From “The Iron Wall” to “Peace Through Strength”

Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener

Executive Summary

We look at the evolution of Israel’s security doctrine from Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” concept to the contemporary “peace through strength” approach advanced by Prime Minister Netanyahu. Jabotinsky’s central premise, that lasting peace requires unquestionable military strength, became the foundation of Israel’s defense strategy, later formalized by Ben-Gurion into the principles of deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. Over time, as Israel faced shifting threats, from conventional armies to asymmetric actors like Hamas and Hizbullah, the doctrine evolved toward containment and defense, notably under the Meridor Committee’s 2000s reforms.

The October 7 attacks marked a turning point, exposing the weaknesses of containment and prompting a strategic shift back to decisive victory. Israel’s current approach emphasizes dismantling enemy capabilities, sustained enforcement to prevent rearmament, and greater self-reliance in defense production to ensure long-term security sustainability. Israel’s future stability depends on combining military strength, economic and technological development, and strategic diplomacy, continuing Jabotinsky’s vision of peace built on strength and deterrence.

Background

Israel’s security concept grew out of Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” logic: the need for an “iron wall,” a strong Jewish military force that would prove to the Arab inhabitants of the land that any attempt to uproot Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel was doomed to fail. Only then, Jabotinsky argued, would pragmatic elements gain strength and political agreements and durable compromises become possible. A hundred years on, it is striking how closely this resembles the principle of “peace through strength” that Israel and the United States now seek to advance in the region.

The Iron Wall concept was adapted by David Ben-Gurion and served as the basis for Israel’s security doctrine in its early decades, later distilled into the principles of early warning, deterrence, and decisive victory. For much of Israel’s history, however, substantive debate over a security concept, as the starting point for military thinking and doctrinal development, was sorely lacking. Despite the major changes after the Six-Day War, when Israel’s borders expanded and strategic depth was gained, the security concept, built in part on the absence of strategic depth, was not revised.

This remained the case in the early 1980s with the peace treaty with Egypt and growing focus on the Palestinian issue. Other major events later affected national security as well: the Lebanon War, the First Intifada in 1987, the Oslo Accords in 1993, and another peace treaty with a key Arab state, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in 1994. Beyond the Palestinian issue and peace arrangements, another significant shift greatly affected Israel: the growing threat to Israel’s home front from missiles and rockets. This intensified with rocket fire from Lebanon and became palpable to every Israeli during the 1991 Gulf War. Yet, despite these changes, which were certainly impactful on the security concept, no orderly process was undertaken at the time to review and update it.

A significant attempt to update the security concept was undertaken by the Meridor Committee in the early 2000s. The “Committee for a Re-examination of Israel’s National Security Concept” operated from 2003 to 2006 and, for the first time, proposed substantive changes to Ben-Gurion’s concept, foremost among them the addition of a fourth pillar: defense. Another central change in the committee’s conclusions was the shift from a decisive victory concept, one of Ben-Gurion’s three pillars, to a containment concept. Although the committee’s conclusions were not formally ratified as binding policy, its recommendations, especially the emphasis on defense as a foundational element, percolated deeply into Israel’s security establishment and influenced its actions.

This approach accompanied Israel through the 2000s, including the first phase of the Second Intifada, at least until Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002. It was highlighted by the withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and even more so by the 2005 Gaza disengagement, including the pullout from the Philadelphi Corridor, the main route for smuggling weapons and explosives into the Strip.

In August 2018, Prime Minister Netanyahu presented a security concept he had formulated.¹ The document emphasized the Iranian threat as existential, underscored the need to build economic and technological strength as foundations for military and diplomatic power, and elaborated on the “campaign between wars” (Mabam) doctrine—continuous strikes on enemy capabilities to curb their build-up and delay readiness for war, aiming to prevent wars or at least lengthen the intervals between them. This was a clear example of the Meridor containment approach taking precedence over Ben-Gurion’s decisive victory.²

