Summary
The agreement outlines a roadmap for ending hostilities through phased security measures and restoring the Lebanese state’s monopoly on the use of force. However, immediate rejection by key armed and political factions raises serious doubts about whether it can be implemented. Lebanon’s leadership lacks the military and political capacity to enforce the required measures without risking internal conflict. As a result, the framework presents a clear diplomatic vision but lacks a credible path to achieving it peacefully.
Key Takeaways
- The agreement establishes a phased plan for ending the conflict, linking an Israeli military withdrawal to the disarmament of non-state armed groups, but its success depends on cooperation from actors that have already rejected it.
- Lebanon’s government and armed forces face a difficult dilemma because enforcing state control over armed groups could trigger internal violence, deepen sectarian divisions, and risk civil war.
- Without an effective way to overcome political and military resistance while preserving Lebanon’s stability, the agreement is likely to remain an aspirational diplomatic framework rather than a practical solution.
The Trilateral Framework Agreement, signed on June 26, 2026, in Washington, D.C., establishes a phased process to end the state of war and coordinate an Israeli military withdrawal alongside the disarmament of non-state armed groups. In practical terms, this means the eventual disarmament of Hizbullah, even though the organization is never mentioned by name. There is no doubt that the agreement is a major diplomatic achievement. However, its real-world viability faces an immediate and potentially existential challenge.
The contrast between the ceremonial optimism in Washington and the military reality on the ground underscores the high-stakes gamble undertaken by all parties. The situation became even more volatile when Hizbullah swiftly rejected the agreement, followed by several Lebanese political factions that declared their opposition and warned of renewed domestic conflict. The starkest warning came from Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and leader of Amal, Lebanon’s second-largest Shiite militia, who declared that Lebanon is now on the brink of civil war.
The framework’s fundamental weakness is that it relies on a sequential process that its primary target, Hizbullah, has already rejected. Within minutes of the signing ceremony, Hizbullah MP Hassan Fadlallah dismissed the agreement, declaring that the organization would oppose its implementation and “hold more firmly to its weapons.” In effect, the agreement requires the Lebanese government to enforce a policy against a heavily armed organization that is deeply embedded within the Lebanese state itself. Under the agreement, Israel will withdraw its forces from the southern security zone only after the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) verify that Hizbullah and other non-state armed groups have been disarmed and that their military infrastructure has been dismantled.
President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and their political allies fully understand the risks. While they seek to restore the state’s sovereign authority as envisioned in the agreement, they lack both the military capability and the political capital necessary to impose it without risking national collapse. The warnings that the agreement could trigger civil war reflect Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance. For the LAF to implement Point 4 of the agreement—the state’s exclusive monopoly on the use of force—and dismantle Hizbullah’s military infrastructure would require it to engage in a direct and bloody internal confrontation. Ordering the army to forcibly disarm Hizbullah could fracture its ranks along sectarian lines, precisely the dynamic that ignited the Lebanese Civil War in 1975.
Faced with what Hizbullah views as a humiliating strategic setback, all bridges between President Aoun and the Shiite “duo”—Hizbullah and Amal—appear to have been severed. Hizbullah is likely to seek first to topple the government by compelling Shiite ministers to resign. At the same time, it may intensify attacks against Israeli forces operating within the southern security zone, and possibly beyond, in an effort to provoke a large-scale Israeli military response. Such an escalation could pressure Washington to restrain Israel out of concern that wider fighting would jeopardize the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding, ultimately forcing Israel to withdraw from its current positions in southern Lebanon.
As Secretary of State Marco Rubio observed, the Washington agreement represents “the beginning of the beginning.” It outlines an ideal postwar vision but provides no credible mechanism for implementation that avoids plunging Lebanon into internal conflict. Unless the international community can find a way to neutralize Hizbullah’s political and military veto without fracturing the Lebanese state, the agreement’s 14 points are likely to remain a diplomatic blueprint rather than an operational reality.
