On January 9, 2025, General Joseph Aoun was elected as the 14th President of Lebanon, which marks the end of nearly three years of efforts by the two Shiite organizations, Amal and Hizbullah, to promote their preferred candidate, Suleiman Frangieh, at the cost of paralyzing Lebanon’s political system.
Four days later, Judge Nawaf Salam, president of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, was elected as Lebanon’s prime minister by a majority vote—contrary to the stance of Amal and Hizbullah, who sought to extend the tenure of caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati. In response, Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Shiite Amal movement, stated, “This is not what we agreed upon.”
Both organizations attempted to create the impression that Aoun owed them his presidency. During the first round of voting in Parliament, Shiite representatives cast blank ballots. They used the break announced by Berri to meet with Aoun before joining the second round of voting, in which he received 99 votes.
Subsequently, Lebanese media reported that the Ministry of Finance would be allocated to a Shiite representative in the new government in exchange for Shiite support from both organizations.
When they realized they could not secure the election of their candidate, Mikati, Berri, and Hizbullah representatives in Parliament chose not to vote for any candidate for prime minister. The offended Shiite bloc expressed resentment over the election outcome, hinting at possible retaliatory measures without elaborating—further heightening sectarian tensions in Lebanon.
This marks Hizbullah’s fourth major setback since it declared its support for Hamas, further demonstrating the organization’s weakening position. Moreover, significant changes seem to be occurring within Lebanon’s Shiite community and Hizbullah itself.
Hizbullah’s Miscalculations
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Misjudging Israel:
Former Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who considered himself the ultimate authority on Israel, assumed that the war-torn and weakened state would not dare confront Hizbullah. This miscalculation cost him his life, along with the lives of most of Hizbullah’s senior leadership. It also led to an unprecedented agreement for a ceasefire, brokered by Hizbullah’s “big brother,” Berri.
Hizbullah had hoped Israel would be drawn into southern Lebanon and fall into its planned trap. Instead, Israel focused on dismantling Hizbullah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, taking advantage of the strategic surprise of disrupting Hizbullah’s communications systems, which crippled its leadership. Hizbullah had not anticipated the depth of Israel’s intelligence infiltration—and paid a heavy price.
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Syria’s Regime Collapse:
No one, including Hizbullah, expected Bashar al-Assad’s regime to fall within 11 days, only to be replaced by a government hostile to Iran and Hizbullah. The fall of the Alawite regime severed Hizbullah’s physical connection to Iran, cutting off a critical supply line and ending Hizbullah’s military presence in Syria, which had served as a weapons storage facility and a site for producing precision-guided munitions.
The Presidential Battle in Lebanon
Hizbullah was caught off guard when Frangieh withdrew his candidacy just 24 hours before the vote. Left without an alternative, the two Shiite organizations were forced to support a candidate backed by the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—all of whom are not allies of Hizbullah.
What Will Hizbullah Do Next?
The statements of Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, clearly show that Hizbullah does not intend to abandon its mission. The group is waiting to see Israel’s next steps after the 60-day ceasefire period ends.
If Israel remains in Lebanese territory without the approval of the Lebanese government, Hizbullah may adopt the same strategy it used before the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000—launching a guerrilla war against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Hizbullah will argue that since the Lebanese army is unable to fight Israel, the “resistance” must take on the task.
However, the organization seems to ignore the fact that under current circumstances, Israel will not cease its military operations across Lebanon.
This sentiment was reflected in a heated meeting between Hizbullah’s liaison to the Lebanese Army, Wafiq Safa, and Aoun. During the meeting, Safa attempted to persuade Aoun to accept several of Hizbullah’s symbolic positions while allowing the organization to maintain control over its facilities and weapons depots. However, Aoun refused.
At this stage, Hizbullah and Amal’s grip on Lebanon’s political system has weakened significantly. Their strategy could involve non-cooperation with Lebanese government institutions—even to the point of sabotaging critical reforms necessary for the country’s recovery.
Furthermore, if, as stated by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon as per the ceasefire agreement, it would serve as further proof of the “resistance’s” irrelevance and mark the beginning of Hizbullah’s decline as an independent force outside Iran’s control—the biggest loser in the war between Israel and Hizbullah.
