Negotiations with terrorist organizations often follow a structured methodology in specific stages. These include collecting intelligence for negotiations with the terrorists (their ideology, demands, status, “red lines”), preparing the negotiating team (with experts from various disciplines), developing the strategy, setting clear boundaries while maintaining flexibility, risk and contingency planning, involving a “neutral” third party, securing commitments, and conducting a situation assessment.
As part of setting the strategy, the negotiators take into account different factors such as military achievements on the ground, psychological warfare, and the like.
The current negotiation is between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. In the Iranian perspective, however, it is between the “resistance axis” led by Iran, on the one hand, and Netanyahu. Or at the very least, the Iranians are partners in it. This is evident from statements by senior Iranian and Hizbullah officials, who make an equation between the progress of the negotiations and the intensity of their response. For both Sinwar and the Iranians, the task is to end the war, preserve Hamas’s rule, and ensure its recovery.
Sinwar’s behavior in the negotiations so far, such as sending a delegation that “listens” but does not participate, not responding to proposals, and hardening positions, is part of a stalling strategy. The resistance axis and Iran are attempting to end the war in Gaza without a deal. In light of failures, including Iran’s thwarted attack in April and Hizbullah’s inability to avenge the assassination of its military chief, the current campaign is aimed at influencing public opinion and wearing down political will in Israel.
Iran seeks to put pressure on Netanyahu, and analysts connected to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assess his potential pressure points:
- In the psychological sphere, they view disagreements in the negotiations over issues such as the release of Palestinian prisoners, the Philadelphi corridor, and the Netzarim corridor as pressure points that can potentially create a wedge against Egypt and the United States.
- In the military sphere, the ongoing war of attrition in Gaza with its continued casualties, combined with the anticipation of an Iranian-Houthi response to Israeli actions, keeps the Israeli military on high alert for extended periods. New kinds of strikes from the West Bank, including suicide attacks and car bombings, alongside continued rocket fire from the north, further increase the military pressure and create a sense of vulnerability in Israel.
The Iranians view Netanyahu as a master at extricating himself from crises, especially to ensure his political survival. Analysts warn of a combination of strategies to achieve his ends. They believe Netanyahu may harden his negotiating stance on issues like prisoner releases and the Netzarim corridor. They also fear that he will offer concessions to shift the blame for the talks’ failure to Hamas. For instance, he might agree to a temporary ceasefire while expanding the conflict in the region.
In light of these concerns, the Iranian analysts recommend intensifying the cognitive warfare campaign, using public opinion in a country under attack as a weapon against it. Iran already made successful use of a similar strategy during the student protests in the United States, where the strategy involved turning the protesters against the U.S. itself.
In the Iranian strategic outlook, the victory of the Palestinian struggle is a victory in the war, not just in a battle. The aim is to undermine Israel’s political will so that it will alter its behavior and cease to fight. Iranian analysts claim that, in the wake of the horrific murder of the six kidnapped individuals, Israeli public sentiment can be exploited against the government in a way that weakens the Israeli security establishment’s will to continue the war in Gaza.
On the regional level, such a victory would affect Israel’s relations with Egypt, particularly after the revelation of the dozens of arms-smuggling tunnels leading from Egypt into Gaza. It would significantly boost Hamas in the West Bank and affect the stability of Jordan, where Iran is exerting its influence. It would also affect Israel’s relations with Prince Salman of Saudi Arabia and the prospects of formalizing Israeli-Saudi ties, all of which is subject to the U.S. elections.
A document found in the tunnel where Hamas leaders were taking refuge includes instructions to intensify the psychological warfare against the Israeli public by disseminating videos of hostages, directing pressure at Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, targeting the narrative that military operations will free the hostages, and continuing to aim accusations at Netanyahu. This deliberate approach aligns with the concept of psychological warfare against Israel that was already held by IRGC-connected analysts as early as December 2023.
The Iranian effort to turn the Israeli population against the government reflects careful observation of the enemy’s strategies. The Iranians believe Israel employed a similar psychological warfare approach to mobilize Iranian protesters following the killing of Mahsa Amini in summer 2022.
* The author thanks Avraham M. of the Iran Desk at the Jerusalem Center for his assistance with this article.
