Summary
Iran currently projects strength abroad while grappling with significant vulnerabilities at home. Internationally, its leadership emphasizes American decline, strengthens ties with Russia and China, and seeks to assert regional influence in the Caucasus, the Gulf, and the Israel–Palestine arena. Yet these foreign-policy narratives contrast sharply with mounting internal strains.
Domestically, power struggles between the presidency and a hardline parliament undermine governance and contribute to a climate of uncertainty. Economic pressures—chronic inflation, currency deterioration, subsidy reform, resource shortages, and entrenched corruption—intensify public frustration.
Social tensions are rising as well, particularly around digital censorship, perceived inequalities, and legislation affecting women’s rights. These issues have contributed to a broad erosion of trust in state institutions.
The Iranian press in recent days paints a picture of a country caught between growing external pressure, nuclear uncertainty, and an internal divide that is widening daily. Alongside ongoing efforts to cultivate support in the East and depict the United States as a retreating power, there is a sharpening awareness in Tehran that the real threat to the regime is the collapse of public confidence. Economic crisis, clashes between the government and the Majles (parliament), disputes over censorship and women’s issues, and geopolitical tensions in the Caucasus and the Gulf all contribute to a narrative of a system that struggles to stabilize itself internally even as it seeks to project strength externally.
Overall View: A Crisis of Trust as a Common Thread
In every arena of public discourse in Iran, one recurring theme stands out: a sense of crisis of trust. Externally, the regime claims to practice “cautious diplomacy” against American aggression and deepen its anchors in the East. Internally, the press describes a system unable to reconcile tension between a government that claims to pursue science-based policy and “public participation,” and a conservative Majles that uses every parliamentary mechanism to pressure the cabinet and preserve its own power. Over all of this hovers a persistent economic crisis affecting everyday life: fuel prices, rice, paper, and the expanding gap between official rhetoric and reality.
Foreign Policy: America Losing Ground, the East Strengthening
The tone toward the United States is sharp and clear. Tehran views the U.S. National Security Strategy document as not just policy but evidence of “American decline” and a retreat to the Western hemisphere. Analysts argue that labeling Iran a “source of instability” is unsurprising, but they interpret the way the document repositions the strategic focus closer to home as an “admission of weakness.”
In contrast with the West, Iran advocates a strategy of “reliance on the East”: deepening ties with Russia, China, and partner states in economic and security corridors, and bolstering the message that Tehran is not isolated but part of a regional network where the United States is losing its place.
The Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Regional Projects
The Caucasus features prominently in discourse, especially in light of the trauma of the “12-Day War” and Iranian suspicions of Azerbaijani cooperation with Israel. The Iranian foreign minister’s visit to Baku is presented as a critical step toward stabilizing relations. The language is cautious but clear: the need for continued talks, consultations, and increased mutual visits to address “misunderstandings,” alongside warnings against “foreign interference” that could destabilize the region.
In parallel, the “ARS Road Plan”—an energy and infrastructure project along the Aras River—is promoted as reinforcement of a north-south corridor with Russia, intended to ensure Iran is not only a military power but also a regional transit and energy hub.
The Gulf, the Three Islands, and the Arash Gas Field
A recent Gulf Cooperation Council declaration in Bahrain renewed claims by the UAE over three islands in the Gulf and the Arash gas field. Tehran’s press labels this the “most aggressive stance in recent years.” Iranian media sees these claims as attempts to construct “fabricated legal narrative” around a territorial dispute it considers long settled.
Tehran’s response centers on two axes: a historical-legal argument asserting that the islands and Arash field are integral parts of national territory, and a political argument that Gulf states are “pouring fuel on the Zionist enemy’s mill” rather than engaging in direct regional discourse. Former Foreign Minister Zarif revisits historical references, including the role some Gulf states played in supporting Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War.
Israel, Palestine, and the “12-Day War”
Discussion on the Israel-Palestine front occurs on two levels. On one hand, there is emphasis on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and repeated accusations of attacks on UNRWA facilities, portraying Israel as a key factor in destabilization. On the other hand, there is self-empowerment: the “12-Day War” of June 2025 and Iran’s response are framed as a moment of “breaking the Zionist regime’s teeth.”
Defense Minister Amir Khalban Aziz Nasirzadeh is quoted stressing that Iran is “the only country that delivered a strong, tooth-breaking response to the Zionist regime.” The message to the public is simple: even if the West retains impressive military capabilities, Iran has shown it can respond, and deterrence is no longer exclusive to the other side.
