Iran Presents a Victory Image in Jordan

The Confirmation Tehran Had Been Waiting for Came From an American Source

On Wednesday, Iran received what it had been seeking for days: the first external confirmation that the missile attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in the Al-Azraq area of Jordan did not end solely with interceptions and missiles falling in open areas. According to an American report, eight U.S. F-15 aircraft sustained minor damage and were returned to service, while an A-10 attack aircraft suffered more serious damage and was left without one of its wings.

These details do not confirm the Revolutionary Guards’ account in full, but they give Tehran an important propaganda achievement. U.S. forces in Jordan fired more than 30 Patriot missiles while defending the base. From Iran’s perspective, even if most of the missiles were intercepted, the very fact that the United States was forced to activate an extensive defensive system and expend a costly stock of interceptors is part of the achievement.

The American report is still not an official Pentagon statement, and it does not explain exactly how the aircraft were damaged: by direct hits, shrapnel, or interceptors that fell in the vicinity of the base. Jordan had previously said that it detected twenty missiles, intercepted eighteen of them, and that the remaining two fell in uninhabited areas. The accounts could be reconciled if some of the damage occurred inside the base during the interceptions, but without publicly available findings from the site, there is no way to determine this with certainty.

Iranian media did not wait for clarification. The report was presented as evidence of a “heavy blow” suffered by the United States. That wording exaggerates the severity of the damage: only one aircraft was described as significantly damaged, while the other eight returned to service. Even so, this is a more tangible achievement than Iran’s previous claims of strikes on American destroyers, which were denied by Washington and received no independent verification.

For the Revolutionary Guards, that is enough. After days in which their statements relied mainly on partial videos and claims that were difficult to verify, a well-known American news source provided them with propaganda material. The distinction between nine aircraft damaged to varying degrees and nine aircraft destroyed could quickly become blurred in Iranian television broadcasts.

The Explosions Along the Coast Are Still Awaiting an Explanation

During the night, explosions were heard in Qeshm, Sirik, and Minab in Hormozgan Province. Provincial authorities said that the sounds in Qeshm came from the direction of the sea, but did not provide a clear explanation of their source, the identity of the attacker, or any possible damage. Residents said the blasts shook windows and doors, but so far no clear images of damaged targets or military statement have been published that would make it possible to understand what occurred.

Caution is essential here. Explosions heard in a coastal area do not necessarily prove an American attack. Vessels, air defense batteries, missiles, and electronic warfare systems all operate in this area, and any of them could account for some of the sounds. Still, the location deserves attention: Qeshm lies within the Strait of Hormuz, opposite Bandar Abbas, while Minab and Sirik lie farther east, along the coast leading to the Gulf of Oman. Previous reports also pointed to explosions in the Jask area. This is precisely the coastal strip on which Iran relies for its ability to monitor maritime traffic and threaten it.

At the same time, the Revolutionary Guards announced that the area in which vessels would be required to coordinate their passage with Iran would be expanded to begin around Chabahar, including parts of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. An organization spokesman warned that a ship entering without coordination could in the future be denied Iranian port and insurance services.

The implication is an attempt to expand the area under Iranian control. Instead of waiting for ships at the narrow chokepoint of Hormuz, Tehran wants to identify them and impose rules on them while they are still on their way to the strait. This declaration has no international legal standing that would bind shipping companies, but it is backed by a military threat that has already been carried out against tankers and other vessels.

The price of Brent crude crossed the threshold of $100 a barrel, its highest level since late May, and market estimates suggest that further escalation could push it even higher. The increase gives Iran leverage, but it does not guarantee revenue. A high global price benefits those who are able to sell. Iran is now fighting not only over the price, but over its very ability to export oil, receive foreign currency in return, and bring goods into the country through its ports.

The Nuclear File Has Returned to the Security Council

The more dangerous development for Tehran took place in Vienna. The IAEA Board of Governors decided to report Iran’s non-compliance to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. Twenty-three countries supported the resolution, three opposed it, and eight abstained. This is the first time in twenty years that the agency has reported Iran to the Security Council in this manner.

The resolution calls on Iran “to urgently remedy its non-compliance” and allow the IAEA to provide assurances regarding the completeness of its declarations and that nuclear material has not been diverted to other uses. It does not immediately trigger sanctions, but it moves the crisis into a more dangerous diplomatic arena, where asset freezes and punitive measures can be discussed. Russia and China can block some measures, but the referral itself to the Security Council represents a clear escalation.

The focus of the dispute is not a new enrichment figure. The IAEA report cites 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to a level of up to 60 percent, but this is an old estimate of the stockpile Iran possessed in June 2025. Because of the lack of information and access, the agency cannot currently say how large the stockpile is, what its composition is, or where it is located. In other words, the figure appears precise, but it does not necessarily describe the current situation.

This is a critical distinction. The IAEA does not know whether the material remains at the same sites, has been moved, was damaged in attacks, or underwent further processing. Nor does it have an up-to-date picture of Iran’s centrifuge inventory or the activities at its enrichment facilities. Iran can argue that the war and the attacks make inspectors’ visits dangerous, but from the agency’s perspective, even during wartime the country remains obligated to provide information about material that had been under supervision.

The Iranian response was phrased in sharply political language. Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref claimed that “the adoption of a resolution against Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, initiated by the possessors of the atomic bomb, the perpetrators of Hiroshima and the violators of the nuclear agreement, symbolizes double standards”.

Iran’s representative in Vienna, Reza Najafi, was even more pointed: “The document rewards aggression and punishes the victim. This is not oversight, it is hypocrisy”.

