Time to Raise the Price of Terror: Six Ways to End PA-PLO “Pay-for-Slay”

It is clear that the PA-PLO’s terror-rewarding “Pay-for-Slay” policy unequivocally drives and fuels terror. Since the PA-PLO remains undeterred by the measures taken by Israel and the U.S. to combat the policy, the time has come to raise the ante.

This paper will outline potential avenues to broaden the scope of activities and direct additional measures not only against the PA, but also against those implementing the policy and the recipients of the payments.

Before presenting the options, it is important to note that the PA-PLO’s “Pay-for-Slay” payments are not just a malicious policy. Rather, the policy and its implementation create actual breaches of existing criminal law provisions.

As a general rule, the provisions prohibit any action that assists, promotes, or funds the payment of a reward for the commission of a terror offense.

Enacted by both the Israeli parliament,¹ and with mirror legislation in Judea and Samaria,² the provisions establish a substantial legal basis for a host of different actions that could, and should, be taken. These steps would include criminal law enforcement actions and the invocation of a host of potential administrative measures and sanctions.

1. Arrest the PA-PLO officials responsible for implementing the policy

To operate the “Pay-for-Slay” policy, the PA-PLO employs an entire bureaucratic team. Each one of those people, from the simple clerks who receive and process the requests of the terrorists for payment to the high-level PA-PLO officials responsible for authorizing and making the payments, is committing an offense that carries a sentence of seven to ten years in prison.

While arresting every one of the people involved in implementing the policy is of the utmost importance, the message that Israel has finally taken off the gloves would best be conveyed by arresting a handful of the most senior PA-PLO officials.

The first on this list is PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, who is, without a doubt, most responsible for the policy and its implementation. It was Abbas who codified what were, historically, ad hoc PA-PLO payments to terrorists into PA legislation. It was Abbas who repeatedly raised the salaries paid to the terrorists. And it was Abbas who repeatedly declared, literally putting his money where his mouth is, that even if the PA is left with just one penny, he would pay it first to the terrorists.³

The next person on the list would be Ramzi Khoury. Abbas appointed Khoury in 2005 to head the Palestinian National Fund (PNF). As chairman of the PNF, Khoury is automatically a member of the PLO’s Executive Committee. Although not a member of the PA government, he holds the rank of minister.

In June 2017, Israeli Minister of Defense, Avigdor Liberman, designated the PNF as a terrorist organization. Explaining the move, the designation noted that “The fund encourages terrorist attacks against the State of Israel by funding those responsible for executing severe terrorist acts – including funding imprisoned terrorists, released prisoners, and the families of terrorists who were killed or injured.”⁴

Despite standing at the head of a designated terrorist organization, and despite his involvement in the financing of other Israeli designated terror organizations,⁵ Khoury still enjoys special privileges, including occasionally attending events in Israel as an official PA representative.⁶

PA Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa and PA Finance Minister Estephan Salameh, who oversee budget allocation for the “Pay-for-Slay” payments, would also be relevant officials. In the past, PA ministers have been arrested for their participation in terror.

Hussein Al-Sheikh, Abbas’ deputy in the PLO, would also be a potential candidate. He could be arrested not only for his part in “Pay-for-Slay,” but also for his part in the terrorist attack in which Gad and Tzippi Shemesh were murdered.⁷

The board members of the Palestinian National Economic Empowerment Institution (PNEEI), the organization that now distributes the “Pay-for-Slay” payments, should also be arrested, with particular attention and precedence being given to the chairman, Dr. Ahmad Majdalani, and Raed Abu Al Humus, who is also the Director of the PLO Commission of Prisoner Affairs.

In addition to the top-tier officials who direct the implementation of the policy, all the other PA-PLO bureaucrats, including the staffers in the local offices and the staffers in the main offices, who participate in implementing the policy should also be arrested.

2. Seize all the “Pay-for-Slay” Payments

This recommendation has two elements.

a. Seize the payments at their source.

For decades, the PA-PLO implemented its “Pay-for-Slay” policy with direct bank transfers to the accounts of the terrorists and their families. This simple mechanism was dismantled in 2020 after numerous provisions of Israel’s Anti-Terror Law were applied to Judea and Samaria.

