Iran Prepares to Reopen Hormuz, Turning the Shipping Route into an Instrument of Regional Pressure

Summary

A review of the Iranian press on August 9, 2026, indicates that the debate has shifted from whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen to what kind of arrangement will govern it. The government is continuing talks with Oman and seeking to resume implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum, but lawmakers in the Majlis are already advancing a proposal that would allow Iran to deny passage to vessels linked to Israel, countries that impose sanctions, and other parties Tehran defines as hostile.

President Masoud Pezeshkian is trying to expand his government’s room for maneuver on three fronts: negotiations over Hormuz, restoring internet access, and managing the energy crisis. He faces resistance from the security establishment and the conservative camp, as well as severe economic constraints. According to published figures, food inflation has reached 128.1 percent, industry is dependent on electricity imports, and maritime traffic remains far below prewar levels.

Hormuz Is Reopening, but Shipping Remains Far from Normal

The central question in Iran is no longer simply whether the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, but who will determine which vessels are allowed to pass through it and under what conditions. The government is continuing negotiations with Oman over navigation arrangements and is discussing a return to the understandings contained in the Islamabad Memorandum. At the same time, lawmakers are seeking to enshrine in law Iran’s ability to distinguish between vessels it considers acceptable and those it deems hostile.

The Islamabad Memorandum is the framework of understandings signed in June between Iran and the United States through Pakistani mediation. Among other provisions, it stipulated that Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and that the United States would lift its naval blockade of Iran. The agreement also addressed the cessation of hostilities and the opening of broader negotiations on sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program.

The signing, however, did not resolve disputes over the routes vessels would use, responsibility for their security, mine clearance, the collection of transit fees, or the respective authorities of Iran and Oman. The talks with Oman are intended to translate the general commitment to reopen the strait into practical navigation rules.

According to the economic newspaper “Donya-e Eqtesad”, only 33 vessels passed through the strait during the first four days after the latest easing of restrictions began. Before the war, according to an estimate by the tracking firm Kpler, roughly 140 vessels passed through it each day. Current daily traffic is therefore less than one-tenth of its normal level.

The figure is not based on a complete official Iranian registry, but it illustrates the gap between declaring the strait open and restoring freedom of navigation in practice. Shipping companies still face security risks, high insurance costs, sanctions, financing difficulties, and uncertainty over how Iranian forces will treat individual vessels.

Proposed Legislation Would Turn the Strait into a Permanent Instrument of Pressure

Ali Reza Salimi, a member of the Majlis Presidium, outlined a bill under consideration by the National Security Committee. According to Salimi, a final version of the proposal is expected to be formulated within approximately two weeks.

The proposal seeks to prohibit the passage of Israeli vessels and ships linked to countries that Iran defines as hostile or that impose sanctions. It could also apply to vessels carrying certain military cargoes and to ships belonging to countries that, in Tehran’s view, have failed to pay their share of compensation for war damage. The imposition of transit fees, coordinated with the armed forces, is also under consideration.

At this stage, the measure is a proposal by lawmakers, not an enacted law or an approved operational policy. Its significance is political. Conservatives want to prevent the government from agreeing to a broad reopening of the strait before the political and economic price Iran will receive in return has been defined.

The proposed legislation links four separate issues: the confrontation with Israel, Western sanctions, demands for compensation for war damage, and control of maritime passage. If adopted, Hormuz would not return to its previous status as an international shipping route open to all vessels on equal terms. Instead, it would become a selective passageway that Iran seeks to regulate.

The practical difficulty will lie in determining the connection between a vessel and a particular country. A ship may be registered in one country, fly the flag of another, be owned by a company in a third, carry cargo for a client in a fourth, and be insured in a fifth. Ambiguous definitions could prompt shipping companies and insurers to avoid the strait even if Tehran declares it open.

The key measure, therefore, will not simply be the publication of an agreement with Oman. It will be necessary to monitor how many insured vessels pass through the strait each day, whether delays or searches occur, and what happens when Iranian forces suspect a vessel of having Israeli or Western links.

Pezeshkian Seeks Greater Freedom to Negotiate

At a press conference the previous day, President Pezeshkian presented the Islamabad Memorandum as a process that had already begun moving into implementation. According to him, the process included an easing of the naval blockade, sanctions relief related to oil and petrochemicals, and talks on releasing funds and financing the reconstruction of war damage.

The president said that another incident in the strait had interrupted the process and prompted an Iranian response, but stressed that negotiations were continuing. His remarks should be treated as Iran’s description of the state of the understandings, rather than as a joint document fully endorsed by all parties.