Russia also adopted part of the Iranian position. Its representative to the IAEA argued that the full restoration of inspections would require “truly credible guarantees” from the United States and Israel that they would not again use or threaten force. According to him, Iran agreed to agency visits to all three units at the Bushehr power plant in mid-September. But access to Bushehr does not solve the central problem: Bushehr is a power plant, not one of the enrichment facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.

The Stock Market Rises, the Rial Continues to Lose Ground

Alongside the military and nuclear escalation, Iran’s markets tell a more complicated story than the victory headlines suggest. The Tehran Stock Exchange index ended the week up about 9.5 percent, while nearly 15.97 trillion tomans flowed into equities, rights, and equity funds. Anyone looking only at the index could call it a “dream week”.

But outside the stock market, the picture is less celebratory. The dollar on the free market reached approximately 232,700 tomans, a weekly increase of more than 5 percent. A gram of 18-karat gold rose to approximately 24.34 million tomans, while an Emami gold coin reached around 242 million tomans. The public continues to move money into assets perceived as more resilient than the rial.

The rise in equities also fits this pattern. Exporters, mining companies, metals producers, and refiners hold assets or earn revenues whose value in tomans rises as the local currency weakens. During an inflationary period, buying shares can be another way to escape cash. The stock market rally is therefore not necessarily evidence that investors believe the war is approaching its end. It may instead be another expression of the lack of confidence in the value of the rial.

The issuance of securities linked to gold coins provided another example. Headlines in Iran spoke of a “queue of 12 million” to buy them, without clarifying whether this referred to securities, orders, or some other measure of demand. Each security represents one-thousandth of a full gold coin, and purchases were restricted to individuals and gold funds. Even without knowing the exact meaning of the figure, the demand itself is consistent with what is visible in the currency market: households are seeking protection against depreciation, even when gold is offered to them through a government-run system.

Internal Criticism Is No Longer Focused Solely on the Management of the War

Within the system itself, criticism is beginning to emerge that is not directed solely at the external enemy. Jahanbakhsh Mohebi-Nia, a former member of the parliament’s presiding board, said that the war does indeed affect prices, services, and budgets, but rejected attempts to turn it into an explanation for every failure. According to him, routinely using the war as an answer to management failures is “laziness”.

This criticism is noteworthy because it is being published within the boundaries of authorized media. It does not challenge the war itself, but it does mark an internal red line: the external threat cannot be used to absolve the government of responsibility for managing the economy, the currency, the internet, and public services.

Gholam-Ali Rajaei, a former adviser to Hashemi Rafsanjani, attacked the government from another direction, stating that “the government’s performance in removing filtering is unacceptable”.

He referred to Masoud Pezeshkian’s promise to ease internet restrictions and argued that millions of jobs had been harmed. According to him, the president failed to use his position on the Supreme National Security Council to advance a solution, while also failing to defend the value of the currency.

The broadest criticism came from Ali Jannati, a former culture minister and veteran establishment figure. Jannati warned that closing Hormuz could push countries dependent on the maritime route into security cooperation against Iran. According to him, “the art of diplomacy is to turn military power into sustainable diplomatic and economic openings, not to isolate the country within its surroundings”.

Jannati also proposed using Article 59 of the constitution, which allows a referendum to be held on major political, economic, and international issues. There is no indication that Iran’s leadership is considering such a move, but the very fact that the possibility was raised in a public interview shows how far the debate has expanded. Former senior officials are no longer content merely to demand more efficient government; they are beginning to question the way strategic decisions are made without public participation.

Behind the Military Headlines, an Accelerated Punitive Mechanism Is at Work

While the headlines focus on Jordan, Hormuz, and Vienna, an accelerated punitive mechanism continues to operate inside Iran. It was reported that the cases of 18 prisoners at Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan were transferred to the Revolutionary Court with charges that could lead to the death penalty. According to a judicial document obtained by media outlets outside Iran, the names of 75 prisoners were recorded in connection with the prison fire and unrest, and at least 26 were referred for legal proceedings. The charges include arson, damage to public facilities, leading riots, and “incitement to war and killing”.

It is important to be precise: the document was not published by Iran’s judiciary and has not been independently verified. The 18 prisoners therefore should not be described as having already been sentenced to death. The more accurate formulation is that they face charges that could allow prosecutors to seek such a sentence.

The case joins reports of ten protesters sentenced to death in Isfahan and five executions in the case known as “Alikhani Square”.

Wartime conditions give prosecutors harsher language to work with: an incident inside a prison is described not merely as disorder or property damage, but as rebellion during wartime and an attack on state security. Once charges are framed in those terms, the scope for punishment expands even before the evidence is publicly examined.

Desk Conclusion: Iran Has Demonstrated an Ability to Inflict Damage, Not an Ability to End the Crisis

The attack in Jordan was an Iranian tactical success. It caused damage at a base hosting American forces, forced the launch of dozens of interceptors, and gave Tehran external confirmation that its firepower is not merely symbolic. There is no need to minimize that. But there is also no basis for turning one aircraft that was seriously damaged and eight that returned to service into a strategic victory.

The more important long-term development took place in Vienna. The nuclear file is once again before the Security Council, and the IAEA has no current information about the location of Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Even if Russia and China prevent new sanctions, the lack of oversight complicates any attempt to resume negotiations and strengthens the argument that Iran is using the war to create nuclear ambiguity.

Any assessment of Iran’s position in the coming weeks should be based on three clear indicators: the number of ships that actually pass through an agreed route, the access granted to inspectors at enrichment facilities rather than only at Bushehr, and the dollar exchange rate on the free market. All three measure outcomes rather than declarations.

As long as maritime traffic continues to decline, nuclear inspections do not resume, and the rial continues to weaken, Iran is best described as a country that has succeeded in raising the cost of confrontation, but has yet to translate its military power into an arrangement that serves its economy and its security.