015, the ISA reported¹⁰¹ on the arrest of the terror cell that murdered Malchi Rosenfeld. The report noted that the terror cell was directed by Ahmad Najar, who had initially been released as part of the Shalit deal to the Gaza Strip, but had since moved to Jordan. Najar was arrested in December 2003¹⁰² and after his trial and conviction, was sentenced to six life sentences for his part in multiple terrorist attacks. According to the indictment submitted against the terrorists, Najar funded the activities of the cell using money that had been paid to him by the PA, as a terrorist prisoner and released terrorist. Najar had spent about eight years in prison.
• In August 2017, the ISA exposed¹⁰³ the continued operations by Hamas terrorists who had been released in the Shalit deal and who were based in Turkey, in funding for Hamas activities. Among those mentioned were Majed Juabe and Harun Aldin. According to the report, using the system they established, Juabe and Harun provided hundreds of thousands of dollars for Hamas terror activities. Juabe, originally from Hebron, had been in prison since April 1995 and was serving a life sentence. He was released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza after spending over 16 years in prison. Aldin, who had been in prison since December 1992 serving a life sentence, was expelled and went to live in Turkey. Aldin was further implicated in an additional ISA report,¹⁰⁴ detailing his involvement, in August 2018, in additional activities to provide funding for Hamas. Aldin had spent about 19 years in prison.
• In January 2018, the ISA exposed¹⁰⁵ that Abdallah Arar had instructed a terrorist from Judea and Samaria to recruit a terror cell and carry out attacks. Arar had been arrested in January 2006, and sentenced to life in prison for his part in the kidnapping and murder of Sasson Nuriel. As part of the Shalit deal Arar was expelled to the Gaza Strip after spending over five years in prison.
• In February 2018, the ISA exposed¹⁰⁶ the continued terror activities of Hamas members who had been expelled, as part of the Shalit deal to Turkey. Among those mentioned were Zaher Jabarin, Jihad Yag’mur and Salame Mari’i. Jabarin was arrested in 1993 and sentenced to life in prison for his part in a series of terrorist attacks. When he was released in 2011, Jabarin had spent just over eighteen years in prison (arrested in April 1993). While Jabarin initially worked under the leadership of Hamas terrorist Salah Arouri, he is now considered to be Hamas’s main financier. Yag’mur was arrested in 1994 and sentenced to life in prison for his part in the kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldier Nachshon Waxman. When he was released in 2011, he had spent just over 17 years in prison. Yag’mur is the head of Hamas representation in Turkey. Mari’i was arrested and sentenced to life in prison for his part in the 1993 murder of an IDF soldier. When he was released in 2011, he had spent just over 18 years in prison.
• In May 2018, the ISA reported¹⁰⁷ that two Hamas terrorists who had been released in the Shalit deal and were residing in Turkey, Mahmoud Atuan and Musa Aka’ari provided other Hamas terrorists with thousands of dollars to support Hamas terror activities. Atuan had been arrested in June 1993 and was sentenced to three life sentences. When released, he had spent over 18 years in prison. Aka’ari had been arrested in July 1993 and was also sentenced to three life sentences. When released, he had spent over 18 years in prison.
• In July 2019, the ISA reported¹⁰⁸ that Hamas terrorists in Gaza had spent a year training an explosives expert, Fadi Abu El-Salah, who was sent to set up an explosives laboratory in Judea and Samaria. Abu El-Salah was arrested after he abused a permit that allowed him exit from Gaza to seek medical treatment. Among the terrorists involved in the scheme were Musab Hashalmon. Hashalmon was arrested in September 2004, and prior to his release in the Shalit deal, was sentenced to 17 years in prison. When released, he had spent over seven years in prison.