The Need to Update the Security Concept

The events of October 7 brought the containment concept to an end. Prime Minister Netanyahu understood this from the first days and, already on October 8, while terrorists from Gaza were still inside Israel, spoke of changing the face of the Middle East. Indeed, in the months since that terrible day, Israel has operated in line with Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall doctrine: mobilizing national resources to defeat the threat, leveraging the Air Force’s relative advantage and moving to ground maneuver on enemy territory, seeking cooperation with the United States where possible, particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump took office, and strengthening home-front resilience for wartime conditions.³

Israel struck Hamas, dealt major blows to Hizbullah, contributed indirectly to the fall of the Assad regime, destroyed most of the Syrian army’s capabilities, and ultimately hit Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs hard. Following these achievements, especially the impressive strike in Iran, voices are now being heard about regional peace agreements akin to the Abraham Accords. States seek alliances with Israel, the rising regional power and America’s leading partner under President Trump.

This is an opportunity to revive Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall. As he argued, only a strong Jewish military force that deters the Arabs and proves that removing the national home is impossible will open the way to durable agreements and compromises. Led by Netanyahu, who at times cites the Iron Wall as a formative text, Israel now stands at a historic juncture that allows it to maximize the military gains of the past two years and translate them into diplomatic achievements and improved security reality.

A Return to Decisive Victory

To shape the security environment, and thereby Israel’s diplomatic clout, for years to come, Israel must first and foremost return to a decisive-victory concept, focused on dismantling enemy capabilities rather than periodic deterrent operations. This has become essential in the “War of Revival” war, given threats from Hamas in Gaza, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Iranian infrastructures in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and Iran’s ballistic-missile and nuclear programs.

The broad ground operation in Gaza—seizing territory, destroying tunnels and above-ground infrastructure, and eliminating senior Hamas figures—reflected the need for a decisive defeat to destroy the organization’s military capabilities and prevent similar future attacks. The decisive-victory approach is needed to ensure that groups like Hamas cannot rebuild their strength.

In Lebanon, the fight against Hizbullah showed that offensive action can destroy extensive capabilities and target its leaders. Years of focused airstrikes in Syria as part of the Mabam doctrine, interdicting Iranian arms shipments to Hizbullah, such as SAMs and precision munitions, demonstrated that preemption alone is insufficient. Defeating Hizbullah required neutralizing its infrastructure, striking its fighters and senior operatives (e.g., the pagers and radios operation), destroying weapons depots and headquarters, and targeting the organization’s leadership (including Nasrallah), all to deprive it of offensive capacity and force long recovery cycles. These blows also weakened Hizbullah’s standing within Lebanon, which, now backed by the U.S., seeks to dismantle its military capabilities.

The securing of a security zone in southern Syria and around Mount Hermon, and the destruction of most of the Syrian army’s capabilities within days of Assad’s fall, likewise reflected a shift to the decisive approach. Finally, striking Iran’s nuclear facilities and long-range missile array places Israel’s security doctrine in a new era.

This return to decisive victory also stems from Israeli public pressure for strategic change after the failure of containment exposed on October 7, and from the understanding that confronting the Iranian-led radical axis requires firm action. A decisive-victory concept, paired with diplomacy (“peace through strength”), is essential for Israel’s security against states and organizations alike, and this is the path Israel is now taking.

The Need for Enforcement

The required shift in the security concept also concerns sustaining decisive outcomes through enforcement. Having dealt a heavy blow to Hizbullah and hit Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, Israel must maintain its gains by preventing rearmament and renewed threat-building. Hence, the ongoing series of strikes in Lebanon, even after a ceasefire, Israel acts on intelligence to block Hizbullah’s attempts to recover.

We see similar IDF activity in Syria, aimed at stripping residual Syrian army capabilities, hitting terrorist actors attempting to threaten Israel, and thwarting Iranian entrenchment. An example of enforcement was the July 2025 IDF action in Syria to block regime forces from moving south of Damascus and to assist the Druze in as-Suwayda on Jabal al-Druze, preventing harm to them.

After the painful blow Iran suffered in “Operation Rising Lion,” Israel will likely soon face the need to prevent the ayatollahs’ regime from rebuilding its nuclear program and missile project.