Following the application of the law, Palestinian Media Watch wrote to all the banks operating in the areas controlled by the PA and warned them that their continued acceptance of the “Pay-for-Slay” payments would potentially expose them to both criminal and civil liability.⁸ Within days, the banks responded by refusing to accept bank transfers to the terrorists from the PA-PLO.⁹ It was later reported that, as a result of the warning, the PA banks closed 35,000 bank accounts of the terrorists and their families.¹⁰

Initially, the PA-PLO decided to circumvent the Anti-Terror Law and commercial banks’ refusal to cooperate by establishing a new bank.¹¹ In the interim period, the PA-PLO decided to provide cash handouts to the terrorists and their families through the PA post office.¹² However, since the post office process was slow, the terrorists and their families criticized the move, claiming it was “humiliating.”¹³

Since establishing the new bank was set to take time, and providing the terror rewards via cash handouts at the post office was unacceptable to the terrorists, the PA decided to make the payments via ATMs.¹⁴

Following an additional warning letter,¹⁵ the company that provides the PA banking system – Russian-owned, Swiss-registered, BPC Banking Technologies – clarified that the PA had assured them that the “ATM machines installed at the post offices are not connected to the switches, banking network and any of the banks supervised and regulated by PMA.”¹⁶

In other words, the system now operated is simple: The PA-PLO has provided the terrorists and their families with ATM cards. These cards are used in stand-alone ATM’s that are not connected to the rest of the PA banking system. At the start of each month, the PA-PLO announces when it will deposit the terror reward funds into the ATMs, so that the terrorists and their families can withdraw the funds.

The extended explanation of the current system is critical to understanding what could potentially be a highly effective operation.

The proposal, similar to the system, is simple: The Israeli security forces- the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Israel Security Agency (ISA) – should map out the locations of the specialized ATMs. As soon as the PA-PLO announces that the terror reward funds have been deposited into the ATM’s, the IDF should immediately mobilize and send pre-trained forces to seize the ATMs physically.

Since the monthly payments exceed 20 million NIS, in one night Israel could confiscate a huge sum of terror funds.

The seizure would have substantial additional effects. First, the terrorists would still demand their payments, and the PA would be required to find a solution. Second, the PA-PLO would have forfeited tens of millions of shekels. Third, the PA-PLO would again be sent spiraling and would have to invent a new terror payment scheme, constantly fearing that Israel would again repeat the same process.

The legal basis for this operation is also simple. As noted above, since 2020, the payment of a reward for an act of terror is a criminal offense.¹⁷ Paragraph 60 of the Order for Security Provisions empowers a soldier or other appointed authorities to seize funds given as a reward for conducting an act of terror. The seized funds can then be forfeited.

For many years, the reservation of some elements in the government and the security establishment to seize the “Pay-for-Slay” funds was the potential impact on the PA banking system. As shown above, this reservation is no longer relevant. According to the PA-PLO’s own admission, the ATM’s that facilitate the “Pay-for-Slay” payments are stand-alone machines unconnected to the wider banking system.

The result is that an operation of this nature would be entirely surgical, specifically targeting terror funds, without any impact on the wider PA banking system.

b. Do More to Seize The “Pay-For-Slay” Payments from Their Recipients

The Israeli authorities clearly know who has received the terror reward payments – all the terrorist prisoners and released terrorists. Each one of the payments received by the terrorists while in prison or after their release constituted an offense. Both Israel’s Anti-terror Law and the Order for Security Provisions (applied in Judea and Samaria) authorize the Israeli authorities to seize those funds. If the actual funds, the actual bank notes, are no longer available for seizure, both laws provide for the seizure and forfeiture of other property in the value of the illegal funds received.¹⁸

Since 2019, Israel’s Ministers of Defense have issued dozens of orders for the seizure of the terror reward payments the PA-PLO paid to Israeli terrorists. While the cumulative value of these orders exceeds 50 million NIS (approximately $17 million), only a fraction, estimated at no more than 15%, of that sum has actually been seized.

The low seizure rate means that the PA-PLO was able to make the payments to the Israeli Arab terrorists, and the terrorists were able to receive the payments, with relative impunity.

To change this situation, the Israeli authorities need, at the very least, to establish a cross-ministerial task force, with representatives from, inter alia, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the Israel Security Agency.

