Summary
Iranian political messaging presents two parallel narratives: uncompromising public rhetoric centered on revenge and resistance, alongside reported progress toward a limited maritime agreement that could temporarily restore shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The proposed arrangement remains incomplete and dependent on approval by Iran’s highest leadership, while major disagreements persist over implementation and authority. At the same time, internal political divisions over negotiations, economic strategy, and leadership succession continue to shape the country’s public discourse. The ultimate direction depends largely on whether the leadership chooses escalation or a limited diplomatic compromise.
Key Takeaways
- Public confrontation contrasts with private diplomacy. Iranian media strongly promotes themes of revenge, resistance, and rejection of negotiations with the United States, while reporting also indicates continued indirect negotiations through Oman on a draft maritime arrangement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
- The Strait of Hormuz remains the central strategic bargaining chip. The reported draft focuses on maritime security, shipping corridors, mine clearance, and monitoring, but still awaits approval from the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council, with unresolved disputes over sovereignty and financial arrangements.
- Domestic politics and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined. Debate over President Masoud Pezeshkian’s future has become a broader struggle between hardliners favoring continued confrontation and reformists advocating diplomacy as the best way to reduce pressure and stabilize the economy.
Summary
Iranian newspapers on August 5, 2026, present two very different versions of Iran.
In the first, millions of Arbaeen pilgrims have become the “Avengers of Khamenei,” any agreement with the United States is portrayed as betrayal, and every compromise is depicted as surrender.
In the second, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly already granted preliminary approval to a draft maritime arrangement with Oman aimed at temporarily restoring shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
The most hardline headlines deny the existence of any direct channel with Washington, yet they can no longer conceal the progress of the maritime negotiations. Iran and Oman have now completed eight rounds of talks, covering both technical and political issues. The agenda includes a maritime corridor, mine clearance, monitoring mechanisms, and possible payments for security and environmental services.
The draft has not yet been signed. It is still awaiting approval from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The United States also opposes granting Iran any permanent authority over international shipping lanes or allowing it to collect fees that could be interpreted as transit tolls.
Meanwhile, the struggle over the future of President Masoud Pezeshkian continues to intensify. Hardliners accuse those demanding his resignation of exploiting the crisis for political gain, while simultaneously attacking those who view negotiations as the path out of the war. Reformist newspapers counter that deterrence in the Strait of Hormuz is a tool for reaching an agreement, not a substitute for one.
Arbaeen Becomes a Display of Vengeance
Arbaeen marks the 40th day after the death of Imam Hussein at the Battle of Karbala in the seventh century. Every year, millions of Shiite Muslims travel to Karbala in Iraq to participate in one of the world’s largest religious pilgrimages.
This year, however, the Iranian press has gone well beyond the event’s religious significance. It links Hussein’s memory to calls for vengeance over the death of Ali Khamenei, who was killed on February 28, 2026, while reinforcing the legitimacy of his son and successor, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
Kayhan declared that the pilgrimage of millions had “taken on the color of blood vengeance.” Hamshahri led with the headline “The Arbaeen of Blood Vengeance.” Vatan-e Emrooz referred to the “Avengers of Hussein’s Blood,” while Farhikhtegan described the event as “the revival of political Islam.”
Javan, the newspaper affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, used the most direct language: “The Eruption of the Avengers of Blood from Tehran to Karbala.” Above photographs of the crowds appeared the slogan “Ya Litharat al-Khamenei,” roughly meaning, “O Avengers of Khamenei.”
The slogan draws on a historic Shiite call for vengeance associated with the death of Imam Hussein. By replacing Hussein’s name with Khamenei’s, the regime seeks to give the late leader’s death a sacred religious dimension while tying loyalty to the state to a perceived religious duty of vengeance.
The crowds and the pilgrimage are real. The coordinated language used across newspapers aligned with different centers of power is not. When nearly identical expressions appear throughout the Iranian media landscape, it points to a coordinated effort to transform Arbaeen from a religious commemoration into an instrument of political mobilization.
Revenge Also Serves to Strengthen the New Supreme Leader
The slogan is not only about the late Ali Khamenei. It is equally about consolidating the authority of Mojtaba Khamenei.
