Summary
The debate over resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict often centers on the “two-state solution,” seen internationally as the only fair path forward. However, widespread Israeli skepticism—especially after October 7th—underscores deep concerns that a sovereign Palestinian state would pose existential risks.
The core issue lies in perception: while Western advocates see two states as justice, many Israelis see rejectionism and hostility that undermine coexistence. A potential way forward lies in redefining what “statehood” means for Palestinians, drawing inspiration from models such as Puerto Rico, French territories, or British overseas lands.
These entities demonstrate how self-governance, cultural identity, and partial independence can coexist within broader frameworks that safeguard security and stability. In this vision, the solution may lie not in formal labels, but in creating a structure that both satisfies Palestinian aspirations and addresses Israeli security needs—achieved through “psychological diplomacy.”
The “two-state” solution is almost universally accepted as “the only” solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, making it difficult for any alternative proposal to be considered seriously. However, the reality of a full-fledged Palestinian “state” is not something most Israelis can accept, certainly not post-October 7, 2023.
For outsiders, the “why” in favor of a two-state solution is logical enough. Palestinians have been denied independence, denied freedom, and denied self-determination. All their “resistance” stems from the lack of a place of their own. For most Western liberals, having a Palestinian state is the only “fair” thing to do and a reasonable solution that would solve the conflict.
This logic lacks credibility in a reality where Palestinians, both leadership and society, refuse to accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. Instead, we have a generational culture of Jew-hatred where the goal is not a state alongside Israel but a state instead of Israel. The continued popularity of Hamas among Palestinians in the face of the horrors of October 7th serves as a constant reminder of the futility of seeking a Western solution in a Middle Eastern framework.
While Israelis see this, others do not. How do we narrow the gap and morph the Western obsession with “two-states” into a situation that Israel can live with? It is the perception of a “state” that requires change, and that is where some “psychological diplomacy” can help.
A Palestinian “state” can never pose a military threat to Israel. It cannot oppose peaceful coexistence. It can’t enter into treaties with states hostile to Israel, and it can’t continue to educate to hate. It can’t host terror organizations, and it can’t deny Jewish rights to the land. These are principles that even those favoring a “two-state” solution can agree upon. So, how do we get there? By changing the perception of what a “state” for Palestinians would be.
Perception determines reality. So, “If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck” may allow for a viable political solution for both those who favor the creation of a “two-state solution” and those who are opposed to it. The two-state solution refers to the endgame and desired result, but ignores the process that would lead us there. One side requires conditions to be present before moving forward, and the other sees that moving forward would bring about those conditions.
The difference between the “state” that Westerners envision and the entity that Israel can accept may be only a matter of perception, that is, in name only.
The concept of Palestinian self-government was first raised in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and Egypt that led to the Camp David Accords. Known as “autonomy,” it came to a diplomatic dead end, with a mindset that required formal “state” recognition to be considered diplomatically legitimate.
But the same world that calls for Palestinian independence plays a different game itself. France, the first Western country to call for Palestinian independence, rules over 13 separate territories outside of France, places like Martinique and Guadeloupe. While residents do have a vote and are French citizens, their national identity as independent nations is not recognized. The United Kingdom has 14 British Overseas Territories, including places like Anguilla, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, and Gibraltar, none of which are members of the United Nations, and all of which are subject to British constitutional oversight and authority over defense, foreign relations, and internal security.
For Americans, the most recognizable “less than a state” entity would be Puerto Rico, which is defined as a commonwealth; neither a sovereign country nor a U.S. state. Its residents are full U.S. citizens, but do not have voting rights on a federal (national) level. They have an independent legislative body that governs the commonwealth and are subject as well to U.S. federal law when applicable. Their language is Spanish, and their cultural identity is Puerto Rican. They have their own flag and their own representation in international events, such as the Olympics. In repeated plebiscites on status, residents of Puerto Rico have consistently voted not to be independent, not to be a U.S. state, and to remain as a commonwealth.
Puerto Rico is functionally independent, retains a unique separate identity, but benefits from a relationship with the U.S. that brings security and economic benefits. It is a different kind of “duck.”
Can the Palestinians build upon the Puerto Rico model? In theory, it provides independence and self-determination within a framework that protects Israelis and maintains national identity for both sides. If Puerto Rico is an apartheid entity, if it is denying self-determination, and if it is creating second-class citizens, then American legislators need to tackle their own issues before looking at Israel’s view of a Palestinian state. But if it is not, then the “two-state solution” that is parroted by so many needs to look at how Israel’s version of a Palestinian “Puerto Rico” or a British or French “overseas territory” will look.
In fact, when presented with arguments in favor of such a model, 21% of Americans supported the notion versus 27% who supported the traditional “two-state solution.”
How anyone views a “duck” is less important than how the duck actually behaves. It is all a matter of psychological diplomacy.