The task force would receive the seizure orders and formulate a multi-disciplined approach to seize ALL the funds. The houses of the terrorists would be raided, and the funds, or their value, would be seized. Liens would be placed on bank accounts, and cars would be confiscated. Any real property registered in the terrorists’ names would be forfeited.

While the Minister of Defense has issued multiple seizure orders for PA-PLO “Pay-for-Slay” payments paid to Israeli terrorists, no such systematic approach has been adopted by the IDF Central Command, where the bulk of the recipients live.

As noted above, the Israeli authorities can easily identify all the recipients – terrorist prisoners, released prisoners, and families of dead terrorists – of the “Pay-for-Slay” payments. Every residence of these recipients should be raided to seize the payments or goods equal to their value.

The goals of this activity would be to seize the funds and warn recipients that continued receipt of terror funds will no longer be accepted.

3. Raid The Offices of the PA-PLO, Seize Documents and Present Them to the World

As noted above, the entirety of the “Pay-for-Slay” policy – i.e., the provision of any payment as a reward for an act of terror – is prohibited by law. The offices in which the policy is implemented, whether it be the payments to the terrorist prisoners and released prisoners or the payments to the injured terrorists and the families of the dead terrorists (all of which are part of the policy), are offices in which crimes are being committed. These premises should be raided by the Israeli security officials, and all the computers and other documentation should be seized.

While it is clear that Israel has a certain indication of how much money the PA-PLO spends paying rewards to terrorists,¹⁹ raiding the offices and seizing the computers and the documents would have numerous other advantages.

The PA-PLO implementation of the policy is not entirely devoid of bureaucracy. In fact, in some cases, the documentation is meticulous. In the past, for example, complete histories of payments to certain terrorists have emerged.

This being the case, in addition to the general disruption that would be caused, the files and documents could then be used to present to the international community authentic PA-PLO payments to the full range of terrorists.

The documents and computers could also be used to accurately calculate the full extent of the “Pay-for-Slay” policy.

4. Adopt New Legislation Imposing Fines in the Value of the Funds Due to Be Received

While acts of terror are not always connected to financial gain, one of the realities of the PA-PLO’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy is that the terrorists receive a concrete financial reward from their participation in terror.

The legislation aims to neutralize that financial gain from the outset. Under the proposed legislation, if a potential recipient of the “Pay-for-Slay” payments is convicted of a terror offense, he would be sentenced, in addition to any other punishment, to a fine equal to his anticipated gain.

As is known, the PA-PLO “Pay-for-Slay” payments grow with time spent in prison. Thus, for the first three years, the PA-PLO pays the terrorist a basic monthly salary of 1,400 NIS; For three to five years in prison, the “salary”²⁰ goes up to 2,000 NIS a month. For five to ten years in prison, the salary grows to 4,000 NIS per month. The salaries continue growing incrementally with time spent in prison, growing to 12,000 NIS per month for terrorists who have served over 30 years in prison.

Under the proposed legislation, as part of sentencing, the judge would impose a fine on the terrorist commensurate with the prison sentence handed down.

In other words, for every month the terrorist is due to spend in prison, the fine would grow accordingly. Thus, for example, if a terrorist is sentenced to two years in prison, the fine imposed on him would be 24 months multiplied by 1,400 per month, totaling 33,600 NIS; if a terrorist is sentenced to four years in prison, the fine imposed on him would be 36 months multiplied by 1,400 per month (for the first three years, totaling 50,400 NIS), and twelve months multiplied by 2,000 NIS (for the fourth year, totaling 24,000 NIS) for a cumulative fine of 74,400 NIS, etc.

The guiding idea of the legislation would be to clearly signal to every terrorist that they would receive no financial gain from their participation in terror and that, in fact, any potential gain they sought to receive would actually be paid, in the form of fines, into the coffers of the State of Israel.

Legislation²¹ reflecting this idea was submitted²² as a private members bill²³ to the outgoing 25^th Knesset. Unfortunately, the legislation did not progress before the October 7, 2023, massacre and was placed on the back burner during the ensuing seven-front war.

Accordingly, the legislation should be resubmitted, preferably as a government bill, and passed as soon as possible.

