Lebanon’s Failure to Confront Hizbullah Leaves Israel No Choice but to Act

Hizbullah’s Grip on the Lebanese State

The assessment that Washington has grown deeply skeptical of the Lebanese government’s capacity or political will to curb Hizbullah independently touches the dilemma defining U.S. and Israeli policy toward Lebanon. Indeed, following the tri-partite Tampa meeting between delegates from the U.S., Israel and Lebanon, it seems that the U.S. has finally concluded that the Lebanese government is unwilling thus unable to carry the task of curbing Hizbullah since he is present in the deep state, re constructed his ranks with the help of the IRGC instructors and military advisers, defying the government and threatening to take to the streets if provoked by the Joseph Aoun administration.

The premise that Hizbullah is woven into the fabric of Lebanon’s deep state is well documented. Hizbullah has long operated not just as a militia, but as a parallel state – maintaining its own social services, economic networks, and security infrastructure while simultaneously occupying a legal and institutional footprint within Lebanon’s official political bodies. Because major state decisions require consensus or involve officials whose political survival depends on avoiding a direct, catastrophic civil clash with Hizbullah, the central government and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) face a profound structural paralysis. From Washington’s and Jerusalem’s perspectives, asking a government heavily influenced or constrained by these power dynamics to dismantle its most powerful armed faction is treated as asking the system to dismantle itself.

Iran’s Role in Rebuilding Hizbullah’s Military Capabilities

Intelligence pointing to Hizbullah’s ability to reconstitute its ranks and infrastructure with the backing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) illustrates the asymmetric nature of the conflict. Despite heavy military setbacks, Hizbullah has historically proven resilient through decentralized command structures, covert supply lines, and financial lifelines funneled via the IRGC. If the assessment concludes that the LAF is either unable or unwilling to police these revival efforts aggressively, it directly undermines the logic of transitional security frameworks—such as those discussed during the U.S.-mediated talks at CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Those frameworks fundamentally rely on the Lebanese state acting as the sole guarantor of security south of the Litani and beyond.

Seized Explosives Expose Hizbullah’s Defiance of Lebanese Authority

The recent high-profile interception of a massive shipment containing hundreds of kilograms of C-4 and TNT explosives smuggled from the Beqaa Valley toward Beirut and Hizbullah’s explicit public demand for the Lebanese government to return the explosives and release their detained operatives represent a stark turning point. This incident is not an isolated security breach; it is a clear symptom of Lebanon’s growing systemic malaise, institutional paralysis, and constitutional crisis. By publicly claiming ownership of the seized explosives and demanding their restitution, Hizbullah has stripped away any illusion of functioning within the state framework. Demanding that a sovereign government hand back illegal military-grade explosive materials associated with past political assassinations and domestic intimidation in Lebanon is an open declaration that Hizbullah views its illegal arsenal as superior to Lebanese law. For Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, complying with or quietly acquiescing to these demands would be equivalent to capitulation. It signals to both the domestic population and international backers that Lebanese security agencies operate merely as temporary custodians of weapons until Hizbullah demands them back.

The Threat of Internal Violence and Political Intimidation

The seizure has deeply exacerbated domestic paranoia and political paralysis. While Hizbullah official Hassan Fadlallah publicly claimed the explosives were intended strictly for use against Israeli forces, political rivals and the public view the movement of heavy explosives toward the capital as a preparation for internal political violence, targeted assassinations, or violent street coercion. By framing the government’s law enforcement actions as a “threat to internal security” and issuing warnings against enforcing bans on illicit arms, Hizbullah effectively holds the country hostage. The implied ultimatum is simple: allow us to rearm and traffic weapons unhindered, or face street violence and state collapse.

Lebanon’s Failure Undermines International Security Guarantees

This crisis validates the conclusions American and Israeli delegates reached in international forums like the Tampa meetings. When Lebanese state authorities lack the political backing or operational leverage to keep confiscated explosives out of militia hands, international guarantees that the Lebanese state can police its own territory, such as south of the Litani, lose all credibility. This dynamic reinforces the doctrine that if Beirut cannot or will not disarm the group or retain intercepted contraband, external actors will act unilaterally.

Israel’s Emerging Doctrine: “If You Can’t, We Will”

If Washington has indeed concluded that Beirut cannot fulfill this enforcement role, it fundamentally alters the diplomatic and military calculus. One can consider enforcing the “If You Can’t, We Will” doctrine. This assessment provides the underlying rationale echoed by Israeli leadership that if the Lebanese state cannot or will not dismantle Hizbullah’s infrastructure, Israel reserves the right to act unilaterally without being bound by past constraints or unverified local assurances. Moreover, a loss of faith in Beirut’s political leadership places the Lebanese Army in an untenable position. It forces Washington to choose between continuing conditional support and pivoting to a more coercive posture that pressures both the Lebanese political elite and military command.

Ultimately, this assessment captures a persistent deadlock: Lebanon’s institutions are too weak to confront Hizbullah without triggering internal conflict, yet too intertwined with the broader regional axis to remain neutral. When international mechanisms fail to yield verifiable disarmament or structural changes on the ground, the default trajectory tends to drift away from diplomacy and back toward confrontation.

Why Lebanon’s Leaders Fear a Direct Confrontation with Hizbullah

As to the ruling Lebanese Administration, the president and his Prime Minister have been the target of criticism because they lack the political resolve to confront Hizbullah. While critics view their hesitation as a lack of political resolve, their strategy is rooted in avoiding a catastrophic domestic collapse. Despite firm public stances, Aoun and Salam are unlikely to launch a direct, military-first campaign to dismantle Hizbullah in the streets forcibly. Several constraints shape their caution: As a former army commander, President Aoun understands the LAF’s structural composition. The army’s rank-and-file reflects Lebanon’s broader sectarian makeup. Ordering soldiers into direct combat against Hizbullah risks widespread desertions along sectarian lines. Rather than risking the fragmentation of the state’s sole remaining unifying institution, Aoun prefers to use the LAF for containment, intelligence raids, and gradual interdiction. Aoun and Salam recognize that a direct military clash in urban areas like Beirut or the Bekaa Valley is precisely the scenario that plays into Hizbullah’s street-level militia capabilities.

Beirut’s Strategy: Gradual Pressure Instead of Military Confrontation

Therefore, Aoun and Salam must maneuver within Lebanon’s consensus-driven political system. Rather than a dramatic operational shift, Aoun and Salam could be expected to continue a calibrated strategy of legal and administrative pressure. Using intelligence and logistics interdictions (seizing arms caches, monitoring border crossings, and shutting down illicit supply lines) rather than large-scale troop deployment in Hizbullah strongholds. Leveraging U.S. and international backing to demand regional guarantees, while using Hizbullah’s internal economic crisis and post-war exhaustion to erode its popular support over time, pushing forward judicial investigations and executive mandates against illegal weapons transfers.

The Strategic Deadlock: Avoiding Civil War While Hizbullah Rearms

Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam will not alter their core calculation by risking an all-out military clash with Hizbullah that could plunge the country into civil war. Their strategy remains focused on state-building, selective enforcement, and diplomatic leverage, even if that slow approach fails to satisfy Washington’s or Jerusalem’s immediate demands for rapid disarmament.