Pezeshkian also said that the decision to go to war does not fall within the government’s authority, even though the government is required to manage its economic consequences. The distinction does not amount to a complete disavowal of the system, but it creates a political record of how responsibility is divided. The security establishment and the Supreme National Security Council determine military policy, while the civilian government is left to contend with shortages, inflation, and damage to infrastructure.

The message could serve Pezeshkian in the future if he is required to explain why his government failed to stabilize the economy. He is not directly blaming the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the supreme leader, but he is reminding the public who has the authority to decide on war and who must bear its daily costs.

Moderates Attack Opponents of Negotiations

Alongside the talks, the moderate camp has intensified its criticism of opponents of negotiations. Hossein Nouraninejad, deputy secretary-general of the Union of Islamic Iran People Party, argued that deepening internal divisions encourages U.S. President Donald Trump and that opponents of negotiations should take the national interest into account.

This is not a factual finding about Trump’s calculations, but a political argument. Its significance lies in turning the dispute over Hormuz into a contest over legitimacy. Supporters of negotiations portray opposition to talks as a risk to national security, while their opponents depict any flexibility toward the United States as a concession to the enemy.

Both camps therefore invoke the same concept, national security, to justify opposing policies. Moderates argue that an agreement is necessary to prevent another war. Hardliners contend that only continued control of the strait can deter the United States and Israel.

Lower Inflation Is Not Reflected in the Cost of Food

The most prominent economic figure published in Iran appears, at first glance, to indicate a slight decline in inflation. According to data from the Statistical Center of Iran published by ILNA, year-on-year inflation fell from 88.6 percent in Khordad to 87.9 percent in Tir.

The decline of seven-tenths of a percentage point does not mean that prices fell. It means that the annual pace of price increases slowed slightly, while prices continued to rise from an already extremely high base.

The situation in the food basket is considerably worse. Inflation in food and beverages reached 128.1 percent. Oils rose by 261.5 percent, dairy products and eggs by 147.1 percent, meat by 145.2 percent, and bread and cereals by 116.7 percent.

The gap between the overall index and food prices hits workers and low-income households particularly hard. The lower a household’s income, the larger the share devoted to food, electricity, and housing. A slight decline in the headline inflation rate therefore does little to change the perception that wages are falling ever further behind the cost of living.

Pezeshkian acknowledged that the state of prices and the exchange rate was unacceptable. He described the year 1405 as one of a wartime economy, shortages, and imbalances in electricity, water, gas, oil, and the banking system. His remarks were intended to temper expectations, but they also provide his critics with an official acknowledgment that the security lull has yet to improve conditions for ordinary citizens.

The Dollar Weakens, but the Crisis Is Not Over

On the open market, the dollar fell to around 185,900 tomans, approximately 2,000 tomans below the previous day’s level and its lowest rate since 24 Tir. Even so, its value remained nearly double that recorded during the same period a year earlier.

The decline likely reflects some reduction in the risk premium following progress in the talks over Hormuz. It does not indicate that the market expects sanctions to be lifted, foreign investment to return, or long-term stability to emerge.

Iran’s exchange rate reacts quickly to rumors of negotiations and security escalation. Until an implementable agreement is published and there is a tangible increase in exports and foreign currency revenues, the improvement could prove temporary.

Electricity Imports from Turkey Protect the Petrochemical Sector

Deputy Energy Minister Mostafa Rajabi Mashhadi announced that contracts and preparations had been completed for the import of 450 megawatts of electricity from Turkey for petrochemical plants. According to him, the Turkish side is ready to begin transmission, and the next stage depends on action by Iranian companies.

According to the figures he provided, the domestic electricity grid supplies approximately 650 megawatts to the petrochemical sector, while demand from affected plants could reach 1,000 megawatts. Iran also imports approximately 500 megawatts from Turkmenistan and Armenia during the year.

The decision to direct imported electricity to the petrochemical industry reflects the state’s priorities. The sector is an important source of foreign currency and export revenue, so the government is seeking to protect it even during a period of shortages.

Electricity allocated to industrial plants, however, does not resolve shortages for households. Nor is it a substitute for investment in the transmission grid, power plants, and improved energy efficiency. Dependence on supplies from Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Armenia creates an additional vulnerability precisely when Iran is trying to project strategic self-sufficiency.

Restoring Internet Access Tests the Government’s Authority

The government announced that Pezeshkian had ordered international internet access conditions to be restored to the situation that existed before the Persian month of Dey 1404. Dey is the tenth month of the Persian calendar and, in that year, began in late December 2025.

