Executive Summary
The Israel–Egypt peace treaty, a nearly five-decade pillar of regional stability, has endured upheaval following the 2023 Gaza war. It allows Israel to redirect its security and diplomatic focus and enables limited cooperation with Egypt on counterterrorism and regional energy.
However, the peace remains largely “cold.” Deep Egyptian hostility toward Israel persists, and Cairo’s diplomatic actions—especially on the Palestinian issue—often run counter to Israeli interests. Meanwhile, Egypt’s massive military expansion is increasingly sourced from China and other powers, and its warming ties with Turkey also raise concerns about its long-term strategic orientation.
For Israel, Egypt’s growing capabilities do not yet signal aggression. Still, they require inclusion in future defense planning. Israel must balance deterrence and preparedness with diplomacy and reassurance. This approach avoids fueling mutual suspicions. Sustaining peace will require preserving U.S. involvement, leveraging regional partners like the UAE, and maintaining open political channels with Cairo. These steps are vital amid shifting regional dynamics.
The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt is a pillar of Israel’s security concept and remains in force nearly two generations after its signing. It enables Israel, which was Egypt’s principal adversary during its first 30 years, to redirect its security and national resources elsewhere. Over the past decade, Israel has provided security assistance to Egypt in its campaign against ISIS in Sinai. Israel has also partnered with Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus to establish a regional energy framework in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus far, the peace treaty has withstood even the severe test posed by the war, as reflected in Egyptian public opinion. Egyptian leadership continues to state, despite hostile voices at home and in Israel, that peace is Egypt’s strategic choice.
That said, it is a “cold” peace, with almost no people-to-people contact. Economic anchors are limited to energy supply and Egyptian exports to the U.S. under the QIZ framework. Meanwhile, worrying signs are accumulating regarding the future of the relationship. Diplomatically, Egypt is leading problematic initiatives on the Palestinian issue, and its Foreign Ministry still seeks ways to censure Israel over its alleged capabilities, shifting the arena from the IAEA board to the UN General Assembly. Popular hostility in Egypt, especially among elites, is deep and has intensified under the shadow of the suffering in Gaza.
The Egyptian military now consists of 13 divisions and 3 internal security divisions. Its air and naval forces are powerful, with over 400 fighter aircraft. These forces are trained and equipped with a focus on what they call “the small state in the northeast.” Military deployment and infrastructure in Sinai are steadily increasing, sometimes with Israel’s consent, even when these changes do not always fit the treaty’s military annex. For now, these changes do not seem to have an offensive purpose. American assistance remains important for Egypt and shapes its military thinking. Still, Egypt is increasingly turning to other suppliers, especially China, for weapons. Another concern is Egypt’s improving relationship with Turkey. In the past, Turkish leader Erdoğan’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood isolated Egypt and led to shared worries with Israel and Greece about Turkey’s intentions. Recently, Egypt’s economic troubles and tensions with Ethiopia have drawn it closer to Turkey, reducing trust with its former regional partners.
Because Israel is facing tough battles on other fronts, these developments create new strategic challenges. Even if warnings about Egypt seem premature, Israel must prepare for possible changes. Egypt is focused on its own problems, such as the Ethiopian dam, instability in Libya, and the threat of economic collapse. Still, Israel cannot ignore Egypt’s growing military strength when planning its own defense forces. Israel needs to maintain its qualitative advantage, with a significant, multi-branch military that relies in part on American support. This will help ensure long-term deterrence and readiness in the face of unexpected shifts in Egypt’s policies. At the same time, Israel should be proactive in how it builds its military, so as not to increase Egyptian suspicions or trigger a military buildup in response. For these reasons, open political communication with Egypt and cooperation with American and regional partners remain essential.
The Peace Treaty’s Resilience Was Tested…
More than twenty months after October 7, 2023, the peace treaty with Egypt has held up well. It has survived the most severe test ever, far harsher than earlier episodes like the 1981 strike in Iraq, the 1982 Lebanon War, the 1987 intifada, the “escalation and lull” from fall 2000, and four rounds of fighting with Hamas in Gaza (2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021). The suffering and destruction in Gaza during the current war have left a powerful imprint on Egyptian public consciousness. They have further fueled deep hostility among professional and academic elites in Egypt. IDF operations in the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah area posed a real risk of direct friction with Egypt, and there were incidents with casualties. The potential for escalation was significant, yet it has not materialized so far.
