Summary
Tensions between Washington and Tehran are approaching a critical juncture, with a limited military strike seen as marginally more probable than a negotiated settlement. Although Iran’s strategic capabilities have been damaged, its nuclear knowledge, missile development, and reconstruction capacity remain intact. The regime faces deep internal dissatisfaction and economic pressure but retains control over the security apparatus. Any significant political transformation would likely emerge gradually through internal elite shifts rather than sudden street-driven collapse.
Key Takeaways
- The likelihood of a limited U.S. strike currently appears slightly higher than the chances of a comprehensive diplomatic breakthrough, particularly if negotiations stall over uranium enrichment limits.
- Iran’s nuclear and missile programs have been significantly degraded but not eliminated, and reconstruction efforts, combined with retained technical expertise, preserve a substantial long-term threat.
- The regime is internally brittle due to economic strain and public discontent, yet meaningful change would most likely stem from elite fractures rather than popular protests alone.
Il Tempo: President Donald Trump has given Iran a 10–15-day deadline to reach an agreement, while the United States is already mobilized and moving military assets into the region. From your point of view, what are the chances that an agreement will be reached, and what are the chances that the U.S. will strike?
Oded Ailam:
President Trump has created a compressed timeline but redlines in the Middle East are often drawn with an eraser-tipped pencil. The Iranian regime calculates that it can absorb a short, sharp strike and survive politically. So, it is walking a tightrope offering the minimum necessary concessions while preserving its core nuclear leverage.
From Washington’s perspective, Trump has no appetite for “another muddy Iraq or Afghanistan.” He likely believes that a limited, surgical strike could shock Tehran into accepting terms closer to American demands. At the same time, key voices around him are cautious about escalation. No one can confidently predict the endgame, especially if Iran retaliates by threatening the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil – around 17–20 million barrels per day – flows. Even a temporary disruption would rattle global markets and spike energy prices dramatically.
The real question is twofold: how far is Tehran willing to retreat on uranium enrichment, and how much enrichment is Washington prepared to tolerate? Advisers are whispering in Trump’s ear as Henry Kissinger advised Richard Nixon during Vietnam: declare success and get the hell out. Whether either side is ready for that kind of pragmatic compromise remains unclear.
Right now, we are in the assessment phase waiting for Iran’s formal response and weighing whether negotiations can be stretched further. If I had to lean one way, the odds slightly favor a limited strike over a breakthrough agreement but in this region, certainty is always the first casualty.
IT: After Operation “Rising Lion” in June 2025, Iran has been rebuilding its nuclear sites and missile capabilities at an accelerated pace. In your view, does the regime still retain significant offensive capabilities today?
Ailam:
Operation “Rising Lion” inflicted real and measurable damage, but it did not erase Iran’s strategic capabilities. On enrichment, the program has been halted for now and key facilities were significantly degraded. However, Iran still reportedly retains roughly 420 kg of uranium enriched to 60% and about 3.5 tons at 3.5%, and we do not have full certainty regarding the location and status of all this material. Restarting large-scale enrichment would likely take months, not weeks, but the scientific knowledge, the engineering cadres, and the industrial DNA remain intact. You cannot bomb knowledge. And with potential technical assistance from North Korea, the recovery curve could shorten. So, while the program is wounded, it is not amputated.
On missiles, the picture is similarly mixed. Israel reportedly degraded roughly 50% of Iran’s long-range ballistic missile arsenal. Out of approximately 584 launchers, about 178 are currently assessed as operational. That is a serious reduction. But Iran is rebuilding, remarkably fast, reportedly with material and technological backing from China and Russia. Current projections suggest that by the end of 2026, Iran could field around 2,000 missiles and 600 launchers if reconstruction continues at this pace.
That is not a marginal threat. It is a strategic one not only to Israel but to the wider region. Some of these systems have ranges that can reach parts of Europe. And if the regime feels its back is against the wall, it may behave less like a rational chess player and more like a wounded tiger in a shrinking cage dangerous precisely because it believes it has nothing left to lose.
In short: Iran has been set back, but not neutralized. The infrastructure is damaged, the arsenal reduced but the intent, the know-how, and the reconstruction effort mean the threat remains very real.
