Executive Summary
The regional balance of power has shifted dramatically following the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of a new Syrian leadership under Ahmad al-Sharaa. Syria’s pivot away from Iran and its outreach to Israel have transformed a former enemy into a potential partner. This realignment has disrupted Iran’s land corridor to Lebanon, weakened Hizbullah, and turned Syria into a strategic buffer separating Israel from Iranian influence.
Israel now benefits from greater strategic depth, an extended defensive frontier, and enhanced early-warning capabilities against threats from the east. Emerging cooperation between Israel and Syria—focused on deterring Iran, stabilizing the border region, and coordinating security measures—offers both nations new opportunities for peace and regional integration. If sustained, this partnership could mark a major step toward reshaping the Middle East’s strategic landscape in Israel’s favor.
The sudden collapse of the Ba’ath regime in Syria, which had been identified with the Alawite Assad dynasty for nearly six decades, has shattered Israel’s long-standing security concept regarding defensible borders with Syria.
Following the Six-Day War and the October 1973 War, the Israeli–Syrian security framework was based on strict adherence to the 1974 disengagement agreement, monitored by UN observation forces (UNDOF and UNTSO). This agreement, which imposed clear limitations on Syrian force deployments facing Israel, was scrupulously observed even during times when Israeli forces clashed with Syrian troops in Lebanon or conducted airstrikes deep within Syrian territory.
True to its strategic doctrine of preventing any existential nuclear threat, Israel destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor built with North Korean assistance in 2007, signaling that it would not tolerate any attempt to endanger its survival or allow any hostile entity to acquire nuclear capabilities threatening the Jewish state.
The Syrian civil war created an entirely new strategic environment. Iran and its proxies intervened to rescue the Assad regime, establishing a continuous military presence in areas adjacent to the Israeli-held Golan Heights. Over the past fourteen years, Israel has worked tirelessly to prevent Iran and its allies from entrenching themselves along the Israeli border. Iranian monitoring stations and Hizbullah observation posts, reinforced by pro-Iranian militias from Afghanistan and Pakistan, took up positions facing Israel. This transformed the local threat into a regional and even global axis of confrontation designed to encircle and ultimately destroy Israel.
In essence, Iran succeeded in constructing a “ring of fire” stretching from Lebanon through Syria and Iraq to Yemen, creating a de facto front line with Israel 1,300 to 1,500 kilometers from Iran’s own borders.
In response, Israel adopted a strategy known by its Hebrew acronym MABAM (“the campaign between wars”), aimed at preventing Iranian and proxy entrenchment in Syria and halting the transfer of strategic weapons from Iran to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Israel carried out hundreds of airstrikes on targets in Syria, achieving only partial success, intercepting perhaps ten percent of weapons shipments, but with Russian mediation, managed to prevent large-scale Iranian deployments near the Golan frontier.
On December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed like a house of cards, replaced by a Sunni jihadist militia that accomplished the unthinkable: the ouster of the entrenched Alawite oligarchy.
Fearing a surprise assault similar to the October 7 attack on its southern front and believing the new Syrian leader to be a reincarnation of ISIS, Israel launched intensive air raids to neutralize remaining Syrian army threats, then advanced ground forces into the buffer zone and deep into the southern Golan plateau, seizing positions on the Syrian side of Mount Hermon overlooking Damascus. To prevent future surprise attacks, Israel began constructing a massive trench as an insurmountable barrier ahead of its new defensive line.
Soon, however, a surprising new tone emerged from Syria’s new ruler, Ahmad al-Sharaa, known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, a former ISIS and al-Nusra member and founder of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Initially viewed with deep suspicion as a disguised jihadist seeking to deceive observers, Al-Sharaa gradually gained legitimacy through consistent peace overtures. His message was clear: Israel should have no doubts about Syria’s peaceful intentions. Syria, he declared, would not serve as a launchpad for attacks on Israel. Instead, Syria and Israel shared a common enemy, Iran, which was conducting subversive operations to topple his regime.
Al-Sharaa’s gestures multiplied. In a striking symbolic act, he presented Israel with the complete archive of Eli Cohen, the legendary Israeli spy executed in Damascus in 1965. He accepted proximity talks with Israel, held in Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, and even within the Golan buffer zone. U.S. President Donald Trump later revealed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had encouraged him to lift sanctions on Syria and appointed Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s National Security Adviser, as liaison with the Syrian leadership.
Under Al-Sharaa’s leadership, Syria began its rehabilitation among nations, leading to a strategic convergence of interests between Israel and Syria, each driven by its own motivations:
- Syria: Israel represented a potential ally capable of deterring Iran and Hizbullah.
- Israel (and Saudi Arabia): Syria’s alignment offered a potential diplomatic bridge to Washington.
- Both sides: Israel’s relationships with the Druze and Kurdish communities, long seen as levers of influence, required careful management to avoid destabilizing Syria.
- Israel: Ensuring that areas east and south of the Golan would remain free of Iranian militias became a top priority, with Syrian cooperation vital to securing this objective.
Rumors soon surfaced about a potential peace treaty between Syria and Israel, possibly following a meeting between Netanyahu and Al-Sharaa during the UN General Assembly next September. More cautious voices spoke instead of a non-belligerence pact, which could include provisions such as:
- From the Syrian side: Israeli withdrawal from territories seized after December 8, cessation of uncoordinated air incursions over Syria, and Israeli recognition of the Shebaa Farms as Syrian (contrary to Hizbullah’s claim that they belong to Lebanon).
- From the Israeli side: Expansion of the buffer zone to include not only the original strip but the entire area south of Damascus to the 1967 border, creating a “sterile zone” guaranteeing full Israeli military and aerial freedom of action and eliminating future threats.
Whether or not such a treaty materializes, one fact is undeniable: Iran’s ambition to establish a direct border with Israel from 1,500 kilometers away has failed. The siege Iran sought to impose around Israel has been broken. In fact, the strategic tables have turned. Syria has become a buffer state between Israel and Iran, severing Tehran’s land corridor to its Lebanese proxy, Hizbullah.
Consequently, Israel’s effective frontier has shifted eastward to the Syrian–Iraqi border, dramatically transforming the regional strategic balance in Israel’s favor.
In this new order, Israel enjoys significantly enhanced early-warning capabilities against threats from Iran and Iraq. Cooperation with Syria could enable the installation of joint early-warning systems, bolstering both nations’ defenses against Iranian subversion. Security collaboration would allow coordinated counterterrorism operations and facilitate the Israeli Air Force’s use of Syrian airspace as a corridor to penetrate Iranian defenses.
Syria’s position as a buffer zone also strengthens Israel’s monitoring of its border with Jordan, which is especially important given Iran’s ambition to ignite unrest along the 300-kilometer Israeli–Jordanian frontier by infiltrating through Syria and Iraq.
Moreover, Syria’s strategic realignment has severely disrupted Iran’s logistical lifeline to Hizbullah. The Lebanese organization now finds itself unable to replenish its arsenal or access the funds once supplied by Tehran, its former patron and lifeline.
In short, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime has opened new avenues that greatly enhance Israel’s ability to defend itself against Iranian threats. Cooperation with Syria has become not merely desirable but imperative. Both nations stand to gain immeasurably from the vast opportunities presented by the emergence of a new Syrian regime.
