Senior officials in Jerusalem are expressing deep concern over Turkey’s growing regional and international standing, bolstered by the backing of U.S. President Donald Trump, and Ankara’s apparent ambition to position itself as a nuclear-capable regional power as it senses the early stages of erosion within the Iranian regime.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly raised the prospect of nuclear weapons as early as 2019. Speaking on September 4 of that year at a rally of the ruling Justice and Development Party in Sivas, he declared that Turkey had aspirations to acquire nuclear arms.
“We cannot accept a situation in which major powers possess nuclear weapons while Turkey is denied such capabilities,” Erdoğan said.
He pointedly referenced Israel, arguing that its possession of such weapons shields it from external pressure and deters adversaries.
On February 9, 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan echoed this line in an interview with CNN, stating that Turkey is considering the broader strategic implications of joining a regional nuclear race. While affirming that Turkey currently has no active nuclear weapons program and remains a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Fidan described nuclear capability as a high-level strategic issue that must be examined within the “larger picture.”
At present, Turkey is focused on constructing its first of three planned civilian nuclear power plants.
Yet Israeli security officials argue that Erdoğan is moving rapidly to encircle Israel diplomatically.
According to these assessments, Ankara is working to consolidate the Sunni world, transforming former Arab rivals, including Egypt, into partners in a broader alignment that could redirect regional momentum against Israel.
The objective, they suggest, is to replace the “Iranian firewall” with a unified Sunni diplomatic wall surrounding Israel, thereby limiting its maneuverability and isolating it politically.
In Africa, Erdoğan is said to be engaged in what Israeli officials describe as a “shadow war,” a strategic contest stretching from Libya to Sudan and Somalia.
Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are reportedly alarmed by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and are coordinating efforts to constrain Israel’s strategic freedom of action in the Red Sea arena.
Senior defense sources note that much of the Middle East now views Iran’s weakening as an irreversible process.
In response, a broad Sunni axis is reorganizing to fill the vacuum emerging between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Israel thus finds itself confronting a more complex environment, facing several Sunni states, some of them overtly hostile, with Turkey at the forefront.
In such a configuration, Israel may find it increasingly difficult to translate military superiority into immediate strategic gains.
Despite Tehran’s refusal to yield to President Trump’s demands regarding its nuclear program, ballistic missile project, and regional proxies, Iran’s regional standing has eroded significantly since the twelve-day war last June.
Its power centers in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip have been severely damaged. Simultaneously, Iran is grappling with a deep economic crisis, compounded by shortages of water and food. At the same time, the United States continues to impose sanctions, intensifying systemic pressure on the regime.
In practical terms, a coalition of Sunni Muslim states is taking shape, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Pakistan.
Some of these states are linked through military cooperation frameworks. They are coordinating their interests to prevent renewed Iranian entrenchment and to expand their influence in key theaters such as Syria, Lebanon, and the Red Sea.
Senior Israeli diplomatic officials voice growing concern over this emerging coalition, even though several of its members maintain close ties with Washington.
They argue that the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia is receding. Riyadh, which had previously examined joining the Abraham Accords with seriousness, has recently adopted a more critical and rigid posture toward Israel, particularly in light of the war in Gaza and Israel’s refusal to commit to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
In recent weeks, Saudi Arabia has entered into an unprecedented and public dispute with the United Arab Emirates over developments in southern Yemen.
Abu Dhabi was the pioneer of normalization with Israel, yet the move has become less popular across the Arab world.
Saudi distancing from Israel has, to some extent, left the UAE relatively isolated, while positioning Riyadh as the primary address in the Sunni sphere.
Amid an unresolved war in Gaza, stagnation on the Palestinian political track, and Israeli policies in the West Bank, Israel’s integration into a broad regional framework has become increasingly complicated.
The UAE, Israel’s most visible Arab partner, senses a degree of isolation within the Arab world.
The Middle East is entering a phase of strategic reconfiguration. Iran remains a central actor, but it is no longer the sole force defining the rules of the regional game. In its place, a new Sunni coalition is consolidating, aspiring to shape a revised regional order.
Senior security officials warn that if Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey were to operate in concert, Israel would be compelled to reassess both its military doctrine and its freedom of action.
Any Israeli move could acquire a different strategic meaning if confronted by three coordinated Sunni powers. Even if the alliance is not formally directed against Israel, its very existence constrains the diplomatic and military latitude to which Israel has grown accustomed.
Pakistan’s role is particularly significant. As a nuclear-armed state that has provided formal security assurances to Saudi Arabia, Islamabad alters the regional balance of dependence.
Instead of drawing closer to Israel to build a joint defensive framework against Iran, Riyadh can rely on an internal Sunni power structure within its own strategic orbit.
This reduces Saudi incentives to advance normalization with Israel and may complicate diplomatic processes that had begun to take shape over the past year.
These developments also place Israel on a trajectory of growing rivalry with Turkey, which is poised to become a leading force in the emerging regional architecture.
Ankara, which leads the Muslim Brotherhood axis, could leverage this alliance to deepen its influence across the Sunni world and within the Palestinian arena, thereby narrowing Israel’s room for maneuver with the Gulf states and widening the strategic gap between Jerusalem and Ankara.