IT: You have written that the regime of the ayatollahs is not only under political siege, but in a state of “existential bankruptcy.” After last summer and the popular protests that were brutally suppressed, is Khamenei’s regime fragile? Could it truly collapse rapidly?
Ailam:
The regime is at its lowest point since the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988. At that moment, Ruhollah Khomeini accepted the ceasefire and said: “Accepting this resolution is more deadly than taking poison. I submit to God’s will and drink this poisoned chalice.”
Today, the Islamic Republic faces a similar sense of strategic exhaustion but internally. The economy is severely strained, inflation has hollowed out the middle class, and many assessments suggest that 75% -80% a very large majority of the population rejects clerical rule. Even among traditional Shiite supporters, there is growing recognition of where this path has led.
Yet fragility does not equal imminent collapse. The brutal suppression of the protests was designed not only to crush dissent but to inject lasting fear. The shock effect remains. And despite sympathetic rhetoric from Western capitals, no concrete external assistance materialized. That reality weighs heavily on public willingness to re-mobilize. And the lack of alternative leadership is crucial.
Regimes fall not when people are angry, but when the pillars of power crack. Collapse would likely begin with fractures inside the elite or the security apparatus like the IRGC the QUDS forces or the army like cracks in a dam before the flood. At present, Ali Khamenei still controls the coercive machinery of the state.
The critical variable is economic pressure. If sanctions remain firm, structural decay will deepen. If, however, the United States and Europe ease sanctions in exchange for cosmetic nuclear concessions, we may repeat a familiar historical illusion. When Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich in 1938, he stood before the cameras and declared he had achieved “peace for our time.” History judged that optimism harshly. In short: the regime is brittle but not yet collapsing. Sustained economic pressure could turn brittleness into breakdown. Premature relief could instead grant it renewed oxygen.
IT: How do you envision a potential attack? Would it target specific military objectives only, or political ones as well?
Ailam:
Here’s how I would frame the different phases starting with the role of cyber-warfare as the opening phase of a potential joint U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran: If a military operation unfolds, it would almost certainly begin not with bombers at dawn, but with a coordinated cyber offensive designed to blind, disrupt, and delay Iran’s ability to respond. Cyber-warfare has become as fundamental to modern campaigns as artillery once was and, in some cases, even more decisive.
Phase Zero – Cyber Suppression:
Before a single missile is launched, U.S. and Israeli cyber units would likely strike first against key Iranian military networks, air defense systems, missile launch control systems, and nuclear command-and-control nodes. The idea would be to sever the enemy’s nervous system degrading radar, communication, early-warning systems, and logistics o create confusion and reduce the effectiveness of conventional retaliation. Think of it as cutting the wires before turning off the lights – a digital “shock and awe.”
Phase One – Kinetic Military Strikes:
Once Iranian defenses are disrupted conventional air and missile assets would target:
- Nuclear sites (e.g., enrichment and storage facilities),
- Missile production and launch infrastructure, and
- IRGC command and control centers.
And definitely targeting key prominent figures.
Phase Two – Escalation Dynamics:
If Iran retaliates by striking oil and gas infrastructure or attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the campaign could expand:
- Kharg Island Oil Terminal – primary export hub,
- South Pars Gas Field – energy revenue backbone,
- Abadan Refinery and
- Bandar Abbas Oil Refinery – key refining centers.
At that point, strikes would not just be military counter-force but also economic warfare responding to attacks on global energy markets and freedom of navigation. The cyber phase would still be ongoing in parallel, targeting Iranian cyber command networks and potentially striving to preempt offensive Iranian digital retaliation because Iran has shown it is capable of sustained cyber operations against Israeli and Western networks. In essence: the first shots would be digital, the next kinetic, and the last aimed at neutralizing both military and economic infrastructure if escalation demands it.
IT: The Iranian proxies in the region, which you know well, what offensive capabilities do they currently have? Hizbullah appears to be significantly weakened—does it still possess military capabilities that are a serious concern for Israel?