5. Cancellation Of Israeli Citizenship and Residency

In early 2023, the Israeli parliament adopted an amendment²⁴ to the Citizenship Law and the Entry to Israel Law.²⁵ The amendment passed with the votes of 94²⁶ members of Israel’s parliament, becoming the most consensual law ever passed by Israel’s 120 lawmakers.

The law provides that if an Israeli citizen or resident is convicted of a terror offense, is sentenced to serve a prison sentence, and then asks for and receives a “Pay-for-Slay” payment from the PA-PLO, that terrorist would be stripped of his citizenship or residency.

In other words, if a terrorist sees himself as a Palestinian, acts as a Palestinian, commits acts of terror as a Palestinian, asks the PA-PLO to reward him for acting as a Palestinian, and is actually rewarded by the PA-PLO as a Palestinian who carried out an act of terror, then Israel will no longer see that person as an “Israeli” – citizen or resident – but rather as what he himself seeks to be: Palestinian.

The goal of the law was to provide a concrete deterrent against the participation of Israeli citizens and residents in Palestinian terror.²⁷ The law provides for harsh consequences for any such person who not only participates in terror, but also asks for and receives a reward from the PA-PLO.

Despite the broad support, implementation of the law has been stymied by petty bureaucrats from the Ministry of Justice,²⁸ who, driven by their own political agenda, disagree with the law.

While there appear to be hundreds of Israeli Arabs who have participated in terror, have been convicted and sentenced to prison terms, and who have received “Pay-for-Slay” payments from the PA-PLO, as noted above and evidenced by the orders issued by the Minister of Defense, to date only two proceedings based on the law to strip these terrorists of Israeli status have been initiated.²⁹

During Knesset committee discussions on the law, the ISA clearly stated that it would have a significant deterrent effect. Failure to implement the law therefore diminishes Israel’s deterrent potential. Broader use of the law would have an unequivocal influence, both in preventing terror – which would no longer be incentivized and rewarded – and in cutting the PA-PLO connection to the Israeli Arabs, maintained, inter alia, through the “Pay-for-Slay” payments.  

6. Third Party Actions

While combating “Pay-for-Slay” is, naturally, first and foremost an Israeli imperative, it is also an imperative for any moral, peace-seeking country that objects to promoting, incentivizing, and rewarding participation in terror, including the murder of Jews.

a. The countries that imposed sanctions on Israel

In recent weeks, in a move led by the UK, several countries decided to impose sanctions on Israeli interests in Judea and Samaria. Shrouding their wider intention, the countries framed the decision as one designed to punish actions that pose an obstacle to the so-called “Two State Solution” – a.k.a. the Two State Delusion.

The catalyst, so it was argued, was the progression of a tender to build a few hundred Jewish homes in Judea and Samaria. According to the countries imposing the sanctions, Jews building homes in Judea and Samaria, even in Area C under full Israeli control, would be completely detrimental to the realization of their desired political solution.

Since it is inconceivable to argue that Jews building homes in their ancestral homeland, in an area allocated by the international community for the establishment of the Jewish state,³⁰ is more prejudicial to the Two State Solution than an entrenched multi-billion dollar/pound sterling/Euro policy to promote, incentivize and reward terror, including paying cash rewards to Palestinian terrorists simply for murdering Jews, it would follow that these countries would also be biting at the bit to impose sanctions on the PA-PLO.

To avoid being permanently branded as the hypocrites³¹ they appear to be, every country that decided to impose sanctions on Israel should be urged to impose sanctions on the PA-PLO, specifically recognizing that the PA-PLO’s “Pay-for-Slay” policy is a substantial obstacle to peace and one of the most significant impediments to the realization of the Two State Delusion.

b. The United States – Executive Order 13224

In addition, and in parallel with the measures Israel should implement, the U.S. administration should consider using Executive Order 13224 in at least two ways: one focused on the PA-PLO and one focused on the “Pay-for-Slay” recipients.

Enacted on September 23, 2001, Executive Order 13224 “gives the U.S. Government a powerful tool to impede terrorist funding and is part of our national commitment to lead the international effort to bring a halt to the evil of terrorist activity.”³²

Under the powers of EO 13224, the U.S. government can designate both entities and individuals. Once designated, the entities or the individuals are subject to extensive financial restrictions.