According to IRNA, a special committee approved the decision by a vote of nine to two, and the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology was tasked with its technical implementation.

A decision to restore previous conditions does not prove that all restrictions have been lifted, that connection speeds have returned to previous levels, or that access to all platforms is unrestricted. In Iran, there is a persistent gap between announcements of eased restrictions and their implementation by telecommunications providers and security agencies.

Nevertheless, presenting the measure as a presidential decision is significant in itself. The government is attempting to shift the internet from a sphere governed almost entirely by security considerations toward a public service for which it can assume responsibility.

The real test will be practical: connection times, browsing speeds, access to foreign platforms, and the ability to use tools that circumvent restrictions. Without measurable improvement in these areas, the announcement will remain a political gesture.

Journalists Describe the Cost of War

The newspaper “Shargh” published accounts by social affairs and economic reporters describing their experiences during the war. The journalists reported ringing in their ears after explosions, nightmares, medication use, stress caused by internet shutdowns, and fear of writing because of frequently shifting red lines.

These are personal accounts and cannot be used to assess the prevalence of such experiences across the population. They do, however, reveal the psychological toll on those required to communicate the crisis to the public while experiencing it themselves.

The accounts also connect internet shutdowns with state control over information. For journalists, restricting the network is not merely a technical inconvenience. It reduces their ability to verify information, communicate with sources, and report damage in real time.

The Mecca Alliance Raises Concerns in Tehran

Another regional development attracting attention in the Iranian press is the “Mecca Alliance”, a mutual defense agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The agreement stipulates that an attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all of them and establishes mechanisms for intelligence sharing, security coordination, and consultations among political and military officials.

Turkey’s foreign minister stressed that the alliance is not directed against Iran or any particular country. The newspaper “Shargh”, however, presented differing interpretations. Some commentators viewed it as a U.S.-backed attempt to curb Iranian influence. Others described it as an effort by regional states to protect themselves from both Iran and Israel’s growing power.

These are interpretations, not established facts about the intentions of the member states. From the Iranian perspective, however, the very creation of a new security framework is a troubling development. It combines Saudi Arabia’s economic power, Turkey’s military and technological capabilities, and Pakistan’s strategic capabilities. Pakistan is the only Muslim-majority state with nuclear weapons.

If regional states do not believe that the truce in Hormuz is stable, they are likely to seek alternative security arrangements and trade routes. The more Iran uses the strait to exact a price for sanctions, relations with Israel, or war damage, the greater the incentive it gives its neighbors to reduce their dependence on it.

The Nuclear File Recedes from the Headlines

The nuclear issue was almost entirely absent from the leading Iranian publications of the morning. No new document was published concerning enrichment levels, uranium stockpiles, the condition of nuclear facilities, or the return of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The issue’s absence does not indicate that it has been resolved. Tehran appears, at this stage, to prefer consolidating the terms of the maritime arrangement before moving to the next phase of negotiations.

Such a separation suits Iran because it allows Tehran to seek sanctions relief and the reopening of commercial routes without immediately committing to nuclear concessions. From the U.S. perspective, however, a maritime arrangement that does not lead to progress on the nuclear issue could give Tehran economic benefits without sufficient strategic concessions in return.

The Bottom Line

August 9 marks the point at which the debate over Hormuz is shifting from general declarations to a struggle over the rules governing passage. The government wants to present Oman and the Islamabad Memorandum as a path out of escalation. Conservatives want to ensure that reopening the strait does not restore its previous status as a shipping route open to all.

Pezeshkian is trying to expand his authority in negotiations, internet policy, and the management of an economy defined by shortages. On each front, however, he depends on institutions that are not solely subordinate to the government: the security establishment in Hormuz, the mechanisms controlling internet filtering, and the institutions that determine how electricity, foreign currency, and credit are allocated.

The economy is narrowing his window of opportunity. Slight declines in headline inflation and the dollar exchange rate do not offset food inflation of 128.1 percent. Electricity imports may temporarily protect petrochemical exports, but they do not resolve the nationwide shortage.

Three tests will determine whether the truce develops into a stable arrangement: the publication of an agreed document with Oman, a sustained increase in the number of insured vessels passing through Hormuz, and consistency between Iranian legislation and Tehran’s commitments.

Inside Iran, the tests will be simpler: food prices, the duration of power outages, and the ability to connect to the internet. Without improvement in those three areas, the government may be able to proclaim a strategic achievement in the strait, but the public will continue to judge it at the checkout counter, at the electrical outlet, and on their phone screens.