• In November 2021, the ISA exposed¹⁰⁹ an extensive Hamas network that included more than 50 terrorists. The network was run and guided by terrorists Salah Arouri and Zakaria El-Gasrawi (Najib). Prior to his release in the Shalit deal, El-Gasrawi, a resident of Jerusalem, had been arrested in February 1996 and was sentenced to 22 years in prison for his part in the kidnapping and murder of Nachshon Waxman. When released, he had spent over 15 years in prison. The report also noted the involvement of Musa Dudin, a member of Hamas who had been in prison since December 1992 serving a life sentence, was also released in the Shalit deal and who initially went to live in Qatar. When released, he had spent almost 19 years in prison.
• In March 2022, Israeli security forces arrested Mohammad Hamed.¹¹⁰ His interrogation exposed that Farah Hamed had recruited him to carry out terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. Farah Hamed, a member of Hamas, was arrested in December 2003 and had been sentenced to seven life sentences for his part in multiple terrorist attacks in which a number of people had been murdered, before his release in the Shalit deal and his expulsion to Gaza. When released, he had spent almost eight years in prison.
• In October 2022, the ISA exposed¹¹¹ another terror cell operating in Judea and Samaria under the direction of Bilal Basharat. Basharat had been arrested in June 2002 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his part in a number of terrorist attacks. As part of the Shalit deal, Basharat was expelled to the Gaza Strip. When released, he had spent over nine years in prison.
• In August 2023, the ISA reported¹¹² on the arrest of another terror cell in Judea and Samaria that had been acting under the instructions of Ala’am Ka’abi. Ka’abi, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, had been arrested in April 2003 and was serving nine life sentences for his part in terrorist attacks. As part of the Shalit deal, Ka’abi was expelled to the Gaza Strip and moved from there to Lebanon. When released, he had spent over eight years in prison.
• During the military operation in the Gaza Strip after the October 7 massacre, Israeli security forces arrested Mahmoud Kawasme¹¹³ in the Al-Shifa hospital. Kawasme was among the planners and funders of the 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teens, Eyal Yifrach, Gilad Shaer, and Naftali Fraenkel.¹¹⁴ Prior to his release in the Shalit deal, Kawasme had been arrested in October 2004 and had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for his part in terrorist attacks. An additional report of the ISA,¹¹⁵ from November 2021, also mentioned Kawasme, among others, for promoting terror from Gaza. When released, he had spent almost seven years in prison.
• During the military operations in Gaza, the ISA reported¹¹⁶ the elimination of terrorist Raid Asila and seven other terrorists. Asila was responsible for the murder of Haim Kerman in Jerusalem in 1998. He was released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza. In Gaza he continued his Hamas activities. The seven other terrorists, who were not named, were also involved in murderous terrorist attacks, were also released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza, and continued their Hamas terrorist activities.
• In February 2026, the ISA reported¹¹⁷ that it had eliminated Hamas terrorist Basel Haimouni. Haimouni was arrested in October 2004 and convicted for his part in the murder of 16 people in the August 2004 bus bombing in Be’er Sheva. Haimouni was released in the Shalit deal and expelled to Gaza, where he continued his Hamas activities.