Also, Egypt put itself, both as a partner and a rival to Qatar (which does not get along with Sisi’s government because of support for the Muslim Brotherhood), as a main go-between in talks to free hostages. Egypt also wants to play an important role in planning for what happens next, as the natural way for people and goods to enter for future rebuilding. In earlier problems with Hamas, Israel pushed for Egypt—not Turkey or Qatar—to handle the final steps. Then, now, and in the future, this work means Egypt must keep open lines with Israel.
Since the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Cairo on July 3, 2013, ties between Israel and Egypt have developed in three key areas. These changes go beyond patterns from the Mubarak era.
- Israel helped a lot in the U.S. to stop efforts to punish and cut aid to Egypt after its elected president was removed.
- A terrorist organization entrenched itself in northern Sinai and pledged allegiance to ISIS, becoming the “Sinai Province” of the Islamic State. Intelligence and even operational cooperation with Israel then emerged to aid the Egyptian army. This cooperation has never been officially acknowledged. Press reports, including a detailed New York Times article in 2019, indicated that the IAF, with Egyptian approval and at Egypt’s request, struck terror targets in Sinai.
- The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was established in 2019 and is hosted by Egypt. Israel, Greece, Cyprus, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority participate, with European actors and the U.S. as observers. The forum reflects a shared interest in developing gas and possibly oil resources in the region. Trilateral summits—Egypt–Greece–Cyprus and Israel–Greece–Cyprus—have been held, creating a framework for strategic cooperation, though not merging into a quadrilateral.
Shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean arise partly from concern about Turkey’s ambitions under Erdoğan. Israel sided with Egypt and Greece in their dispute with Turkey over exclusive economic zone boundaries. Turkey claims a corridor linking its waters to those of Libya. The UAE took a similar stance and was among the main actors who supported the anti-MB movement in 2013. Egypt’s reaction to the 2020 Abraham Accords was positive, a big change from earlier hostility to normalization. Egypt’s dependence on the UAE also helps the peace treaty’s resilience.
Even if Egyptian public discourse remains extremely hostile toward Israel, the regime has a strong interest in avoiding a flare-up, if only because more urgent matters dominate the agenda: the dispute with Ethiopia over filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile; devastating civil wars in Sudan and Libya; and, above all, feeding roughly 110 million people.
…But Worrying Signs Are Accumulating: The Military Dimension
Despite all of the above, especially the last point, namely the disastrous implications for a perpetually near-bankrupt state of reverting to a costly, ruinous conflict of the kind Anwar Sadat inherited from Nasser, there are aspects of Egyptian behavior, in force build-up and deployment as well as in diplomacy, that raise concerns about the future of the peace treaty and Egypt’s long-term intentions toward Israel. In Israel’s research and public discourse, there are voices that amplify these aspects to the point of “warning” that deterioration to crisis (or even a surprise attack) is imminent; even if that is, at this stage, an unfounded fear, it would be unwise to ignore the gathering clouds.
The most troubling sign concerns both the scale of Egypt’s force build-up and the growing diversification of its sources for advanced weapons. In July 2025, the U.S. administration announced its intention to sell Egypt advanced air-defense systems on a wide scale—about $4.67 billion. A significant portion of Egypt’s military, especially the ground forces (Abrams tanks and APCs) and air force (F-16s and Apache helicopters), continues to rely on U.S. follow-on support within the longstanding $1.3 billion annual aid package. The Egyptian military today has 13 divisions (4 armored, the rest mechanized), plus three internal-security divisions and special-forces formations; over 3,800 tanks, more than a quarter American M1A Abrams; and an air force with over 400 fighter aircraft, more than half F-16s.
In recent years, however, Egypt has increasingly diversified its arms sources, especially for the navy and air force. The Egyptian navy is the largest in the Middle East. The purchase of four German submarines already caused a stir in Israel. The navy has also acquired four German, two Italian, one French, and six American frigates. In addition to a French helicopter carrier, Egypt is acquiring two from Russia, which seeks to preserve its influence and partnership with Egypt in regional policy, particularly in Libya.