Hamshahri wrote that Mojtaba’s leadership constitutes “the foundation for even greater victories.”
According to the report, the new Supreme Leader has not appeared in public since being wounded in the attack that killed his father. Messages attributed to him have instead been delivered through his office, written statements, and quotations from senior officials.
Under such circumstances, the cult of vengeance serves an important political function. It portrays the transfer of power as both natural and sacred: the father becomes a martyr, the son becomes his rightful successor, and the public is called upon to demonstrate loyalty through the demand for revenge.
Farhikhtegan expanded this argument by portraying Arbaeen as the awakening of a transnational “political Islam” extending across Iran and Iraq. According to the newspaper, the event demonstrates that the regime’s ideology remains capable of mobilizing massive crowds despite months of war, economic crisis, and damage to critical infrastructure.
Yet this religious mobilization conceals an uncomfortable political question: if the leadership is truly confident in its authority, why does it need to transform a religious pilgrimage into what amounts to a referendum in favor of revenge and the succession of the slain Supreme Leader?
The Denied Letter Was Not from Trump
Some headlines were worded in a way that could leave readers with the impression that the Office of the Supreme Leader had denied responding to a letter from the President of the United States. A closer examination of the official statement tells a different story.
The letter at the center of the controversy was attributed to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, not to Donald Trump.
Conservative cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharazi claimed that Pezeshkian had previously submitted letters of resignation and that the Supreme Leader had warned him that if he resigned again, the resignation would be accepted.
Mojtaba Khamenei’s office denied the claim, stating that the quotations attributed to the Supreme Leader were false. It called for preserving “sacred unity” and respecting public officials, particularly the government.
The denial is significant because it provides Pezeshkian with a measure of political backing precisely at a time when rumors about his resignation have been circulating. It does not prove that relations between the president and the Supreme Leader are harmonious, but it does indicate that the Supreme Leader’s office is not currently seeking to provoke a constitutional crisis or replace the government.
Separately, Javan published the headline: “We Have No Letter for Negotiations with Washington.” This statement concerns the American diplomatic channel and should not be confused with the Supreme Leader’s office denying claims about Pezeshkian’s alleged resignation letter.
This distinction is critical.
The hardline press merged several separate denials into a single narrative suggesting that Iran is conducting no negotiations, responding to no letters, and has no need for any agreement.
In reality, at least the Omani channel remains active and continues to make progress.
No Talks with the United States, Yet Negotiations Continue
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei stated that Iran is not currently engaged in direct talks with the United States. The same position was reported by the government-owned English-language newspaper Iran Daily.
Alongside the denial, however, came an important qualification: Qatar continues to work toward a diplomatic solution between Tehran and Washington. In doing so, the government leaves the door open to indirect negotiations even while denying the existence of a direct channel.
There is no inherent contradiction. Iran can claim that it is not speaking directly with the Americans while simultaneously conveying proposals through Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, or Egypt. This has long been a familiar feature of Iranian diplomacy, allowing the regime to maintain a public denial while practical negotiations continue behind the scenes.
The real question is not whether Iranian and American representatives are sitting in the same room. The question is whether the proposals being transmitted through intermediaries are acceptable to both sides and capable of evolving into a binding agreement.
The denial of a direct American channel is aimed primarily at a domestic audience. It allows hardliners to continue insisting that Iran has neither surrendered nor negotiated under pressure, even as Foreign Ministry officials discuss the details of an arrangement designed to satisfy the American demand to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
The Eighth Round with Oman and the Draft Awaiting Approval
The most significant development does not appear in the revenge-themed headlines but in the smaller news reports.
Hamshahri confirmed that Iran and Oman have held eight rounds of talks on managing the Strait of Hormuz. The discussions are taking place on both political and technical tracks.
The reformist newspaper Etemad reported that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has granted preliminary approval to a maritime agreement in the Gulf. According to the report, the draft covers mine clearance, the establishment of a maritime corridor, and the division of responsibilities between Iran and Oman.