Accordingly, the first potential use of the EO could be to implement the finding of Congress, as part of the Taylor Force Act, 2018,³³ that the PA-PLO “Pay-for-Slay” payments are an “incentive to commit acts of terror,” and designate the PA-PLO as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The designation would take into account not only the fact that the “Pay-for-Slay” payments promote, incentivize, and reward terror in general, but also the fact that many of the recipients of the PA-PLO terror reward payments are responsible for the murder not only of thousands of Israelis, but also many U.S. citizens.

In theory, the designation should be made as regards the PA-PLO in their entirety. However, if political considerations cloud what should otherwise be a clear moral decision, the designation could refer to certain PA-PLO organizations, branches, or individuals, as discussed above.

In addition to the institutional focus on the PA-PLO, the second potential usage of EO 13324 would be a focus on the “Pay-for-Slay” recipients.

Using the provisions of EO 13324, the U.S. government has designated³⁴ hundreds of organizations linked to terror and hundreds of individual terrorists. These designations have included, over the years, many Palestinian terrorists.

Following the call of Congress in the Taylor Force Act, which required “Palestinian Authority, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and any successor or affiliated organizations to stop payments for acts of terrorism by individuals who are imprisoned after being fairly tried and convicted for acts of terrorism,” in theory, the use of EO 13324 could be expanded to include every person convicted by Israel – whether in the domestic or military courts (Judea and Samaria) – who receives a “Pay-for-Slay” payment.

Implementation of this recommendation would require extensive information sharing between Israel and the U.S. and would potentially lead to the designation of tens of thousands of additional terrorists.

Until the details of the comprehensive approach are completed, this recommendation could be implemented incrementally, starting with the terrorists convicted of murder and attempted murder. Within that category, special attention could be devoted to the terrorists convicted of murdering U.S. citizens, beginning with those prematurely released as part of the deal to secure the release of the hostage kidnapped during the October 7 massacre and the deal to free Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Since the list of terrorists convicted for the murder of U.S. citizens is long, the following terrorists³⁵ are a small sample of terrorists convicted of murdering U.S. citizens, all of whom received and continue to receive “Pay-for-Slay” payments:

Ahlam Tamimi – Tamimi was convicted for her substantial part in the August 2001 bombing of the Sbarro pizza shop in downtown Jerusalem in which 16 people were murdered, half of them children, and dozens injured. Those victims included, among others, U.S. citizen Malki Roth, who was 15 when she was murdered. Tamimi was released in 2011 as part of the Shalit deal and expelled to Jordan. Despite being on the FBI’s most wanted list,³⁶ despite having been indicted by the U.S. authorities,³⁷ and despite a pending U.S. request to Jordan to extradite³⁸ her, Tamimi remains free, living in Jordan. It is estimated³⁹ that Tamimi has been paid hundreds of thousands of NIS/USD by the PA-PLO and continues to receive “Pay-for-Slay” payments.

Khalil Jabarin – Jabarin was convicted for the 2018 murder of U.S. citizen Ari Fuld. Despite being sentenced to life in prison, Jabarin was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gaza terrorists. Jabarin was last located in Turkey.

Iham Tzabakh – Tzabakh was convicted for the 2016 murder of U.S. citizen Tuvia Weisman. Tzabakh was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Amr Taha – Taha was convicted for the 2016 murder of U.S. citizen Tuvia Weisman. Taha was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Bilal Abu Ghanem – Abu Ghanem was convicted for the murder, among others, of U.S. Citizen Richard Lakin. Abu Ghanem was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Zeid Amr – Amr was convicted for the 2015 murder of U.S. citizen Na’ama Henkin and her husband Eitam. Amr was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Rajeb Aliwa – Aliwa was convicted for the 2015 murder of U.S. citizen Na’ama Henkin and her husband Eitam. Aliwa was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Wael El-Arja – El-Arja was convicted for the 2011 murder of U.S. citizens Asher Palmer and his infant child, Yonatan. El-Arja was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

Ali Sa’ada – Sa’ada was convicted for the 2011 murder of U.S. citizens Asher Palmer and his infant child, Yonatan. Sa’ada was released in January 2025 as part of a deal to secure the release of hostages held by the Gazan terrorists.

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Notes