Even more dramatic are implications of air-force procurement: alongside 54 French Rafales (24 bought in 2015, 30 more in 2021), 46 Russian MiG-29s, and a rolling deal for 50 South Korean FA-50 light fighters, China’s importance as an arms supplier (and as an investor and economic backer within the Belt and Road framework, in which Egypt is a strategic anchor) is becoming more prominent. In February 2025, the first advanced J-10CE fighter jets began arriving in Egypt, part of a 40-aircraft deal agreed in summer 2024. Egypt is also purchasing Xi’an Y-20 transport aircraft, with Chinese assistance, building 60 JL-8 trainers, and acquiring advanced Chinese UAVs and HQ-9 air-defense systems (in parallel with U.S. procurement), raising questions about technology exposure.
Moreover, an unprecedented joint air exercise with China in April–May 2025, titled, with pointed bravado toward “young” and “uncultured” America, “Eagles of Civilization 2025,”is a worrying signal regarding Egypt’s strategic orientation. A loosening of the American grip on the future of Egyptian military power could affect how Egypt’s military leadership views the importance of the peace treaty and the “Camp David package.”
Naturally, Egypt’s force build-up, despite the treaty, is benchmarked against Israel as the reference threat. Sudan and Libya pose governance challenges due to internal conditions, but neither justifies acquisitions on this scale; even a clash with Ethiopia is little more than an impractical notion. Still, it is important to distinguish between military-strategic rationales and the political weight of the military establishment, which has effectively ruled Egypt for over seventy years, ousted the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, and for whom military might is both essence and symbol of state hegemony. In this respect, the “Israeli threat” is more pretext than cause—but that does not allay concern that capabilities might one day be translated into intent.
In this context, Egypt’s military presence and infrastructure in Sinai are also significant. Because of the fight against ISIS, Israel in 2015 gave its consent (explicit, renewed from time to time as “agreed activities”) to roughly doubling the permitted Egyptian military presence in Sinai beyond the treaty annex (to over 40,000 from 22,000). Since October 2023, amid concerns about spillover of the fighting and/or population transfer into Sinai, forces have been further reinforced, with battalion-level formations deployed near the border.
However, these are not divisional or corps-level formations with all that entails, and the Egyptian military is neither organized nor designed to fight the IDF’s power in a classic force-on-force framework. For years, it has been aware of its weaknesses in a “meeting engagement” in Sinai, given Israel’s technological superiority, which was newly demonstrated again. Looking ahead, the more troubling element is the scale of investment in dual-use infrastructure—airfields, logistics bases, and transport routes—that could mobilize large forces on order, under air cover, and with a mobile air-defense umbrella.
…And in the Diplomatic Dimension
Concern about Egypt’s intentions, and the meaning of its military build-up and posture, stems first and foremost from the fact that this is a cold peace whose economic anchors are quite limited (gas supply to Egypt and QIZ exports to the U.S.), and that it lacks any real layer of people-to-people relations that might restrain deterioration.
Added to this is Egypt’s diplomatic stance, which, despite the peace treaty, continues to preserve elements of hostility. As a leading actor in the Arab League, it continues to adhere to core demands on the Palestinian issue—statehood within the 1967 lines with Jerusalem as capital—and to promote them internationally.
Regarding Israel’s alleged special capabilities: already in early 1995, when the Oslo process was still in full swing, Egypt brought the multilateral negotiations with Israel to a halt, demanding that Israel accede to the NPT; after several failed efforts in the IAEA plenary in the last decade, Egypt shifted the campaign to the UN arena.
Other questions about the future of relations concern broader aspects of Egyptian regional policy. Despite the ties mentioned above with the Gulf states, chiefly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt has in practice avoided taking a clear stance toward Iran (with which it has maintained foreign-minister-level dialogue in recent years); moreover, it has not assisted in military efforts against Houthi actions in the Red Sea, even though it suffered most economically from reduced traffic in the Suez Canal. Signs of a weakening affiliation with the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, which includes Israel, can therefore be seen.
This weakening is also reflected in the change in Egypt’s relations with Turkey, ideologically aligned with a different camp because of its support, along with Qatar’s, for the Muslim Brotherhood. Relations that were highly strained until a few years ago and, in 2019–20, were on the verge of direct confrontation due to the struggle in Libya between the Tripoli government (defended by Turkish forces) and Khalifa Haftar’s forces in eastern Libya, backed by Egypt, have now warmed. As part of his efforts to cement Turkey’s leading regional role and improve ties with the Gulf states, Erdoğan is seeking to draw Egypt closer and create avenues for cooperation, including military ones. Here, too, a key pillar of shared interest between Sisi’s regime and Israel is eroding.