The draft still requires approval from the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council, Iran’s principal body for coordinating national security policy, nuclear strategy, and relations with major powers. Its decisions become effective only after receiving the Supreme Leader’s approval.
Additional reports point to a temporary arrangement lasting approximately 60 days. During that period, an agreed shipping lane would reopen, allowing a gradual return of commercial traffic while testing security and monitoring mechanisms.
The details remain publicly unresolved.
One proposal would route inbound vessels through waters under Iranian control while outbound vessels would travel closer to Oman. Other reports describe a shared central corridor connecting Iranian and Omani territorial waters.
The question of payments also remains unresolved.
Iran seeks to collect fees characterized as payments for security services, environmental monitoring, and maintenance of the shipping route. The United States opposes any mechanism that could be interpreted as a transit toll recognizing Iran’s authority over international shipping.
As a result, no final agreement yet exists. There is a draft, measurable progress, and a possible framework, but also deep disagreements over sovereignty, financial arrangements, and which vessels would ultimately be permitted to pass.
Why Mojtaba Khamenei’s Approval Is the Real Test
Araghchi can conduct negotiations and provide preliminary professional approval, but the final decision does not rest with him.
Any arrangement concerning the Strait of Hormuz directly affects the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, potential state revenues, and Iran’s most important instrument of strategic deterrence.
If Mojtaba Khamenei approves the draft, the regime will have to explain to the Iranian public why reopening the Strait does not constitute a retreat. The hardline press would likely portray the agreement as international recognition of Iran’s authority and as an achievement secured through steadfast resistance.
If the Supreme Leader rejects the arrangement, American pressure could intensify once again. Trump has already described the negotiations as Iran’s final opportunity to avoid renewed escalation.
The delay in approval suggests that the dispute is far more than technical.
The fundamental question is whether Iran intends to use Hormuz as leverage to secure an agreement or to transform its partial control of the Strait into a permanent strategic reality.
This also explains why the hardline camp invests so much effort in denying any channel with Washington. It is preparing the political ground to oppose any agreement that fails to guarantee Iran control, revenue, and recognition of its new position in the Strait.
The Nuclear Issue Remains Outside the Maritime Draft
The draft currently under discussion with Oman concerns maritime navigation, security, and the Strait of Hormuz shipping corridor. Nothing published thus far indicates that it contains new understandings regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
The United States seeks to use the reopening of the Strait as the first step in a broader diplomatic process. According to President Trump’s statements, the next phase would address the Iranian nuclear threat.
Iran is attempting to separate the two issues.
From Tehran’s perspective, a temporary arrangement for Hormuz does not imply any willingness to negotiate uranium enrichment, dismantle centrifuges, surrender uranium stockpiles, or restore comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
No agreed framework has been published regarding enrichment levels, the number of operating centrifuges, the status of remaining nuclear facilities, or the return of IAEA inspectors.
Consequently, even if the maritime draft is ultimately approved, it should not be interpreted as a nuclear agreement or as a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.
At most, it would represent a limited arrangement designed to reduce pressure on maritime trade and global energy markets while creating additional time for further negotiations.
“One Hundred Million Barrels Burn Every Week”
The hardline press portrays the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as an economic weapon that has forced Trump to yield.
Jam-e Jam ran the headline, “Oil Prices Forced Trump to Beg,” alongside a cartoon describing Hormuz as “the White House’s Graveyard Knot.”
Vatan-e Emrooz called the situation “economic warfare.”
Kayhan claimed that approximately 100 million barrels of oil disappear from the global market every week because of the Strait’s closure.
The figure did not originate in Iranian propaganda.
It was first cited by Amin Nasser, President and CEO of Saudi Aramco, who warned that disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz were removing roughly 100 million barrels per week from global markets, creating one of the most severe supply shocks in recent history.
Kayhan transformed a Saudi warning about global economic damage into evidence of the effectiveness of Iran’s economic pressure.
From the newspaper’s perspective, the missing barrels are not an economic disaster but a strategic lever forcing the United States to compromise.
The argument ignores the price paid by Iran itself.
Iranian oil exports have also been disrupted. Government revenues have declined, trade has become more expensive, and shortages of foreign currency have worsened. The economic blockade harms Gulf states, but it also inflicts serious damage on Iran’s own economy.