The Nuclear Issue and Sanctions: Supervision Without Inspectors
On the nuclear file, rhetoric oscillates between principled firmness and attempts to keep diplomatic channels open. Foreign Minister Arakchi states plainly that “currently, no IAEA inspector is present in Iran.” From Tehran’s perspective, this is a calculated step rather than an uncontrolled deterioration: further negotiations would be possible only if Washington changes its approach and stops “dictating terms.”
References to the June 2025 strikes on nuclear sites under IAEA supervision serve a dual purpose: to argue that the attacks were a “serious breach of international law,” and to claim that the agency itself has lost legitimacy in Iran’s eyes. The “Cairo Agreement,” intended to establish a new cooperation framework, is depicted as blocked by European-American insistence on activating the SNAP mechanism.
Against the backdrop of the supervision dispute, Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization, emphasizes peaceful nuclear energy development, presenting it as essential for national energy needs and development.
Domestic Front: President Fazhjian vs. Majles and the “Hardliners”
Domestically, the central story is the built-in tension between a president trying to craft an image of pragmatic administration grounded in “scientific judgment and documentation,” and a Majles dominated by harder currents seeking to dictate the agenda. Masoud Fazhjian speaks of the need for public policy that is not “selective” but data-based, warning that any measure generating “public dissatisfaction” plays into the hands of “the Zionist regime.” By doing so he frames internal freedoms and economic policy as components of national security.
Opposing him is a coalition of “hardliners” in the Majles, who reportedly consider impeachment, disseminate rumors about political deals with the Speaker, and seek to constrain government actions. Government spokespeople describe these rumors as spin intended to “disrupt public services,” and presidential aides emphasize “transparency” as the way to counter pressure.
The issue of internet filtering has become symbolic of the power struggle. Fazhjian acknowledges it as “one of the country’s biggest problems today” and orders “unfiltered lines to be blacked out so officials can experience what the public does.” Meanwhile, the Majles promotes a “third version of censorship” aiming to deepen control of the virtual space and expand powers for state broadcasting bodies. The fact that about 70 percent of the population uses VPNs, as noted by Kalibaf, hovers over this debate as evidence of the gap between official policy and digital reality.
Economy, Fuel, and Inflation: A Surgical Analysis on a Weary Body
On the economic front, Economy Minister Seyyed Ali Madani Zadeh describes inflation as “the mother of all corruption.” This is a rare admission that the economic crisis is not only the result of sanctions but also “our own performance,” in his words. Behind this are high liquidity, chronic budget deficits, and imbalance in the banking system.
Into this context enters the “three-tier gasoline pricing plan”: from 22 Adar a new model will take effect where fuel prices depend on card type and quantity consumed, with station card refueling set at 5,000 tomans. The government markets this as a necessary measure intended to distribute subsidies more transparently and precisely. Economists warn of accompanying price increases despite the direct impact on inflation being measured in low figures.
The currency exchange rate continues to deteriorate, and commentators point to “politicization” of the market: much of the fluctuations are attributed to anxiety over external developments. The structure of “Arz Rav Shari” is sharply criticized as a mechanism inviting corruption and speculation. The decision to allow the import of basic goods without official forex transfer is seen as encouragement for the black market and another blow to monetary discipline.
Society, Women, and Eroded Social Capital
Social discourse depicts a tired society struggling with daily price increases and a feeling that the system fails to protect the weak. Prices of rice, dairy, and building materials are presented as the everyday faces of crisis: Iranian rice is said to be sold at nearly a day laborer’s weekly wage, and the authorities are blamed for merely observing.
Simultaneously, the government tries to project promotion of women in leadership. Fazhjian speaks of a 50 percent women target in managerial positions, and the Interior Minister describes their participation as an “inevitable necessity.” Against this backdrop, however, a new law limiting prison sentences for failure to pay mahr (bridal gift) to 14 gold coins draws criticism from reformists and women’s activists, who see it as “deepening discrimination.”
In public consciousness, scandals such as the “white SIM cards”—preferential access to quality digital resources for elites while the public uses inferior tools—become symbols of oligarchy. Headlines speak of a “separation between the people and officials” and a “sense of injustice” that gnaws at “social capital.” When a former MP publicly calls for an apology to the public over the economic situation, he articulates what many feel: the problem is not just sanctions or external enemies, but also the internal power structure.
Conclusion
In sum, the Iranian press discourse today depicts a country attempting to shape a new role in the international arena but finding its most dangerous challenges are internal: division among governing institutions, an unstable economy, and an ever-growing alienation between the public and those who speak on its behalf. For many, the big question is not only how Iran will respond to the next American strategy document, but whether it can renew trust between the people and those who represent them.
