Summary
Israel's relationship with Jordan is characterized by significant security, economic, and water cooperation despite persistent diplomatic tensions and public criticism from the Jordanian monarchy. Historical Israeli support for Hashemite stability and Jordan's demonstrated ability to confront domestic threats challenge the assumption that Israel must tolerate an unbalanced relationship to protect the kingdom. A more reciprocal approach would preserve existing peace commitments while conditioning additional benefits on concrete improvements in diplomatic conduct and security cooperation. Jordanian stability remains a strategic Israeli interest, but maintaining that stability should not require unconditional concessions.
Key Takeaways
- Israel-Jordan Relations Need Greater Reciprocity: Israel provides Jordan with critical security cooperation, water supplies, and trade access, yet Jordan's public criticism of Israel raises questions about whether the relationship delivers sufficient diplomatic benefits in return.
- Jordan's Monarchy Has Demonstrated Its Ability to Act Decisively: Historical Israeli assistance helped safeguard the Hashemite monarchy, while Jordan's 2025 crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates that the kingdom can confront internal threats when necessary. Concerns about domestic instability should not automatically excuse hostile rhetoric or prevent diplomatic accountability.
- A Transactional Approach Could Strengthen the Partnership: Israel should maintain its peace treaty obligations and essential security cooperation while linking additional water supplies, trade privileges, and other benefits to measurable improvements in diplomatic relations, counter-incitement efforts, and border security.
A peculiar royal custom has developed in Israel-Jordan relations: Israel is expected to serve simultaneously as the Crown’s insurance company, its water supplier, and its punching bag. Behind the scenes, there are shared interests; in front of the microphones, an indictment. The peace is cold, the needs are pressing, and the bill is always sent to the same table.
In his address to the nation, King Abdullah listed the principal issues facing the Jordanian people: water security, terrorism, and the Palestinian issue. These are the central threats. He is entitled to criticize Israel, even harshly. But when dependence on cooperation with us exists alongside rhetoric portraying us as a regional threat, Israel is entitled to ask: where does diplomacy end and room service begin?
The Hashemite Crown has a historical memory; we would do well to have one too. In 1958, Israel allowed British aircraft carrying troops to Jordan to pass through its airspace as part of efforts to help protect King Hussein’s regime. In September 1970, Israeli deterrent moves and intelligence shared with the Jordanians helped confront the Syrian invasion. The Jordanian army fought, the West applied pressure, and Israel contributed to the defense of the kingdom. These are documented examples of assistance in preserving the stability of the dynasty. In addition, there have been a number of unpublicized incidents in which Israeli intelligence prevented attempts to assassinate the king.
Water, too, comes with figures, not merely metaphors. According to reports, Israel continues to supply Jordan with approximately 50 million cubic meters of water annually under the peace arrangements. In 2021, an agreement was added for the sale of another 50 million cubic meters, doubling the total to approximately 100 million. According to reports from 2026, the additional arrangement expired at the end of 2025 and was not renewed.
Trade routes are also an asset. Haifa and Ashdod serve as gateways for cargo moving to and from Jordan. According to an analysis published by the Atlantic Council in July 2026, the Jordan River crossing handles approximately 140 trucks a day. Israel therefore has considerable logistical importance to Jordan’s economy. The containers cross the border; reciprocity gets stuck at passport control.
For years, the prevailing argument has been that the king should be left alone because, heaven forbid, if he were to display even the slightest pro-Israel inclination, he would risk an internal coup. The related claim is that the king is incapable of confronting fundamentalist forces that might threaten his throne. That argument is without foundation. In April 2025, Jordan banned the Muslim Brotherhood after authorities linked activists to assassination plots against the king and to terrorism. This does not prove that the king is free of all constraints, but it is a reminder that when Amman identifies a genuine threat, it knows how to draw sharp and unmistakable boundaries. The Crown is not made of sugar; there is no need to wrap every Israeli criticism in cotton wool.
To a considerable extent, we should adopt the Trump model in its transactional sense: something in return for something, explicit conditions, and clear benchmarks. Israel should honor the peace treaty and preserve security cooperation that also serves its own interests. But expanded water supplies, new benefits, and additional trade facilitation should become part of negotiations centered on proper diplomatic relations, combating incitement, and preventing smuggling along the shared border.
There is no need to demand applause from the king or agreement with every Israeli action. What should be demanded is a partnership that can also be recognized in daylight. Jordan’s stability is an important Israeli interest. Precisely for that reason, it should not be managed through a blank check and a permanent fear of what might happen to the king.
It is time for the king to understand: a cold peace does not entitle anyone to unlimited credit.