Should Egypt Be Seen as a Threat? The Dilemma Facing Israel’s Security Planners
The sequence of arrangements that removed Egypt from the circle of war, “step by step,” in Kissinger’s phrase, began immediately after the Yom Kippur War and was completed with the 1979 peace treaty and the 1982 withdrawal from Sinai. For roughly five decades, the transformation in relations with Egypt enabled Israel to redirect its military power and national resources to other missions and purposes, including a significant reduction of defense spending as a share of GDP.
Reassessing how Egypt’s strength is factored into Israel’s security equation, therefore, has far-reaching implications. Egypt is not included in the IDF’s “reference threat,” though in the past, during the annual U.S. talks on the aid framework, Israel occasionally raised the need to take Egypt into account when defining Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), which the U.S. is committed to maintaining. A shift in this basic stance would entail far-reaching changes in force structure, posture, and the defense budget.
Faced with this challenge—and the risks and costs inherent in the two alternatives (on the one hand, maintaining the status quo, devoting only limited resources to the Egyptian front; on the other, a sharp pivot placing Egypt at the center of the IDF’s reference threat)—a middle course seems necessary. In it, elements of Israel’s traditional security concept, and additions since the 1950s, are harnessed to address the risk (not yet a realized threat) posed by Egypt’s military build-up and shifting diplomatic climate:
- Deterrence: The IDF’s capability, especially its long arm, has been demonstrated recently, and carries a deterrent message to Egypt. It is important, primarily through quiet channels, to impress upon Egypt’s military leadership what it already knows: the IDF’s superiority in combined-arms maneuver and meeting engagements in Sinai, and the IAF’s ability, if necessary, to neutralize the Egyptian navy’s numerical edge. At the same time, avoid empty threats that only heighten tension and hostility, such as striking the Aswan Dam, which would entail mass casualties and destruction, and is not Israel’s intent.
- Warning (Intelligence): The worrying, though not yet warning-level, signs should translate into elevating Egypt’s priority in the intelligence community’s collection requirements, with particular attention to OSINT: open-source monitoring of policy in Sinai, the complex relationship with northern Sinai’s tribal elements, infrastructure construction, the Egyptian military’s public profile, and sentiments among the Egyptian leadership.
- Decision (Decisive Capability): In the broad restructuring of IDF force build-up and procurement required by wartime lessons, the risk of deterioration with Egypt should be factored into force design, above all, renewed strengthening of maneuver capabilities. Incorporating the Egyptian factor can help refocus attention on military thinking components Israel has neglected and that have eroded.
- Defense: The Egypt–Israel border’s terrain is not easy to defend against an attacking force (as distinct from the fence’s effectiveness against infiltrators and migrants). October’s lessons point to the need to thicken defensive arrays along potential avenues of approach and to maintain substantial reserves for rapid counter-attack.
- Technological Superiority: Alongside familiar U.S. systems, Egypt is acquiring advanced capabilities from China and others; this calls for Israeli intelligence and industrial efforts to generate counters.
- Strategic Partnership: So long as the U.S. remains Egypt’s principal (though not exclusive) security patron, and the massive air-defense/air package appears designed to preserve that status, Israel should both convey restraining diplomatic messages and secure mitigations for potential impacts on QME.
Alongside these adjustments, diplomatic reassurance is required, informed by the “security dilemma”: Egyptians might interpret Israeli steps as threatening, accelerate their build-up, and further deteriorate the situation. Hence, the need to identify and emphasize shared interests that still exist, and to clarify that Israel has no intention of harming Egypt (or forcing Gaza residents into Sinai) so long as the basics of the peace treaty are respected. The American channel, administration, and Congress alike (and in the past, Egyptians also valued ties with Jewish organizations in the U.S.) can also serve to deliver messages, both to reassure and to signal that certain Egyptian activities, especially infrastructure development in Sinai, are concerning not only to Israel.
Additionally, Egypt’s orientation—toward Israel, toward China globally, and toward Turkey regionally—should concern other actors, including the UAE, whose ties to the U.S. are deep and whose view of Erdoğan remains wary. As a principal investor in the Egyptian economy, including the vast $35-billion Ras al-Khaimah tourism development on the Mediterranean, the UAE holds levers over Egypt that Israel can also benefit from, given the dire regional implications were Israel–Egypt relations to veer onto a dangerous path.