Enforcement aims not only to preempt attacks on Israel but also to block adversary strategic force-building, using a variety of tools alongside military ones: economic, legal, and diplomatic.⁴ As shaped after the war in Lebanon, enforcement requires close cooperation with the United States to ensure international legitimacy and secure backing for wide-ranging enforcement operations—as is already the case in Lebanon and Syria. It also requires continuous intelligence hold across multiple arenas and preservation of Israel’s operational freedom of action throughout the Middle East.

This is the most significant change relative to Ben-Gurion’s concept. Whereas Ben-Gurion favored rapid decision, given limited territorial and manpower depth, today, after a swift decision, an enforcement phase is needed to preserve the military gains.

Security Sustainability

Shortages of munitions and spare parts that hindered the IDF during the war (especially under the Biden administration) showed how dependent Israel is on others to execute its security policy. They underscore the need to develop indigenous procurement, development, production, and acquisition capacity so that Israel can carry out almost any military plan it deems necessary in line with its security interests, while recognizing that absolute autonomy is unattainable.

Israel should strive for security sustainability (defense self-sufficiency, especially in weapons and munitions): diversify procurement and produce domestically as much critical ordnance and as many platforms as possible. To overcome dependence on the U.S., Israel should examine alternative sources for ammunition, weapons, and advanced systems, in addition to or in place of U.S. procurements, and in line with the additional needs of an expanded force structure. Procurement of critical systems should be distributed among several countries wherever possible. Israel should also build partnerships with other states with similar interests to bolster security sustainability.⁵

Accordingly, to ensure security sustainability, Israel should work to reduce its dependence on the United States as much as possible, including gradually curtailing and ultimately ending U.S. military aid, while investing in and expanding Israel’s defense industrial base. Israel must also re-examine and redefine its reference threat scenarios and required stockpile days to maintain adequate inventories for protracted war and emergencies.⁶

Conclusion

The evolution of Israel’s security concept reflects changes in the strategic reality in which it operates. Ben-Gurion’s era focused on rapid decision against regular armies; today, Israel faces more complex threats, including terror and cyber. Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall still influences Israeli policy, but has undergone significant adaptations. Notably, the peace treaty with Egypt, and to a lesser degree with Jordan, actually reflected Iron Wall logic toward them: even if they did not embrace the legitimacy of a Jewish state, they came to understand that removing it was not feasible in the foreseeable future and that dedicating most national resources to that goal was irrational. Israel’s achievements over the past year seem to signal to Egypt that it is wise to adhere to peace as a strategic choice.

The “Iron Wall” includes not only a military capable of striking the enemy, but also advanced defense systems, technology, intelligence, diplomacy, and social cohesion. To Jabotinsky’s original idea must be added the economic and technological capacity to develop advanced weapons and intelligence, and to maintain a powerful, modern defensive force.

The shift from decisive victory to defense and containment reflected, in part, the assessment that fully defeating non-state actors is difficult. The “quiet will be met with quiet” policy dominant in Gaza before 2023 showed its limits, especially on October 7, since it allowed Hamas to rebuild between rounds and plan a major blow against Israel. The “War of Revival” marked a partial return to decisive victory, while highlighting the need to update Israel’s security concept and adapt it to present realities.

The move from action against intentions to action against capability-building reflects recognition that preventing enemy armament is more effective than waiting for intentions to mature into offensive capacity. Strikes in Syria and Gaza aimed at terror infrastructure have shown this approach can reduce threats over time; implementing it requires precise intelligence and advanced technologies.

Israel’s security concept has thus evolved from an offensive doctrine centered on decision at the end of each round to a framework that integrates defense, containment, and prevention. The Iron Wall remains the conceptual foundation, but must be adapted to Israel’s current challenges. The “War of Revival” shows that despite technological and military advances, full decision over non-state actors remains a major challenge. Going forward, Israel’s security concept will require continued investment in technology, a stable economy, intelligence, and diplomacy, while upholding the foundational principles of warning, deterrence, and defense—alongside alliances and agreements near and far. This is the “peace through strength” cited by Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump: a peace that will secure Israel’s resilience and prosperity and strengthen its regional and international standing.

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Notes