The above examples, and many others similar to them, are not isolated incidents. Rather, they demonstrate a sustained pattern documented repeatedly by the ISA over more than a decade.

Some of the terrorists released in the Shalit deal that later participated in the October 7 massacre or held senior positions in Hamas at the time of the massacre:

While the preceding examples demonstrate that numerous terrorists released in the Shalit deal resumed terrorist activity, the following examples illustrate an even more significant phenomenon: a number of those same beneficiaries later occupied senior positions within Hamas or directly participated in planning and executing the October 7 massacre.

• Yahya Sinwar – Sinwar was arrested several times during the 1980s and spent several years in Israeli prisons. He was convicted in 1989 and sentenced to four life sentences for the interrogation and murder of Palestinians he, and the Hamas security apparatus he established, suspected of collaborating with Israel.¹¹⁸

He was released in the Shalit deal. In 2017 he was elected to head Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and worked swiftly to establish links to the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, Qassem Soleimani.¹¹⁹

In 2018, after he planned and initiated the first Hamas attempt to invade Israel, en masse, Sinwar appeared at one of the staging sites and declared: “We will take down the border [with Israel], and we will tear out their hearts from their bodies.”¹²⁰

Sinwar was the architect of the October 7 massacre.¹²¹ When released, he had spent over 22 years in prison, entitling him to a guaranteed, senior position and commensurate salary from the PA. Sinwar was eliminated in October 2024 by IDF forces operating in Gaza.¹²²

• Ali Qadhi – Qadhi was sentenced to life in Israeli prison in 2005 for the kidnapping and murder of Sasson Nouriel in 2005. After spending just six years in prison, he was released and deported to the Gaza Strip as part of the Shalit deal. As one of the commanders in Hamas’s Nukhba forces, Qadhi led one of the groups that invaded Israel and carried out the October 7 massacre.¹²³ Since it is unclear whether Qadhi served additional prison terms, it may be assumed that he was entitled, at the very least, to the fixed salary paid to terrorists who spent five to ten years in prison.
• In May 2024, the ISA reported¹²⁴ that Israeli forces had arrested nine terrorists and eliminated another 18, who belonged to “Mateh Hagada,” a Hamas organization responsible for promoting terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria. Among the names mentioned were Khaled Najar, who functioned as the head of the “Mateh Hagada,” and Yasin Rabi’a, both of whom had been released in the Shalit deal. Rabi’a had been arrested in December 2003 and was serving two life sentences.
• Tawfik Abu Naim – Abu Naim was originally arrested in May 1989 and was serving a life sentence. When released in the Shalit deal, he had spent over 22 years in prison, entitling him to a guaranteed, senior position and commensurate salary from the PA. At the time of the October 7 massacre, he was the head of the Hamas Internal Security apparatus.¹²⁵
• Rouhi Mushtaha – Mushtaha was originally arrested in February 1988 and was serving four life sentences. When released in the Shalit deal, he had spent over 23 years in prison, entitling him to a guaranteed, senior position and commensurate salary from the PA. At the time of the October 7 massacre, he was Yahya Sinwar’s right-hand man and the head of the Hamas governance apparatus in the Gaza Strip.¹²⁶
• Zaher Jabarin – Jabarin, together with Salah Arouri, is credited with establishing the Hamas military wing in Judea and Samaria. He was arrested in April 1993, convicted for his part in the murder of Israelis and sentenced to life in prison. After spending 18 years in prison, Jabarin was released in the first part of the Shalit deal. When released, Jabarin had spent over eighteen years in prison, entitling him to a guaranteed, senior position and commensurate salary from the PA. A condition of Jabarin’s release was that he leave Israel, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip permanently. After his release, Jabarin held a number of senior positions in Hamas. Jabarin was responsible for running Hamas’ financial arm.¹²⁷ In January 2024, the Wall Street Journal credited Jabarin as the “CEO of Hamas” responsible for securing the funding to attack Israel.¹²⁸ Al-Jabarin was described as a critical figure in orchestrating suicide terrorist operations. He is currently tasked with implementing the decision to resume suicide attacks within Israel.¹²⁹

These examples illustrate that the beneficiaries of the PA/PLO’s remuneration and employment scheme did not merely return to terrorist activity. Several rose to the highest levels of Hamas’ political, military, financial, and security leadership and played central roles in planning, financing, or executing the October 7 massacre.

Other Released Terrorists Who Participated in the Massacre or Held Senior Positions in Hamas

In addition to the terrorists released in the Shalit deal, other released terrorists, who would also have been beneficiaries of the PA’s remuneration or employment scheme, also participated, directly or indirectly, in the massacre. This category includes, at the very least, the following terrorists:

• Salah Arouri – Arouri, together with Zaher Jabarin, was credited with establishing the Hamas military wing in Judea and Samaria. Arrested on multiple occasions, between 1990 and 2010, Arouri spent 15 years in Israeli prisons. He was eventually released in 2010 on condition that he leave Judea and Samaria permanently. In October 2017, Arouri was elected to be the deputy chairman of the Hamas politburo.¹³⁰ From abroad, Arouri continued his involvement in terror.¹³¹
• Wessam Farhat – Farhat was originally arrested by Israel in 1995 and spent ten years in prison. According to the IDF,¹³² Farhat took part in the planning of the October 7 Massacre, during which, he directed Hamas “Nukhba” terrorists to infiltrate the Nahal Oz Kibbutz and an IDF post. Farhat was eliminated by the IDF during the war.
• Wael Asefa – Asefa was imprisoned between 1992-1998 for his involvement in terrorist attacks against Israeli communities and was involved in the incitement and promotion of terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers for decades. According to the IDF,¹³³ Asefa, together with other commanders of the Central Camps Brigade, was responsible for sending Hamas Nukhba terrorists into Israeli territory during the barbaric massacre on October 7. Following the massacre, he planned additional terrorist attacks. He was eliminated by the IDF during the war.

Abbas, the PLO, and the PA Never Condemned the October 7 Massacre

It is a matter of public record that the PA, the PLO, and the senior members of those bodies never explicitly condemned the October 7 massacre. At best, some of the Palestinian leadership, when pressed, were able to issue mealy-mouthed statements condemning terror and violence by both sides.¹³⁴ While occasionally critical of Hamas, the PA, the PLO, and their leadership have never openly declared that Hamas and the other participants in the October 7 massacre are terrorists who should be prosecuted for their actions.

Abbas’s Letter to President Macron and its Connection to The Law of Prisoners

As noted above, the Law of Prisoners prohibits the PA from signing any peace agreement that does not include the release of all of the prisoners. In anticipation of an international conference initiated by French President Emmanuel Macron, to be held in mid-June 2025, Abbas wrote a letter¹³⁵ to Macron and others, outlining his vision for settlement of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Among other subjects addressed in the letter, on two occasions, Abbas noted that the future arrangement with Israel would have to include the release of all the terrorist prisoners.

While Abbas’s demand to release the terrorist prisoners, including mass murderers and the participants in the October 7 massacre, does not have a financial element, it does nonetheless convey a substantial perceptive and cognitive message. That message is that the PA, as provided in its law, is unequivocally committed to pursue the goal of freeing all the terrorists. This message provides not only the terrorists but also their families with a beacon of hope. It is also a clear expression of the wide umbrella of responsibility that the PA took upon itself to be the representative of all the different terrorists, irrespective of their internal Palestinian affiliation.

How Much Does the PA Pay to the Released Terrorists?

While analysts estimate that the full extent of the PA-PLO payments to terrorists exceeds one billion shekels per year, quantifying the exact amount would require access to hidden PA and PLO sources.

However, in July 2018, Israel adopted the “Freeze Law,”¹³⁶ which guaranteed to “freeze money that the Palestinian Authority has paid in connection with terrorism from the money transferred to it by the government of Israel.”

According to the Freeze Law, at the end of every year, the Israeli Minister of Defense is required to submit a report quantifying the PA-PLO payments to the terrorists in the preceding year. Once the report is confirmed, the sum designated by the minister is deducted from the taxes Israel collects and transfers to the PA under the Oslo Accords.¹³⁷

The findings of these reports, which include not only the PA-PLO payments to the imprisoned and released terrorists but also the PA-PLO payments to the families of dead terrorists,¹³⁸ are presented in the following chart:

The difference between the estimates of the analysts and the sums designated by the Minister of Defense is partially explained in the reports of the Minister that indicated the inability to quantify the full extent of the additional benefits paid to the injured terrorists and the families of the dead terrorists. An additional limitation results, as noted above, from some of the released terrorists being employed by the different ministries of the PA and not through the PLO Commission of Prisoners.

Unfortunately, the published reports of the Minister of Defense are highly censored and do not provide a clear differentiation between the sums paid by the PA/PLO to the terrorist prisoners and the sums paid by the PA/PLO to the released terrorists.