Ailam:
The short answer is this: they are no longer a strategic game-changer. Iran’s proxy network, what Tehran calls the “Axis of Resistance,” has been significantly degraded over the past year. Supply routes have been disrupted, senior commanders eliminated, financial flows constrained, and coordination impaired.
As for Hizbullah, it has undoubtedly been weakened. Its long-range precision missile project has suffered setbacks, command structures have been exposed, and Israel has demonstrated deep intelligence penetration. Hizbullah still retains rockets, drones, anti-tank capabilities, and a trained fighting force but it is far more cautious today. It understands that a full-scale confrontation could threaten its very survival inside Lebanon.
In military terms, Hizbullah can still inflict pain but it no longer holds the kind of overwhelming deterrent leverage it once claimed. The balance has shifted. What was once perceived as a northern strategic sword now looks more like a blunt instrument dangerous, yes, but not decisive. So, while the proxies remain somewhat disruptive actors, they are not, at this stage, a serious existential threat to Israel
IT: In Europe, Iran is often perceived as distant and not particularly threatening to security. Do you agree? What threats does it pose to us Europeans, and who supports it here?
Ailam:
First, the missile dimension.
Iran has developed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that, depending on configuration and payload, can reach parts of Southeastern and Central Europe. Systems such as the Khorramshahr and upgraded Shahab-3 variants are assessed to have ranges in the 2,000 km class. From western Iran, that places parts of Europe within theoretical reach. Even if Europe is not the primary target set today, the capability exists—and in strategy, capability often matters more than declared intent. Missiles are political weapons; their mere range alters deterrence equations.
Second, the proxy and covert infrastructure inside Europe.
Iran has demonstrated willingness to operate on European soil. In 2018, an Iranian diplomat based in Vienna was convicted in Belgium for involvement in a plot to bomb an opposition rally near Paris. That was not rhetoric; it was an operational cell with explosives inside the EU. Iranian intelligence networks, often operating under diplomatic or commercial cover, have been repeatedly exposed across Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia and, I am certain, in Italy too.
Third, the convergence between terrorism and crime.
European security services have increasingly warned about the blurred lines between state-directed terror networks and criminal gangs, money laundering, weapons procurement, and logistics pipelines. We have seen how organized crime ecosystems in parts of Europe can provide infrastructure for covert operations: forged documents, smuggling routes, and cash movement. When ideological extremism plugs into criminal supply chains, the result is a hybrid threat harder to detect and easier to deny.
And finally, escalation logic. If Iran feels cornered economically strangled or militarily pressured, it may seek asymmetric retaliation abroad. Europe, perceived as softer terrain than the United States, could become an arena for intimidation operations, cyberattacks, or deniable terrorist activity.
So no, I do not agree that Iran is irrelevant to European security. It may not present an imminent invasion threat but it poses a missile capability risk, a covert terrorism risk, and a hybrid criminal-terror nexus risk. In strategic terms: distance is not immunity. Europe is not outside the chessboard; it is simply a square that Tehran has not yet chosen to move on decisively.
IT: In 2025, you spoke publicly about the “extensive network” of assets that the Mossad maintains in Iran, recruited among ethnic minorities, opposition members, and citizens impoverished by the regime. In the event of an attack, could these figures be operationally decisive? How?
Ailam:
I have not been in the Mossad for quite a few years, so I cannot and will not comment on operational details. Intelligence services do not discuss current assets, and certainly not in the context of a potential conflict.
What I can say based on history is that for over more than 45 years, Israel has demonstrated an impressive intelligence reach inside Iran. That reach has drawn on a wide spectrum of sources: human intelligence, technical collection, cyber capabilities, open-source analysis, and regional partnerships. Effective intelligence coverage is never about one dramatic source; it is about layered penetration from multiple angles.
In any modern military campaign, intelligence is not a supporting element; it is the backbone. Accurate targeting, battle damage assessment, early warning, and insight into decision-making circles can significantly shape the outcome. Intelligence can shorten wars by increasing precision and reducing uncertainty.
But it is important to avoid mythology. No intelligence service is omnipotent. Even the best coverage reduces fog but it does not eliminate it. Operational outcomes ultimately depend on political decisions, military capabilities, and escalation dynamics. So, I would frame it this way: Israel has historically demonstrated deep intelligence access in Iran. Whether that would be decisive in a future scenario would depend less on the existence of networks and more on how effectively intelligence is integrated into strategy and execution.
