Hamas has remained publicly silent about the advanced talks between Washington and Tehran to end the conflict. However, commentators in Gaza aligned with the movement report that senior Hamas officials are increasingly concerned about two parallel developments.
The first is Israel’s new policy, as described by observers. This involves gradually eroding the ‘yellow line’ in Gaza and expanding its campaign of targeted assassinations against senior military wing operatives, allegedly with American backing.
The second is the prospect that any future U.S.-Iran agreement will exclude the Gaza Strip entirely, leaving it vulnerable to Israeli actions.
In private discussions, Hamas officials reportedly describe Gaza’s exclusion from the equation as troubling. They believe this could let Israel use its full military power in the Strip without fear of triggering broader escalation.
Negotiation channels between Washington and Tehran suggest the primary focus of current understandings is on Lebanon, arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian nuclear issue.
Gaza, by contrast, has not been part of the discussions. For Hamas, this signals that the international community seeks to stabilize the region without addressing Gaza’s ongoing crisis.
Senior security officials say Hamas’s main concern is that a U.S.-Iran agreement would relieve Israel of many strategic pressures. When the possibility of broader confrontation with Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, or Yemen remained, Israel had to divide its military and strategic focus.
However, if tensions with Iran subside, Israel could devote substantially greater resources to the campaign in Gaza.
Officials say developments in Lebanon are being closely watched in Gaza. Reports indicate that understandings between Iran and the United States may include a full ceasefire in Lebanon and new security arrangements along Israel’s northern border.
Should such a scenario materialize, Hamas would view it as the neutralization of one of the principal fronts that has exerted pressure on Israel since the outbreak of the war.
Within Hamas, there is an assessment that Israel’s political leadership could regard such an agreement as a strategic opportunity.
Instead of facing multiple threats, Israel could present diplomatic gains with Iran to its public. At the same time, it could intensify military operations in Gaza to try to achieve a more decisive outcome against Hamas.
The concern is not just military. Hamas also fears that if the world focuses on a successful U.S.-Iran agreement and regional stabilization, Gaza’s issue could fade from the international agenda.
Under such circumstances, Israel could continue its operations in the Strip while facing significantly reduced diplomatic pressure from the international community.
Underlying these concerns is Hamas’s fear that Gaza’s reconstruction will remain stalled.
Any regional agreement that does not mention Gaza risks making the existing situation worse. If the Strip stays outside new understandings, concerns grow that Gaza’s residents will pay the price for regional de-escalation.
Another worry is the possibility that Israel, with American approval, could revive emigration plans for Gaza. On May 27, after the killing of Mohammed Odeh, commander of Hamas’s military wing in the Strip, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated, “the voluntary emigration plan from Gaza will also be implemented at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner.”
Early in 2026, Minister Katz promoted an initiative to establish a dedicated administrative body to encourage the voluntary emigration of Gaza residents to foreign countries. This was built upon ideas previously raised by President Donald Trump about the future of Gaza.