However, there are a number of indicators that can be used to specifically quantify the PA payments to the released terrorists. Thus, for example, in 2021, the head of the PA funded PLO Commission of Prisoners’ Affairs at the time, Qadri Abu Bakr, stated that the PA payments to the terrorist prisoners and released terrorists amount to “between 48–50 million shekels each month.”¹⁴⁸

A study conducted by Palestinian Media Watch in 2018–2019 used prisoner statistics provided by Israel’s Prison Service regarding the number of prisoners and lengths of the imprisonment to calculate the PA/PLO’s monthly payments to the terrorist prisoners.¹⁴⁹ The study found that less than half (19,898,848 NIS) of the PA/PLO’s cumulative monthly payments to the imprisoned and released terrorists were paid to the imprisoned terrorists, and that the remainder was paid to the released terrorists.

Although the precise allocation between imprisoned and released terrorists cannot be determined from the publicly available material, the available evidence consistently demonstrates that the sums the PA/PLO paid to released terrorists amounted to many hundreds of millions of shekels every year.

PA Admits Paying Terrorists in 2025

While the PA/PLO have done their utmost to hide the full extent of the terror-reward payments, on rare occasions, the PA not only openly admits the payments but also openly quantifies them. This was the case regarding some of the PA terror-reward payments in 2025.

As noted above, in February 2025, under substantial international pressure, Abbas issued legislation to cancel all other legislation that mandated the payment of the terror-rewards. To most analysts following the PA/PLO, it was clear that the move was fraudulent and designed to solely to pull the wool over the eyes of the international community.¹⁵⁰

As part of the fraud, however, the PA/PLO transferred the responsibility for paying the terror-rewards to a relatively new body. The new body was meant to abandon the previous terror-reward payments and implement a needs-based criteria.

Later in the year, in the face of mounting proof that the payments had continued despite the fraudulent move, the PA/PLO admitted that the PA Minister of Finance had continued, allegedly without authorization, to make the terror-reward payments. The minister was then summarily replaced.

In an attempt to restore international confidence, the PA/PLO agreed to subject the new body to an independent audit. Although the auditors concluded that the restructured mechanism complied with its stated mandate, their published summary¹⁵¹ nevertheless acknowledged that, between February and November 2025 alone, the PA/PLO paid 188,256,718 NIS to imprisoned terrorists.

Given the cumulative PA/PLO payments to the terrorist prisoners and released terrorists in 2025, as designated by the Israeli Minister of Defense – i.e. 395,970,000 NIS, – it would seem that in 2025 alone, the PA/PLO payments to the released terrorists amounted to approximately 200,000,000 NIS.¹⁵²

Conclusion

The October 7 massacre was the product of numerous military, political, ideological, and financial factors. This study has examined one of those factors. The evidence demonstrates that, for decades, the PA/PLO institutionalized a system that rewarded terrorist activities, guaranteed financial support to imprisoned and released terrorists, and integrated many of them into publicly funded employment. Numerous beneficiaries of that system subsequently resumed terrorist activity, and several rose to positions from which they planned, financed, directed, or participated in the October 7 massacre.

The PA/PLO was aware of the fact that many terrorists returned to terrorist activities, enjoying the financial cushion provided by the “Pay-for-Slay” policy. Moreover, when the terrorists returned to terror and were re-arrested, the PA/PLO counted all cumulative periods of arrest as the basis for calculating the terrorists’ terror-reward salary.

Whether viewed from the perspective of counter-terrorism policy, international law, or public administration, these findings demonstrate that the PA/PLO’s remuneration and employment framework was not a peripheral feature of Palestinian governance but a long-standing institutional policy with consequences that extended far beyond the payment of salaries.

The significance of the PA/PLO’s remuneration policy lies not in the amount of money paid to any individual terrorist, but in the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive institutional framework that systematically reduced the personal and economic consequences of engaging in terrorism, rewarded continued affiliation, and enabled numerous experienced terrorists to return to operational and leadership roles within Hamas.

* * *

Notes