IT: You have openly argued that regime change in Tehran is “the key to the security of Israel, the U.S., and the West.” How soon could such a change occur after a potential attack?
Ailam:
Regime change in Tehran, if it comes, will not be a “hit-and-run” consequence of a single strike. It would be more like cracking a dome—once fractures spread across the structure, gravity does the rest.
Iran is not a monolith. Roughly 40% of the population is Persian, but there are significant minorities: Azeris (around 15%), Kurds (7–10%), Arabs (2–3%), Baluchis (2–3%), Turkmen (1–2%), and others. The regime’s cohesion rests on keeping these diverse components under a centralized ideological system. If the ruling elite begins to fear not just defeat but national fragmentation, that is when internal calculations change. Regime change would likely occur not because of street protests alone, but when the elite concludes the current path is leading to disaster – even disintegration of Iran itself. At that point, the shift would come from within: an internal power move, perhaps led by elements of the security establishment or senior clerical figures. The result might not be a single charismatic leader but rather a collective structure something resembling a political directorate or “politburo” model during a transitional phase.
History shows that external pressure can accelerate internal fractures. The CIA has operated covertly in Iran before most notably in 1953, when it supported the removal of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in coordination with British intelligence during what became known as Operation Ajax. That episode reshaped Iran’s political trajectory for decades. It is reasonable to assume that major powers today maintain various clandestine channels but such processes are long, complex, and unpredictable. This would not unfold in weeks or even months. Structural change in a system as entrenched as the Islamic Republic would take time unless triggered by a dramatic elite rupture.
There is a Persian saying: “Qatre qatre jam shavad, vāngehī daryā shavad” — “Drop by drop it gathers, and then it becomes a sea.” Change in Iran is likely to follow that logic. Pressure accumulates quietly. Then, when perception shifts inside the elite, events can move suddenly. The question is not whether systems under sustained internal and external strain eventually transform. The question is timing and whether the elite decides to save the state by replacing the regime before the structure cracks beyond repair.
IT: The anti-ayatollah protests have elevated Reza Pahlavi as a leader. Do you see him as a figure with the necessary qualities to assume leadership? Do you see other figures? Who?
Ailam:
Reza Pahlavi has indeed gained visibility amid recent anti-regime protests in Iran, positioning himself as an advocate for secular democracy and national unity. While some supporters highlight his eloquence, international connections, and decades of activism against the Islamic Republic, critics often view him as disconnected, tied to his father’s controversial legacy of authoritarianism, and perceived extravagance which aligns with your skepticism about him as a “spoiled child.”
Leadership Qualities Assessment
Pahlavi emphasizes non-violent transition, coalition-building, and a vision for prosperity, drawing on his royal heritage and exile experience. He announced readiness to lead a transitional government in late 2024, backed by some diaspora and protest voices chanting for his return. However, his lack of direct domestic organizing and reliance on symbolism raise doubts about practical governance skills in a fractured opposition.
Alternative Figures
No single dominant alternative has emerged to unify the diverse protest movements, which span women’s rights activists, ethnic minorities, and reformists.
- Protest Icons: Figures like Mahsa Amini (posthumously) or Narges Mohammadi (imprisoned Nobel laureate) symbolize resistance but aren’t positioned for leadership.
- Reformists: Detained politicians like Azar Mansouri or Ebrahim Asgharzadeh represent moderate change but face regime crackdowns and accusations of foreign ties.
- Other Exiles/Activists: Names like Shirin Ebadi (human rights lawyer) or lesser-known opposition coordinators occasionally surface, though none match Pahlavi’s visibility; grassroots leaders inside Iran remain underground to evade arrests.
Opposition Dynamics
Protests since 2022 (e.g., Mahsa Amini uprising) and 2026 economic unrest show broad anti-Ayatollah sentiment but fragmented leadership, prioritizing regime collapse over named successors. A collective council or emergent domestic figure might rise post-upheaval, as historical revolutions like 1979 demonstrated unpredictable shifts.