The hardline press prefers to focus exclusively on the pain inflicted upon Iran’s adversaries.
The reformist press asks a different question: how long can Iran sustain an economic weapon that is simultaneously damaging its own economy?
Two Straits, One Pressure Campaign
Iran’s strategy is no longer confined to the Strait of Hormuz.
Vatan-e Emrooz described a “new order” built on simultaneous pressure in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Situated between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, it serves as the southern gateway to the Suez Canal.
The Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen have declared a blockade on vessels associated with Saudi Arabia. Following these threats and attacks, shipping companies began rerouting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope instead of using the Red Sea.
According to recently published shipping data, total vessel traffic through Bab el-Mandeb has declined by approximately 22 percent since the blockade was announced. Tanker traffic has fallen by roughly 39 percent, while vessels linked to Saudi Arabia have declined by about 46 percent.
These figures do not indicate a complete closure of the waterway. Some vessels continue to transit the Strait, and daily traffic occasionally increases. They do, however, point to a significant decline and growing reluctance among shipping companies to commit to the route.
The combination of pressure in Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb creates a dual strategic challenge.
The first chokepoint affects oil and gas exports from the Persian Gulf. The second disrupts the shortest maritime route to Europe through the Suez Canal. When both routes are compromised, ships must sail much longer distances, insurance premiums rise, and delivery times increase.
The Battle over Pezeshkian’s Resignation Becomes a Battle over the Agreement
President Masoud Pezeshkian has stated that he has no intention of resigning.
Shargh featured his declaration on its front page: “I Will Not Resign. I Will Stand My Ground.”
Government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani also rejected reports claiming that cabinet ministers were resigning en masse.
At first glance, even the hardline camp appears to be defending the president.
Quds attacked what it called the “Merchants of Resignation.”
Vatan-e Emrooz urged respect for public officials.
Kayhan criticized those it accused of spreading defeatism.
Yet this support comes with a clear condition: Pezeshkian must not use political stability as a platform for promoting a compromise that could be portrayed as surrender.
Jam-e Jam declared that “Surrender in the Name of Peace Is Treason.”
The message is aimed not only at the opposition or outside critics, but also at officials within the Foreign Ministry and supporters of negotiations inside the political establishment.
On the other side, Shargh ran the headline “Negotiations: The Winning Card of Iranian Oil.”
According to the newspaper, control over the Strait of Hormuz is not an achievement in itself. Its value lies in the ability to convert that leverage into reduced international pressure, the return of Iranian oil to global markets, and a lower risk of war.
The debate over Pezeshkian’s resignation has therefore become a broader foreign policy struggle.
Hardliners seek a stable government capable of sustaining confrontation.
Reformists seek a stable government capable of concluding an agreement.
The Government Presents Arbaeen as a Logistical Operation
The government newspaper Iran adopted a markedly different tone from the more militant headlines.
Rather than emphasizing revenge, it focused on the services provided to Arbaeen pilgrims.
According to the newspaper, more than 1.7 million services were delivered through approximately 4,000 medical stations at border crossings.
Roughly 150 buses were deployed to transport pilgrims from the Mehran border crossing back to Tehran.
Mehran, located in western Iran, is one of the country’s principal gateways for pilgrims traveling to Karbala. During Arbaeen, it becomes a major hub for transportation, medical assistance, and security operations.
These figures are government statistics and have not been independently verified. Nevertheless, they illustrate the state’s ability to mobilize substantial resources when an event serves both religious and political objectives.
At the same time, Etemad reported that government offices in five districts of Sistan had been closed because of severe dust storms under an Orange Alert.
Sistan, in southeastern Iran, is among the country’s poorest and most neglected regions, suffering from chronic drought, dust storms, unemployment, and weak infrastructure.
The contrast between thousands of service stations for pilgrims and the closure of government institutions in an impoverished province once again highlights the regime’s priorities: resources are readily available for mass mobilization but remain limited when confronting long-term environmental crises.
Even the State Media Acknowledges the American Version
The Persian-language government newspaper reported claims that the United States had used approximately 80 percent of its THAAD interceptor missile inventory during the war.
However, it also included the denial issued by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
THAAD is an American missile defense system designed to intercept ballistic missiles during the terminal phase of flight. Its interceptors are expensive, technologically sophisticated, and intended to protect U.S. forces and allied nations.
There are reports and assessments suggesting that American interceptor inventories have indeed been significantly depleted.
However, the claim that 80 percent of the stockpile has been consumed remains disputed and cannot be presented as an established fact.
The government’s decision to publish the American denial is notable.
Hardline newspapers typically report only the figure supporting their argument that U.S. military resources are being exhausted.
The government newspaper chose instead to present both the allegation and the American response.
That editorial decision reinforces the impression that the government seeks to preserve diplomatic flexibility.
It continues to emphasize deterrence while avoiding the presentation of disputed intelligence estimates as established facts.
The Rhetoric Is Loud, but Military Action Remains Limited
Despite the increasingly aggressive rhetoric of revenge, no significant new Iranian attack against Israel or U.S. forces was identified during the reporting period.
Nor was there confirmed evidence of new military operations by Hezbollah or the Houthis directly linked to the Arbaeen events.
Sobhe No published claims concerning the arrest of an Israeli allegedly spying for Iran, the postponement of an Israeli security cabinet meeting, and growing Israeli distress.
Several of these claims lacked sufficient independent verification and appear primarily intended to strengthen domestic Iranian morale.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stated that his organization “will not leave the field” and argued that negotiations conducted on Israel’s terms would bring Lebanon only humiliation and defeat.
His remarks were political in nature rather than an announcement of new military operations.
Similarly, claims of a “tsunami of emigration from Israel,” heavy smoke at Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port, and the collapse of American military capabilities remain unsubstantiated.
The gap between rhetoric and actual military activity is significant.
The regime may wish to maintain a high level of deterrent messaging while avoiding actions that could jeopardize negotiations with Oman.
Arbaeen thus serves as a demonstration of resolve, while preserving room for diplomatic maneuver.
Iran Also Seeks Economic Support in the East
Alongside its confrontation with the United States and the Gulf crisis, Iran Daily reported that Iran and Pakistan are working toward expanding bilateral trade to $10 billion.
The two countries held the tenth meeting of their Joint Trade Committee in Islamabad while advancing negotiations toward a free trade agreement.
Pakistan cannot replace Western markets or compensate for the revenues generated by oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz.
It does, however, provide Tehran with an additional economic outlet while allowing the government to project an image of independence from any agreement with Washington.
Here again, the government pursues two parallel strategies.
Domestically, it denies dependence on negotiations with the United States.
Internationally, it simultaneously pursues a Hormuz arrangement, Qatari mediation, cooperation with Oman, and expanded trade with Pakistan.
Iran is not choosing between East and West.
Rather, it is seeking to leverage its eastern relationships to strengthen its negotiating position with the West.
Bottom Line
The Iranian press on August 5 attempts to sustain two narratives that are difficult to reconcile.
The first insists that Iran is not negotiating with the United States and that any discussion of compromise amounts to surrender.
The second argues that pressure in the Strait of Hormuz has successfully brought the parties to the threshold of an agreement.
The contradiction is resolved through intermediaries.
Tehran denies any direct channel with Washington while simultaneously advancing, through Oman, an agreement intended to satisfy at least some American demands.
The slogan “Avengers of Khamenei” also serves a dual purpose.
It mobilizes the public around the idea of revenge while reinforcing the authority of the new Supreme Leader, yet it has not, at least for now, been accompanied by a new wave of military attacks.
The rhetoric allows the regime to project unwavering resolve while quietly exploring the possibility of a limited maritime compromise.
The real test will not be the number of red flags waved during Arbaeen or newspaper headlines depicting Trump as pleading for concessions.
It will be Mojtaba Khamenei’s decision.
Will he approve the draft, open a temporary maritime corridor, and use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage for a broader agreement?
Or will he reject it and risk a renewed escalation of the war?
For now, revenge dominates the headlines, while the agreement remains behind closed doors.
The question is which will reach the Strait first.
